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Abstract 
This thesis evaluates a variety of important modern 
approaches to the study of the mind/brain in the light of 
recent developments in the debate about how evidence should 
be used to support a theory and its constituent hypotheses. 
Although all these approaches are ostensibly based upon the 
principles of scientific realism, this evaluation will 
demonstrate that all of them fall well short of these 
requirements. Consequently, the more modern, 
co-evolutionary theories of the mind/brain do not 
constitute the significant advance upon more traditional 
theories that their authors take them to be. 
There are two fundamental elements within my discussion of 
the relationship between evidence and the constituent 
hypotheses of a theory. Firstly, I shall demonstrate that 
the traditional veil-of-perception issue has a wider 
relevance than that which has historically been attributed 
to it, since it is the paradigm case of an attempt to 
construct a two level theory on the basis of evidence tha~ 
does not adequately support either hypothesis. This 
interpretation of the issue can be represented by 
constructing a semantically inconsistent tetrad. It 1S 
shown that similar tetrads can be constructed for each of 
the theories of the mind/brain discussed in this thesis. 
Secondly, I shall argue that the theories discussed all 
employ a variety of the bootstrap strategy. This strategy 
is a relatively recent development in the philosophy of 
science, which suggests a way in which the same evidence 
can be used to generate both a general and a specific 
hypothesis within a theory without violating the 
constraints of scientific realism. However, I contend that 
recent use of this strategy in the investigation of mind is 
largely unsatisfactory as a result of a neglect of 
structural as well as more informal influences upon the 
kinds of evidence employed to support the hypotheses 
contained in the theories. 
The thesis is divided into three major sections. The first 
(Section A) discusses the influence of the motivations of 
the individual theorists upon their arguments and provides 
a critical discussion of the issues of the 
veil-of-perception and bootstrapping. The second section 
(Section B) comprises a detailed examination of a range of 
modern theories of the mind/brain and critically analyses 
their success. The final section (Section C) draws 
together general conclusions and methodological 
consequences of the detailed analysis of the nature of 
realism and evidence in the philosophy of mind. 
Introduction 
Aims of the thesis 
This thesis has four main objectives. My primary a1m 1S to 
compare the more modern, co-evolutionaryl approaches to the 
study of the mind/brain with more traditional theor ies 
based upon conceptual analysis to establish whether the" 
former group really represent the major advance over the 
latter group that their authors take them to be. 
This evaluative task necessarily raises the question of 
appropriate criteria for the comparison of such disparate 
theories. I shall therefore argue that it is imperative 
for theories of the mind/brain to provide us with testable 
explanations of how the processes and representations 
within the mind/brain actually give rise to our mental 
experiences. My second objective is to show that theories 
that fail to provide us with testable accounts suffer from 
the difficulties of metaphysical realism. 
Moreover, I shall demonstrate that the veil-of-perception 
issue has a wider relevance than it has been assigned in 
the recent history of philosophy, since it constitutes the 
paradigm case of a theory that suffers from the problems 
relating to evidence and testability generally associated 
with metaphysical realism. Further, I shall illustrate 
that it is possible to isolate a semantically inconsistent 
1 
tetrad within the veil-of-perception issue which 
exemplifies the difficulties inherent in basing a two level 
theory upon evidence that does not adequately support 
either hypothesis. Similar tetrads may be isolated within 
all the theories of the mind/brain discussed in Section B, 
thereby proving that they all suffer from the problems of 
metaphysical realism. 
My third and fourth objectives are concerned with an 
examination of the methodologies employed to construct the 
theories of the mind/brain described in section B. I hope 
to show, firstly that, although the theorists discussed all 
rely upon different sources of evidence and postulate a 
variety of representational systems within the mind/brain, 
they all employ a version of the bootstrap strategy in 
order to derive both a general hypothesis and a specific 
hypothesis from the same initial body of evidence. I shall 
endeavour to render these bootstrapping arguments explicit 
before going on to examine the standard of the evidence 
that their authors cite in support of their hypotheses 
relative to their individual theories of the mind/brain. 
Finally, I shall show that the arguments of Nordby (1989) 
concernlng the difficulties faced by detectives when they 
bootstrap in order to solve a crime in the absence of any 
overall theory concerning the relative importance of 
diverse sources of evidence are readily extended to account 
for the particular difficulties encountered by co-
2 
evolutionary theorists of the mind/brain who employ the 
bootstrap strategy. 
It is essential to note from the outset that this thesis 1S 
by no means an attempt to evaluate the entire range of 
current theories about the nature of the mind/brain. I 
have chosen to concentrate upon a selection of views that 
I take to be representative of the mainstream of their 
various traditions within the philosophy of mind, in the 
hope that, if my arguments apply to these theories, then 
they may be accepted as having a wider relevance than they 
might have been had I selected only very obscure theories. 
Nonetheless, it is inevitable that I have had to omit any 
discussion of some influential contributors to the study of 
the mind/brain, including Gibson, Vygotsky and stich. 
I do not intend to champion the work of anyone theorist 
working in this field. Indeed, it will become clear in the 
course of my arguments that I believe that all of them have 
made fundamental errors in the construction of their 
theories. 
It should also be noted that I shall not be concerned with 
the philosophical minutiae of what constitutes a good or a 
bad explanation, nor indeed, with the details of what may 
be regarded as good or bad evidence. In what follows, I 
shall merely be concerned to show that theories cannot 
avoid the problems of metaphysical realism simply by using 
3 
the bootstrap 
systematically 
strategy 
protected 
if 
from 
their hypotheses are 
potential sources of 
empirical refutation or are backed by evidence that 1S 
itself either untestable, or equivocal between the 
preferred theory and a rival theory, or has already been 
disputed. 
structure of the thesis 
The first part of the thesis (Section A) contains a 
thorough discussion of the main criteria that must be 
fulfilled for an explanation to satisfy the demands of 
scientific realism. Chapter 1 begins with an examination 
of the way in which the traditional veil-of-perception 
issue can be reformulated in terms of questions about the 
structure of explanation and the criteria employed to 
decide which kinds of evidence are acceptable (see 
especially sUbsections 1.2.4, 1.2.5). It will then be 
demonstrated that it 1S these very kinds of questions which 
render the debate between metaphysical realism and 
scientific realism pertinent to the philosophy of science 
and in particular to the philosophy of psychology. The 
first chapter will also contain illustrations of the way in 
which the structure of the traditional veil-of-perception 
argument is still found in modern psychological theories of 
mind (see sUbsections 1.2.7 and 1.2.8). 
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In the second chapter, 
with the difficulty 
a paradigm methodology for coping 
of basing specific and general 
knowledge on the same epistemolog ical foundations, 
bootstrapping, is discussed and re-evaluated. This 
evaluation includes a discussion of how Nordby's (1989) 
considerations concerning the use of the bootstrap 
methodology in detective work may apply to co-evolutionary 
theories in the philosophy of psychology, that 1S, to 
theories that evolve from a synthesis of philosophical 
thought with neuroscientific data. 
section B begins with a brief introduction to the theories 
of the mind/brain that are to be evaluated 1n this part of 
the thesis, including their views concerning the nature of 
representations within the mind/brain. I then proceed to 
discuss each theory in turn, starting with Colin McGinn's 
treatment of the question of consc1ousness, which 
demonstrates the paucity of the arguments employed 1n 
traditional conceptual analysis when dealing with the 
issues of evidence, metaphysics and science. 
Further confirmation that arguments based upon conceptual 
analysis do not always yield the satisfactory and testable 
hypotheses that are required for a successful use of the 
bootstrap strategy is provided 1n my discussion of the 
Fodorean representational theory of mind in Chapter 4. I 
shall show that the evidence upon which Fodor relies 1n 
support of his language of thought hypothesis 1S 
5 
unsatisfactory, and worse still, that Fodor is guilty of 
systematically protecting his hypotheses from possible 
sources of empirical refutation, thereby rendering them 
untestable. Once more, the difficulties of metaphysical 
realism are revealed within the bootstrap strategy. I 
shall contrast Churchland's attitude towards the problems 
endemic in Fodor's theory with her neglect of the same 
issues in her own arguments (discussed in Chapter 6). 
The very traditional view of man as a being with a mind and 
a body set apart from the external world is challenged by 
modular theories of mind, such as that of Jerry Fodor, 
which is discussed in Chapter 5. Fodor questions two key 
assumptions that are often made by traditional philosophers 
of mind. Firstly, he argues that the boundary between the 
cogni ti ve self and what is cognized may not be exactly 
congruent with the division between man's body and the 
external world. Secondly, by dividing the activities of 
the mind/brain into perception and cognition, Fodor queries 
the notion that is traditionally thought to lie at the very 
heart of personal identity, namely the unity of 
consclousness. Fodor's version of the modularity thesis 
will be defended against criticisms as the most tenable of 
its kind. However, this does not mean that he can avoid 
the accusation that he too incorporates metaphysical 
assumptions into his theory. This issue will also be 
discussed in the course of Chapter 5. 
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In the final chapter of section B, Chapter .6, more co-
evolutionary theories of the mind/brain are exa~ined. I 
begin with David Marr's three-tiered theory of information 
processing which strongly influenced his account of vision. 
I then move on to a consideration of Churchland's argu~ents 
for eliminative materialism. I shall demonstrate that, 
although the two theorists have completely different Vlews 
of the way in which co-evolutionary methodologies should 
deal with evidence from neuroscientific sources, this has 
no effect upon their inability to avoid the use of 
untestable hypotheses and constraints in their bootstrap 
arguments. 
The third section (Section C) evaluates the current status 
of the philosophy of mind in the light of what has gone 
before, and concludes that this branch of philosophy 
suffers, like many others, from an inability to square its 
theories with reality. The suggestion is made that current 
neurophilosophers have failed to see the extent of this 
problem (as have their critics) and that this failure has 
flawed their work, so that they have, as yet, made little 
significant advance upon traditional theories of mind, 
which rely to a greater extent on conceptual analysis. I 
shall also make some suggestions regarding the possibility 
of future successful use of the bootstrap strategy to 
construct theories of the mind/brain. 
1. The term 'co-evolutionary' is used to describe research 
strategies that combine data and arguments from a variety 
of disciplines. Within the philosophy of the mind/brain, 
7 
it denotes those theories that synthesize philosophical, 
psychological and neuroscientific work. For a more 
detailed discussion of the term, see Chapter 6, sUbsection 
6.0. 
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section A 
Chapter 1 - Motivation, methodologies and the veil-of-
perception issue 
1.1 Introduction 
1.1.1 sentences and synapses: motivation, evidence and 
methodologies 
From sentence to synapse, twentieth century philosophy of 
mind has put forward a wide variety of hypotheses about the 
nature of representations and processes within the 
mind/brain1 , many of which I shall discuss in the course of 
this thesis. It will be a central contention that these 
hypotheses 
intended 
and the problems that 
to solve, frequently 
they occas ion and are 
result from their 
perpetrators' views on lssues that are not, in themselves, 
part of philosophy. This lS simply a more specific 
statement of the Popper ian point that genuine philosophical 
problems frequently spring from non-philosophical roots, 
such as religious or scientific debates, for example. 
Popper2 , believes that if we ignore the sources of such 
problems and simply study them in isolation, they will lose 
much of their importance, and our understanding of them 
will be greatly diminished. We must apply this lesson to 
the philosophy of mind. 
9 
1. 1 .1 
Consider, by way of example, the two very different 
approaches of Patricia Smith Churchland and Descartes. The 
motivating factors that led Patricia Smith Churchland3 to 
embark on a neurophilosophical account of mind4 are very 
different from those that inspired Descartes to formulate 
his famous dualistic theory. 
In the introduction to her (1986a), Churchland writes that 
"[t]he guiding aim of the book is to paint ln 
broad strokes the outl ine of a very genera 1 
framework suited to the development of a unified 
theory of the mind-brain. Additionally, it aims 
to bestir a yen for the enrichment and excitement 
to be had by an interanimation of phi losophy, 
psychology and neuroscience, or more generally, 
of top-down and bottom-up research" (Churchland, 
1986a, pp. 3-4). 
This passage makes it clear that Churchland sees the 
philosophical issues involved . ln the mind/brain 
relationship as closely connected with the realm of 
sClence. For Churchland, any satisfactory philosophical 
account of the representations and processes wi thin the 
mind/brain must be formulated in the light of information 
yielded by neuroscientif ic research. Descartes, on the 
other hand, was greatly influenced by the religious 
10 
1.1.1 
sentiments of his time, and hoped that his work ",.;ould 
provide a rational justification of the belief that the 
soul can survive bodily death. In the Dedication of his 
Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes wrote that he 
had 
"always considered that the two questions 
respecting God and the Soul were the chief of 
those that ought to be demonstrated by 
philosophical rather than theological argument. 
For although it is quite enough for us faithful 
ones to accept by means of faith the fact that 
God exists, it certainly does not seem possible 
ever to persuade infidels of any religion, 
indeed, we may almost say, of any moral virtue, 
unless, to begin with, we prove these two facts 
by means of the natural reason" (Descartes, 
1911a, p. 133). 
In Descartes I vlew, the mind/body relationship lS 
demonstrable by rational argument, despite the religious 
background to the debate. In other words, Descartes 
recommends that we need not take faith as our sole 
criterion for believing a theory to be true. 
may be convinced by reason. 
11 
Rather, we 
1. 1. 1 
We must bear in mind these different motivations if we are 
to understand fully the issues at stake, because these 
motivations stimulate different assumptions and indicate 
different research programmes. These assumptions and 
research programmes in turn influence theories and 
arguments. However, this may become a problem if 
motivating factors make us seek a particular kind of answe~ 
which may result in our asking the wrong kind of questions 
and formulating the wrong hypotheses so that we are not 
only led in the wrong direction, but perhaps also prevented 
from seeing the situation from different or more 
appropriate angles. This seems to me to be an important 
point. The crux of this thesis is that the motivating 
forces of the philosophers of mind discussed in Section B 
may have led them into asking the wrong kinds of questions, 
specifically, questions which have caused them to make 
untestable metaphysical assumptions which . . lmpalr the 
scientific credibility of their theories and the 
methodologies by which these have evolved. 
I shall refer to this kind of error as 'bias' or 
'evidential bias'. This term denotes the failure of 
philosophers to subject their hypotheses and methodologies 
to rigorous and impartial scrutiny. This scrutiny should 
include tests that are not specifically designed to confir~ 
favoured hypotheses (perhaps by systematically excluding 
all potential sources of empirical evidence that might 
12 
1. 1. 1 
falsify them), whilst rejecting rival Vl.ews (by denying 
them potentially confirming sources of empirical evidence 
on a priori grounds). Although all philosophers and 
scientists have a natural and ineliminable desire to see 
their preferred explanations triumph, this desire must not 
be allowed to bias the testing of their methodologies and 
theories. It is important to realize that my criticism is' 
levelled at the faulty methodology that often arises from 
the desire to construct a successful theory, and not at the 
desire itself. 
This is not precisely the same use of the term 'evidential 
bias' discussed by Paul M. Church land in (P.M. Churchland, 
1975a), although there are some important overlaps. 
Church land is concerned to emphasise two ways in which our 
language is inherently biased. The first way, intensional 
bias, occurs because the meaning of our observation terms 
is necessarily embedded in theory and is determined very 
little by mere sensation. Secondly, our view of the world, 
and the theories presupposed by it exhibit extensional 
bias. That is to say, it is a contingent fact dependent 
upon our physical constitution that we happen to perceive 
and to classify the world in the way that we do. Other 
ways of perceiving the world, and the theories ln which 
they are embedded may be just as valid, testable, 
internally simple and well-corroborated (P.M. Churchland, 
1975a, p. 258). The situation then becomes one of 
13 
1.1.2 
empirical underdetermination (see Chapter 2, subsection 
2.2.2 for further discussion). 
As the nature of our arguments about philosophical issues 
changes, so too does the kind of evidence that we require 
to be convinced of the validity of theories. Many 
different strategies may be employed ln the evaluation of 
theories. For example, traditional philosophers of mind 
like Colin McGinn rely upon conceptual analysis S , 
whereas Patricia Smith Churchland, as we saw earlier, uses 
a multidisciplinary approach. In other words, as Popper 
rightly says, there is no such thing as the philosophical 
method. No method should be excluded from philosophy on a 
priori grounds. 
1.1.2 Questions and answers: methodology or metaphysics? 
As I noted in the Introduction, one of my maln concerns is 
to argue that the veil-of-perception issue should be 
revived in the form of general question about the kind of 
relationship between hypotheses and evidence that 1S 
required for theories to be testable. This question must 
be confronted by all philosophers who are concerned to 
develop methodologies that conform to the demands of 
scientific realism (see Chapter 2, subsection 2.2.2). 
Consequently, the 
relevance than it 
veil-of-perception lssue has a ',·;ider 
has generally been accorded 1n the 
14 
1.1. 2 
history of philosophy. It should no longer be regarded 
primarily as a summary of the problems that face atte~pts 
to explain how we percelve the external world. Such 
explanations encounter difficulties precisely because they 
do not take adequate account of the complex relationship 
between hypotheses, evidence and testability. I shall say 
more about this relationship in the remainder of this 
chapter and in Chapter 2. 
In the light of these considerations, I shall then proceed 
in Section B to an evaluation both of theories of mind that 
have, by and large been constructed uSlng conceptual 
analysis (such as McGinn's theory of the hidden structure 
of consciousness in Chapter 3, and Fodor's Representational 
Theory of Mind in Chapter 4), and of theories that adopt a 
more innovative approach (the modularity theories in 
Chapter 5, and the theories of David Marr and Patricia 
smith Churchland in Chapter 6). I shall be particularly 
concerned with the issue of whether the kinds of questions 
that these philosophers ask predetermine the kinds of 
explanations that they obtain. If they do, then these 
philosophers may be vulnerable to the charge of 
systematically . . 19norlng, or more charitably, overlooking 
sources of evidence that call the validity of their 
hypotheses into question. This raises the more general 
question of whether scientific realists6 can ever be wholly 
15 
1 . 2 . 1 
free from metaphysical assumptions within their theories. 
1.2 Theories, explanation and evidence 
1.2.1 What is a theory? 
There has been much dispute over the precise definition of 
a theory, and over whether or not a distinction can be 
drawn between theoretical vocabulary and observational 
vocabulary and between scientific theories and metaphysical 
theories on the other? Broadly speaking, theories are 
formulated to explain or predict the nature or occurrence 
of events. They do this by virtue of expressing law-like 
statements which link types of events. Philosophers do not 
all view theories and their explanatory roles in the same 
way. For example, some instrumentalists8 deny that 
theories present us with a true or false account of events. 
For this group of philosophers, theories do not purport to 
describe what 1S going on . 1n the world; their role 1S 
merely to predict what will happen at an observational 
level. An adherent of realism, on the other hand, will 
claim that theories can be true or false, even though it 
may never be possible for us to know with absolute 
certainty that anyone theory 1S true or false 9 • The 
realist believes that the instrumentalist view of theories 
16 
1.2.2 
precludes explanation, and that this lS unacceptable, Slnce 
"[t]here lS no doubt that rightly or wrongly we 
want not only to be able to predict, we want to 
be able to explain" (Newton-Smith, 1981, p. 31). 
The theories of the mind/brain discussed In Section Bare 
(with the exception of Howard Gardner's modular theory) 
undoubtedly realist, since they all make claims about the 
ontology of the mind/brain, which they take to be true or 
false even if they cannot be verified, In a manner that 
instrumentalist theories do not. However, realism does not 
necessarily result In an explanatory theory. The 
difficulties faced by realism are outlined in Chapter 2 
(subsections 2.2.1, 2.2.2). 
1.2.2 How does a theory explain? 
A theory, being a set of one or more hypotheses, cannot be 
regarded as genuinely explanatory unless it provides us 
with additional useful information. One objection to 
theories that fail to provide such information has been 
dubbed the 'v irtus dormi ti va ' obj ection, after its most 
famous example. This occurs In Moliere's Le Malade 
Imaginaire, in which a 
oplum sends people to 
doctor informs his patient that 
sleep because of its dormitive 
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powers. Clearly, since the very term 'dormitive powers' 
simply means 'to send to sleep', no further information 1S 
g1ven to the patient, and no explanation of the effects of 
op1um have been provided. 10 
Theories consist of hypotheses, which are backed up by 
evidence. The relationship between these hypotheses and 
the bodies of evidence that are supposed to support them 
forms a central issue in this thesis. For a theory to be 
genuinely explanatory, its hypotheses must be testable 
independently not only of the arguments and evidence which 
were employed in their formulation, but also ot those 
arguments or events that the hypotheses are currently being 
used to explain .11 As we shall see in a moment, the 
traditional veil-ot-perception issue delineates a situation 
in which a theory may be said to lack explanatory value, 
precisely because its hypotheses cannot be independently 
tested. 
So philosophers and scientists alike should a1m to 
formulate theories that are genuinely explanatory, 1n the 
sense that they have greater content than their explananda. 
Moreover, their hypotheses must be readily and 
systematically testable in the ways just described. 
18 
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1.2.3 The veil-of-perception issue 
We have just noted the necessity of formulating theories 
that attempt to describe the world accurately and 
coherently so that our exper1ences are made more 
intelligible. It has also been emphasized that 
satisfactory theories are ones in which the hypotheses can 
be tested. For a test to have any worth, it must be 
possible to at least say what kind of result would falsify 
a hypothesis: in other words, tests that guarantee A priori 
that the hypothesis under test will be valid are not good 
tests .12 
The veil-of-perception 1ssue 
discussion since it delineates 
1S pertinent 
a situation 1n 
to this 
which a 
theory fails to provide a satisfactory explanation 
precisely because its hypotheses cannot be tested in the 
manner just described. 
The issue of the veil-of-perception has had a thorough 
airing in the history of philosophy. It is mentioned In 
Plato's Republic, Book vii, as a thought experiment. In 
it, a group of men are chained up in a cave with the ir 
backs to the 1 ight, so that a 11 they can see are the 
shadows of objects passing between the light and the cave 
entrance as they appear upon the cave .. ·.:a 11 In front of 
them. They 
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"hold the shadows of those ... articles to be the 
only realities" (Plato, 1892, p.236). 
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The Platonic account goes on to imagine that one of the men 
is then released so that he can see the original objects 
which pass before the entrance to the cave. l3 The version 
of the veil-of-perception issue that we wish to consider 
here, however, caters for no such eventuality, because, of 
course, the very way that the situation is set up prevents 
any possibility of testability. 
1.2.4 Hume and the veil-of-perception issue 
The issue is admirably restated by Hume in his Treatise of 
Human Nature, Book I, Part IV, section ii. He writes that 
since 
"no beings are ever present to the mind but 
perceptions; it follows that we may observe a 
conjunction or a relation of cause and effect 
between different perceptions, but can never 
observe it between perceptions and objects. 'Tis 
impossible, therefore, that from the existence or 
any of the qualities of the former, we can ever 
form any conclusion concerning the existence of 
the latter, or ever satisfy our reason in this 
particular" (Hume, 1978, p.212). 
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The traditional veil-of-perception issue arlses if a theory 
of how we perceive reality rests upon the assumption that 
the following four statements are all true: 
i) there is an external reality over and above our 
perceptions 
ii) this reality stands in relation to our perceptions 
(visual, aural, tactile etc.) as cause does to effect 
iii) we can only ever have direct knowledge of our 
perceptions; our knowledge of external reality comes 
to us indirectly, mediated by these perceptions 
iv) nonetheless, our perceptions normally furnish us 
with a generally veridical representation of the 
world. 
These statements fail to provide a suitable basis for a 
satisfactory explanation of how our perceptions yield 
knowledge of the world, because they form what I shall call 
a semantically inconsistent tetrad. This semantic 
inconsistency arises as a result of conflict between 
interpretations of the claims in the light of the 
particular evidence or assumptions upon which they are 
based. I shall illustrate that verSlons of this 
semantically inconsistent tetrad may be isolated within the 
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theories of the mind/brain examined ln Section B. The 
difficulties identified by Hume constitute a fundamental 
flaw which is rooted deep in philosophical tradition. 
There are two levels of inconsistency within the tetrad. 
Firstly, Hume argued that, since we only ever have direct 
knowledge of our perceptions, which we take to be 
representations of an outer reality (assumption iii), we 
can have no grounds for asserting that there is an external 
reality which causes these perceptions (statements i and 
ii). We may term this the strong or ontological version of 
the argument. 
Secondly, even if we simply assume that such an external 
world exists, we have no reason to believe claim (iv), that 
is to say, that our perceptions provide us with a wholly 
accurate picture of it. This constitutes the weaker, 
epistemological version of the veil-of-perception lssue. 
Hume rightly points out that we are generally unaware of 
the veil-of-perception issue, since we are psychologically 
incapable of making a distinction between our perceptions 
and the world beyond them. This fact is important for our 
day-to-day existence, but it does not justify our ignoring 
the problems of explanation raised by the issue. It ~erely 
emphasises the truth of Descartes's remark that 
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"1.'t . . .. 1.S sometl.mes requl.sl. te l.n common life to 
follow opinions which one knows to be ~ost 
uncertain exactly as though they were 
indisputable" (Descartes, 1911b, p. 100). 
1.2.5 Wider implications of the veil-ai-perception issue 
Those philosophers who have discussed the veil-of-
perception issue have, I believe, failed to see its 
implications for the philosophy of sCl.ence and, 
particularly, for the philosophy of mind14 • Jonathan 
Bennett is a good example of a philosopher who understands 
the problem very well within its historical context, but 
who does not succeed in relating it to more general 
questions about the nature of evidence required for the 
hypotheses of a theory to be genuinely testable. 
Jonathan Bennett (1971, pp. 63-70) discusses the veil-of-
perception l.ssue as it arl.ses in Locke's An Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding (1690). Some places l.n 
Locke's Essay do create the impression that Locke may have 
fallen into precisely those problems that are delineated by 
Hume's discussion of the veil-of-perception issue. For 
example, Locke wrote that 
"[ideas] are only designed to be pictures and 
representations in the mind of things that do exist, by 
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ideas of those qualities that are discoverable ln th " er.l. 
(Locke, 1981, p. 238) 15 
Later on, in Book IV, chapter iv of the Essay, Locke poses 
exactly the problem highlighted by Hume (see section 1.2.4 
above). Locke comments that 
"[i]t is evident the mind knows not things 
immediately, but only by the intervention of the 
ideas it has of them" (ibid, p.348). 
He then goes on to ask 
"[h]ow shall the mind, when it perceives nothing 
but its own ideas, know that they agree wi th 
things themselves?" (ibid, p. 348). 
Bennett quite rightly says that 
"[w]hat is wrong with the question is, precisely, 
that nothing could count as a legitimate argument 
for an affirmative answer to it." (Bennett, 1971, 
p.67) 
Indeed, Bennett hits the nail on the head when he comments 
that the difficulty ln postulating a causal connection 
between appearances and reality is that 
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"[t]o know that there was [such a causal 
connection], however, we should need independent 
access to empirical facts about the objective 
realm" (ibid, p. 70). 
1.2.5 
But Bennett's discuss ion of the issue becomes ster i Ie, 
since he restricts his criticism of the veil-of-perception 
issue to the relationship between sensory states and the 
external world. However, many of his comments are 
pertinent to the wider issue, Slnce Bennett rightly points 
our that empirical arguments can only provide us with 
limited, specific conclusions about the external world, 
based upon specific information from the senses, Slnce 
"[a]ny such argument turns on the fulcrum of an 
unquestioned acceptance of the existence of an 
objective world about which we know a good deal. 
If we stand back and try to focus on the relation 
between sensory states as a whole and the 
objective realm as a whole, asking en bloc 
whether the former are ever reliable guides to 
the latter, empirical arguments cannot get a 
grip; and the 'cannot' is a logical one" (ibid, 
pp. 67-8). 
This passage demonstrates that no amount of empirical 
evidence can provide an exit from the difficulties inherent 
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because a reliable 
relationship between perception and the external ~orld is 
assumed a priori and is therefore not empirically testable. 
However, there are no grounds for inferring that Bennett 
has realized that the traditional veil-of-perception issue 
results from an unsatisfactory relationship between 
hypotheses and the nature of the evidence available to 
support them - a relationship that can and does exist ln 
theories that are not concerned with our perception of the 
external world. In other words, Bennett (like Locke before 
him) commits the sin noted by Popper (see above, sUbsection 
1.1.1) of neglecting the broader issues at stake. 16 
The broader lssues at stake here are clear. We need to 
discover if there are any strategies that will allow us to 
make justifiable and testable inferences from the realm of 
experiences to the existence of those structures and 
objects that both lie beyond and cause our exper1ences. As 
Raymond Tallis comments 
n[e]mpirical observations may generate laws that 
correlate one type of experience with another; 
but can they take us "beneath experience" to its 
basis? It seems unlikely that experience can 
take us outside of the closed circle of 
experience to reveal that upon which experlence -
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experience ln general, rather than particular 
experience - is based" (Tallis, 1991, p.93) .17 
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Clark Glymour has embarked upon a search for just such an 
epistemological breakthrough. Glymour writes that 
"whether the foundation of all empirical belief 
was thought to rest on beliefs about phenomenal 
appearances or on beliefs about observable 
properties of observable things, the structure 
of the problem was the same: what relations 
between statements about 
observation 
statements 
statements, on the 
about material 
phenomena, 
one hand, 
objects 
respectively, about unobservable things 
or 
and 
or, 
or 
unobservable properties, on the other hand, 
permit statements of the former kind to confirm 
statements of the latter kind?" (Glymour, 1980, 
pp.10-11) . 
In chapter 2, Glymour's attempt to solve this problem by 
employing the bootstrap strategy to ground both our 
knowledge of the general and of specific facts upon the 
same evidence will be discussed and evaluated in detail 
(subsections 2.3.4 - 2.4.1). Briefly, Glymour's method is 
to use one piece of evidence, E1 ln conjunction with a 
hypothesis HI to confirm a second hypothesis H= relative to 
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a theory T (where T lS simply a theory which consists of 
hypotheses Hl , H2 , H3 ..... Hn). Once H2 is thus confirmed, 
Glymour argues that we can bootstrap from H2 to confirm Hl 
relative to T using a second piece of evidence, E2 . Given 
that E1 is used to confirm H2 , which in turn confirms H1 , El 
grounds our knowledge of both hypotheses, one of which may 
be specific and the other general. Chapter 2 (subsections 
2.4.2 -2.6) will also describe the variety of bootstrapping 
found in the theories examined in section B. 
The need to solve the problems of evidence associated with 
the veil-of-perception issue is still a very pressing one, 
since failure to deal with these difficulties is endemic in 
twentieth century theories of mind. 
1.2.6 The veil-of-perception issue in twentieth century 
psychology 
This form of argument about the nature of perception can 
still be found in twentieth century psychology in various 
guises. Consequently, the metaphysical issues at stake are 
still very much live questions and should not be dismissed 
as pertinent only to seventeenth century philosophyl8. 
I will discuss two examples out of a number in modern 
psychology which stand out as being related to the veil-of-
perception argument under discussion. These examples are 
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the views of Richard Gregory (1970) and those of Clrich 
Neisser (1976). Gregory and Neisser both put forward top-
down theories of perception, ie: theories that start from 
the assumption that what we see is predominantly determined 
by high-level constraints which control our interpretation 
of visual information. 19 These constraints take the form 
of theoretical constructions about the categories of the 
world in Gregory's theory, and anticipatory schemata on 
Neisser's view. Both of these theories are concerned with 
the nature of our perceptual processes rather than with the 
nature of the external world. 
Gregory and Neisser's theories are very different from each 
other. Gregory's theory is a good example of the belief 
that perception consists chiefly 1n the testing of 
hypotheses formed about the nature of the external world as 
a result of previous experience. In fact, Gregory holds 
that we infer from our perceptions to the obj ects that 
cause them on the basis of these very hypotheses. Feature 
detectors within our perceptual apparatus collate the 
information in our retinal images and match it against 
stored information about objects that we have previously 
encountered. Perception is an active process of problem-
solving, and Gregory thinks that vision provides us with an 
indirect characterization of the external world. 
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Neisser, on the other hand, rejects Gregory I s model of 
perception as the internal processing of perceptual images 
according to categories. Instead, he favours a perceptual 
cycle model. On this view, we construct schemata which then 
direct our visual attention towards one object or another. 
This theory is equally top-down, but does not regard vision 
as a process of matching an inner representation with a 
real object. 
I intend to show in the next two subsections that both 
these theories exhibit the difficulties highlighted ln 
Hume's analysis of the veil-of-perception . lssue 
sUbsection 1.2.4. My aim is not to criticise the views of 
Gregory and Neisser per se, but merely to illustrate the 
point that the veil-of-perception lssue, and hence the 
questions of evidence and method, are still importantly 
relevant in twentieth century psychological debate. 
1.2.7 Gregory and the veil-ot-perception issue 
In his (1970), Richard Gregory describes perception as the 
interpretation of our sensations by reference to the 
theoretical constructions we have of the external world and 
of external objects. These theoretical constructions are 
not wholly a priori, but are at least partially influenced 
by our previous experiences and interpretations. Thus 
Gregory writes that 
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"[gJ iven the slenderest clues to the nature of 
surrounding objects we identify them and act not 
so much according to what is directly sensed, but 
to what is believed" (Gregory, 1970, p.11). 
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Gregory's view rests upon the acceptance of all four of the 
following statements: 
Once 
a) there is an external world over and above our 
perceptions 
b) this world stands in relation to our perceptions 
(visual, aural, tactile, etc.) as cause does to 
effect20 
c) we can never have direct knowledge of the external 
world; such knowledge comes to us indirectly, mediated 
by our perceptions, which are in turn shaped by our 
preconceived ideas about this world 
d) yet our perceptions provide us with essentially 
veridical representations of what lies beyond our 
senses. 
more, we are presented with a semantically 
inconsistent tetrad of statements. The logical conclusion 
of Gregory's claim that we have no way of perceiving the 
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external world directly (statement c) 1S that we can have 
no grounds for asserting that there is such a world which 
causes our perceptions (statements a and b) .21 This bears 
a striking resemblance to the ontological version of the 
veil-af-perception issue delineated in the discussion of 
Hume (section 1.2.4 above). 
Moreover, even if we do not need to have direct perception 
of the external world in order to believe that it exists, 
we still have no reason to believe that our perceptions are 
essentially accurate (statement d). Hence Gregory still 
falls victim to the epistemological version of the veil-of-
perception issue (cf: section 1.2.4 above). 
Two related points should be noted at this juncture. The 
first deals with the paucity of evidence for Gregory's 
claims, whilst the second considers how perceptual errors 
might be possible within his theory. 
Firstly, I am not trying to make the positivist claim that 
direct perception is needed in order for us to have any 
justifiable belief in the existence of an external world. 
I am simply trying to demonstrate that the way that Gregory 
sets up the argument is inadequate because he provides us 
with no independent evidence either for his assertion that 
the external world exists (statement a), or for his claim 
that our perceptions are basically accurate (statement d) . 
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Gregory writes that 
"[w]e are forced ... to suppose that perception 
involves betting on the most probable 
interpretation of sensory data, in terms of the 
world of objects" (ibid, p. 29). 
This means that we may realise that an error has been made 
on specific occaSlons. There are two ways ln which this 
may occur. Our perceptions may conflict with our 
expectations of what should be seen, forcing us to look 
more closely and to decide whether our expectation is 
correct or should be revised ln the light of our 
perceptions. Alternatively, our perceptions may conflict 
with each other, revealing an inconsistency that must be 
resolved. Indeed, Gregory comments that 
"[v]ision demands that every received pattern be 
interpreted according to a theoretical 
construction of the world of external objects, 
and the same is true of all indirect measures in 
. SClence. Both are used to suggest and test 
between alternative hypotheses" (ibid, p. 98). 
However, this cannot count as independent evidence for the 
general accuracy of our perceptions, because we can only 
allow for the possibility of errors in individual instances 
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by assuming that our perceptions are, on the whole , 
accurate. 22 This means that we are simply assuming the 
very point that is at issue. Gregory's argument provides 
us with a first-class illustration of the difficulties that 
psychological theories may encounter when relying upon the 
same source of evidence to support both specific and 
general conclusions. 
This brings me to my second point. Gregory's account of 
perception restricts the concept of error to a deviation 
from the norm, when two perceptions are inconsistent, or 
when our perceptions conflict with our theoretical 
construction of the external world. The validity of 
postulating the existence of such a theoretical 
construction in the first place and subsequent reliance on 
it is never questioned. 
In Gregory's view, it is the very possibility of error that 
enables us to see how perception works. Yet his theory 
will only permit us to have the restricted concept of error 
outlined above. We can never be completely mistaken. The 
concept of wholesale error is missing from Gregory's agenda 
(see also my discussion of realism in Chapter 2, sUbsection 
2 • 2) • 
So, Gregory's theory suffers from the difficulties 
associated with the veil-of-perception issue because the 
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premises upon which the theory rests are not supported by 
appropriate evidence. Nor does Gregory provide us with any 
suggestions as to how we might obtain any independent 
evidence for these . prem1ses. We therefore have no 
justification for regarding the inferences that the theory 
makes from our perceptions to the nature of the external 
world as accurate. 
1.2.8 Neisser and the veil-of-perception issue 
It . 1S clear from our discussion of Gregory that 
psychological theories may encounter problems if they rely 
upon the same evidence when they are addressing individual 
instances as they used when building the general outline of 
their theory23. Ulrich Neisser's theory of perception is 
vulnerable to the same problems, although he denies that 
perception is carried out by means of inferences about the 
world from retinal images. That is to say, perception is 
not just phenomenalism. Neisser writes that 
"[perception] need not be organized in terms of 
momentary retinal 'snapshots' at all, and the 
similarity or dissimilarity between perceived 
objects and their projected images is irrelevant 
to it" (Neisser, 1976, p. 16). 
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Nevertheless, Neisser' s rej ection of the retina I 1mage 
theory of perception does not preclude his adherence to a 
theory of perception that is at least partially top-down. 
His theory rests upon the concept of what he calls the 
perceptual cycle. There are no retinal images inside the 
head; rather 
"the cognitive structures crucial for vision are 
the anticipatory schemata that prepare the 
perceiver to accept certain kinds of information 
rather than others and thus control the activity 
of looking" (ibid, p. 20). 
Perception is only possible in virtue of these anticipatory 
schemata: the . prec1se schemata that each person has 
determine what he sees, the nature of the errors he is 
likely to make, and his interpretations of the world around 
him. We are able to amend our schemata in the light of 
what we actually perceive, but our expectations play a 
large and decisive role 1n determining which of two 
conflicting schemata should be retained and which rejected. 
Neisser comments that 
"[i]f the environment is rich enough to support 
more than one alternative V1ew (and it usually 
is), expectations can have cumulative effects on 
what is perceived that are virtually irreversible 
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until the environment itself changes" (ibid, p. 
44) . 
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Neisser believes that his theory has distinct advantages 
over those theories that involve inference from retinal 
images or perceptual data24 • This is because he allows 
for the possibility that our perceptual schemata may be 
modified by experience, so that the environment does 
influence what we see. He writes that 
"[w]hen a perceptual cycle 1S carried out 
normally, schemata quickly attune themselves to 
the information actually available. Perception 
is veridical" (ibid, p. 43). 
However, it 1S not at all clear that Neisser can 
justifiably claim these advantages for his theory. Neisser 
takes the following four statements to be true: 
I) there is an external reality over and above our 
perceptual schemata 
II) this reality can have a causal effect on our 
perceptual schemata (visual, aural, tactile, etc.) 
III) it is impossible for us to perce1ve this 
external reality except by virtue of our perceptual 
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schemata, which determine what we anticipate 
perceiving and how we set about exploring the 
external world 
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IV) our perceptual schemata provide us with a 
veridical view of this reality (assuming that we are 
mobile organisms in a mobile world). 
Once again we are confronted with a modern psychological 
theory which can be summarized in the form of a 
semantically inconsistent tetrad. If we can only ever 
gain a purchase on the nature of external reality through 
our perceptual schemata (statement III), then we have no 
independent grounds for asserting that such an external 
reality exists over and above these schemata (statement 
I), let alone that this reality can have a causal effect 
upon our schemata (claim II). Neisser cannot therefore 
meet the challenge presented by the ontological form of 
the veil-of-perception issue any better than Gregory. 
Furthermore, the assumption that such an external reality 
does exist does not relieve Neisser of the obligation to 
demonstrate that his theory does not fall foul of the 
epistemological version of the veil-of-perception 
problem. Neisser declares that 
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"[w]hat is seen depends on how the observer 
allocates his attention: ie., on the 
anticipations he develops and the perceptual 
explorations he carries out" (ibid, p. 39). 
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This puts Neisser's theory on a par with that of Gregory. 
He may define error in terms of a conflict between what 
we expect to see and what we actually see, but he cannot 
justifiably assert with any confidence which of our 
perceptions are correct and which are incorrect (claim 
IV). Any of our perceptual schemata may be completely 
mistaken, but this possibility is systematically ignored 
by Neisser. Like Gregory, he can only account for the 
possibility of specific errors (in terms of perceptions 
which conflict with the anticipations embodied in our 
perceptual schemata); wholesale error lies completely 
outside the scope of his arguments. 
1.3 Summary of the major points of chapter 1 and their 
implications for the philosophy of mind in the twentieth 
century 
The theories of Richard Gregory and Ulrich Neisser both 
illustrate my point that, even in the twentieth century, 
psychologists and philosophers frequently fail to 
recognise the need for independent evidential paths In 
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support of the hypotheses that constitute their theories 
(see my discussion of bootstrapping in Chapter 2, 
sUbsection 2.3.1). It is for precisely these reasons 
that neither Gregory nor Neisser can escape the same 
kinds of difficulties as those that Hume identified 
within the veil-of-perception lssue almost three 
centuries ago. 
In section B, I shall examine the Vlews of Colin McGinn, 
Jerry Fodor, the modularity theorists, David Marr and 
Patricia Smith Churchland to see whether they exhibit the 
same kinds of problems concerning the nature of the 
evidence that they evince in support of their theories. 
It is clear from my discussion of Gregory and Neisser 
that, if the philosophers under scrutiny in section B do 
suffer from these problems, they are not unique in their 
plight. However, failure to provide independent 
evidential paths for the hypotheses within their theories 
would indicate that the arguments of Marr and Church land 
do not represent the significant advance over traditional 
theories of mind that their proponents take them to be. 
Consideration of the veil-of-perception issue, properly 
understood, forces us to examine the testability of our 
theories, that is, whether their hypotheses are 
sufficiently supported by independently obtained sources 
of evidence. It therefore raises the issue of realis~. 
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Is our claim to have accurate knowledge of the existence 
of an external world which exists over and above our 
perceptions a justifiable statement which is open to 
revision in the light of fresh evidence, or is it merely 
an assumption upon which all scientific activity is 
based, but which is itself untestable? This question 
will be discussed at length in chapter 2. If it turns 
out that the philosophers examined in section B take the 
second view, then their theories might be beset by the 
sort of metaphysical presuppositions that they explicitly 
seek to avoid. 
1. None of the theorists discussed in this thesis are dualists, 
but since some of them (for example: McGinn, Fodor) place a 
greater emphasis upon traditional concepts of the mental than do 
others (such as Patricia smith Churchland), I have elected to use 
the neutral term 'mind/brain' throughout. 
2. See, for example, Popper, 1969, chapter 2. 
3. For the sake of brevity I shall refer to Patricia Smith 
Churchland as 'Churchland' throughout. Where Paul M. Churchland 
is discussed, I shall state his name in full. 
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4. Neurophilosophy attempts to cast light on the mind/brain 
relationship by revising traditional philosophical methods to 
include a consideration of the methods and results of 
neuroscientific research. It is a term used by Churchland to 
refer to her own version of co-evolutionary philosophy of the 
mind/brain. For further discussion, please see Section B 
. , 
Chapter 6, subsectl0ns 6.2 - 6.2.5. I shall use the generic term 
'neuroscientific' to refer to any research into the structure and 
function of the brain. For further discussion of terminology, 
see P.S. Churchland (1986a), pp. 153-4. 
5. See chapter 3 for a brief discussion of the problems 
associated with McGinn's approach to the mind/brain question. 
6. Scientific realism and metaphysical realism will be discussed 
in Chapter 2, sUbsections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2. 
7. See, for example, W. H. Newton-Smith (1981), Chapter II. 
8. Newton-smith (ibid, p. 30) refers to this class of 
instrumentalists as "semantical instrumentalists". 
9. See also my discussion of realism below, Chapter 2, 
sUbsection 2.2 
10. A prominent example of a theory of the mind/brain that falls 
foul of this objection is Fodor I s Representational Theory of 
Mind. See Chapter 4, sUbsection 4.4.2, below. The' virtus 
dormitiva' objection is also discussed in Dennett (1981), pp.56-
9. 
11. See, for example, Salmon (1989). 
12. For an excellent discussion of the fundamentals, see Giere 
(1983), Popper (1969, eg: p. 249). 
13. Thus, the Platonic version 
would, in more general terms, 
hypotheses could not in point of 
logical possibility of eventual 
of the veil-of-perception issue 
describe a situation in which 
fact be tested, but in which the 
testability would remain open. 
14. The views of David Papineau (1987), who believes that the 
issue fails to cast any light on representational theories of the 
mind/brain, will be discussed in context in the Introduction to 
Section B, sUbsection B2. 
15. Note that no part of my argument depends crucially on 
whether Locke actually held such a view. 
16. However, it should be said in Bennett's defence that he is 
engaged in a critique of the theories of Locke, Berkeley and 
Hurne, and not in a discussion of the criteria for satisfactory 
explanation required within the philosophy of science. 
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17. This is simply another, more general way of stating the 
relationship between Bennett I s conclusions about the relationship 
between perception and the external world, cited above. 
18. This point notwithstanding, there are still some important 
lessons to be learned both by examining criticisms of 
philosophers of the seventeenth century who may have held this 
view, such as John Locke, and by drawing comparisons between him 
and modern philosophers of mind see later on, chapter 3, 
sUbsection 3.2.6. 
19. For further discussion of the differences between top-down 
and bottom theories of the mind/brain, see Chapter 6, 
particularly sUbsections 6.1.1 and 6.2.1. 
20. This statement is true by virtue of the fact that Gregory 
would certainly want to maintain that if the external world did 
not exist, then we would definitely be aware of that, even though 
he also holds that our perceptions are to some extent influenced 
by our beliefs about what the external world is actually like. 
This conflict is at the very centre of the inconsistency of this 
tetrad. Of course, Gregory assumes the truth of current physics 
and physiology in his analysis. 
21. I am not suggesting that Gregory would endorse this 
conclusion, merely that it is a logical consequence of the flawed 
relationship between his hypotheses and the evidence that he 
cites in support of them. 
22. cf: the quotations from Bennett and Tallis, cited above, 
sUbsection 1.2.5. 
23. Philosophers sometimes rely on the methodology known as 
bootstrapping as a way of solving precisely this problem. See 
chapter 2 for an analysis of its contribution to this field. 
24. I think that Neisser would regard both John Locke and 
Richard Gregory as holders of such theories: Locke because he is 
traditionally thought of as propounding a representative theory 
of perception, and Gregory because he upholds Helmholtz's view 
that perception consists of making unconscious inferences from 
sensations to causes. 
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Chapter 2 - Realism, Bootstraps and Bias: Problems of 
Evidence in the Philosophy of science 
2.1 Introduction 
In the course of chapter 1, it was emphasised that one of 
the main aims of philosophy (and, indeed, of science) is to 
formulate theories that are genuinely explanatory. 
However, we have seen that philosophers are liable to 
encounter difficulties if the hypotheses that make up their 
theories are not sufficiently supported by independent 
evidence. It was also stressed that these diff icul ties 
become strikingly apparent when we attempt to go beyond 
direct observation and draw conclusions about the nature of 
a world beyond our perceptions. Moreover, it was 
demonstrated that the veil-of-perception issue as 
delineated in Hume (1978) may be regarded 
it is 
as an 
illustration of precisely this scenarlO. Consequently, the 
four assumptions which form the backbone of theories which 
fall into the trap of the veil-of-perception issue were 
isolated. I was therefore able to show that the veil-of-
perception issue occurs as the result of the presence of a 
semantically inconsistent tetrad of assumptions. 
F ina lly , since the perceptua I theor ies of both Gregory 
(1970) and Neisser (1976) are founded upon variations of 
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this tetrad, 
2. 1 
I concluded that the problem of the 
relationship between evidence and hypothesis is still a 
live issue for twentieth century philosophy of mind. The 
problem raises the entire issue of realism, because it is 
important to determine what attitude philosophers should 
take to the hypothesis that there is a world beyond our 
perceptions, and what role they think such a hypothesis 
should play in the formulation of their theories. 
The following two sUb-sections will discuss two different 
kinds of realism, metaphysical realism and scientific 
realism. The scientific realist's claim that he is better 
able to deal with the problems raised by the veil-of-
perception issue using a version of the bootstrapping 
methodology introduced in chapter 1 (subsection 1.2.5) will 
then be evaluated in a more detailed discussion of the 
methodology itself and of the forms that it may take 
(subsections 2.3 - 2.6). I shall be arguing that use of 
the bootstrap methodology does not necessarily prevent 
those philosophers who would claim to be scientific 
realists from postulating theories which turn out to be 
laden with (often implicit, rather than explicit) 
untestable metaphysical assumptions. consequently, they 
will failed to avoid the difficulties highlighted by the 
veil-of-perception issue of grounding their theories ln 
testable hypotheses. I shall contend that, although a form 
of bootstrapping is used by the philosophers discussed in 
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section B, co-evolutionary theories! within the 
philosophy of mind are particularly unsuitable candidates 
for bootstrapping. 
2.2 Two kinds of realism 
2.2.1 Metaphysical realism and the veil-of-perception 
issue 
Adherents of metaphysical realism take it to be a 
prerequisite of scientific activity that the world exists 
more or less as we perceive it. They presuppose a 
correspondence theory of truth such that our perceptions 
are only true if they are by and large accurate 
representations of the way that the world really is2 . 
But this relationship cannot be independently tested, 
since our only knowledge of the external world is derived 
from our perceptions, and this begs the question of the 
accuracy of these perceptions. So metaphysical realism 
precludes the very possibility of there being any 
scientific evidence for the existence of such a world. 
As a result, theories based upon metaphysical realism 
cannot be regarded as satisfactory explanations. As 
Ellis comments 
"the postulated causes of the phenomena must be 
supposed to exist if the theory is to be 
accepted as doing what it purports to do; and 
normally we should expect to be able to find 
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independent confirmation of their existence 
from various sources" (Ellis, 1985, p. 57). 
2.2. 1 
Even if we could grant that such a transcendental world 
existed, thus dismissing one of Hume's concerns in his 
formulation of the problem of the veil-of-perception 
(which I termed the "strong" version of the 
veil-of-perception problem in sUbsection 1.2.4), the 
metaphysical realists would still have difficulty in 
satisfying us that our perceptions and representations of 
this world are accurate. In other words, they would 
still be faced with the traditional sceptical challenge. 
As Ellis writes 
"[w]e can investigate nature and develop a 
theoretical understanding of the world, but we 
cannot compare what we think we know with the 
truth to see how well we are doing. We cannot 
even be assured that science has made progress 
toward its goal of discovering the true nature 
of reality" (ibid, p.69). 
As Ellis points out, this is not a merely contingent, 
state-of-the-art difficulty, but a necessary consequence 
of the metaphysical relationship between the world and 
our scientific theories about it. He continues 
"[i]f even the perfection of human knowledge by 
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human standards does not necessarily lead to 
truth, then the truth is essentially unknowable" 
(ibid, pp. 71-2). 
;:: . 2 . ;:: 
The very manner in which metaphysical realists frame their 
questions about the world precludes discoverable empirical 
facts from constituting independent evidence in favour of 
their theories. 
2.2.2 Scientific realism, the veil-of-perceotion issue and 
the problem of evidence 
The second strand of realism under discussion is generally 
termed internal or scientific realism. Internal realists 
are just as committed as metaphysical realists to the 
existence of a materialist3 ontology, but they do not seek 
to justify the existence of an external world by reference 
to a correspondence theory of truth. 
This is not to say that scientific realists do not think 
that they have any evidence for the existence of an 
external world. It is simply to say that the way that they 
set up the problem both allows for and demands evidence 
that 1S not available to the metaphysical realist. 
Scientific 
materialist 
explanation. 
realists 
ontology 
justify 
uS1ng 
This argument 
48 
their acceptance of a 
from best the argument 
is 1n itself a scientific 
2 . 2 • 2 
hypothesis which states that the best explanation of why 
scientific theories are successful is that the world really 
is as they postulate it. Hence the internal realists 
derive increased support for the hypothesis that the world 
exists through the existence of successful scientific 
hypotheses. If a theory fails to make successful 
predictions or to explain phenomena it is intended to 
explain, then the theory should be discarded, or at least 
revised. 4 As we shall see later on in this chapter, this 
is the basis of the bootstrapping methodology. Here; thp. 
scientific realist puts forward the relatively unconfirmed 
hypothesis that the world exists beyond our perceptions 
(together with some tentative pieces of evidence) as a 
foundation upon which to build other, more specific 
scientific hypotheses. If these hypotheses are then well 
supported by independently obtained evidence, then they, in 
turn, provide further confirmation of the original 
hypothesis that the world exists beyond our perceptions. 
Scientific realists regard their individual theories and 
the relationship of these theories with the world as 
empirically testable. Yet it is sometimes arguedS that all 
scientific theories are empirically underdetermined, since 
no matter how many of their consequences we examlne, it 
will always be possible to construct rival theories which 
contradict them and yet succeed in explaining exactly the 
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same phenomena. If this argument 1S valid, then the 
internal realist 1S no less vulnerable than the 
metaphysical realist to the difficulties encompassed by the 
veil-of-perception issue. If scientific theory AilS as 
good at explaining our experiences as scientific theory A 
and is backed by equally strong evidence, then the internal 
realist has no reason for believing that A provides a more 
accurate representation of the world than does AI. 
Consequently, he falls victim to the weak version of the 
problems outlined in my discussion of the veil-of-
perception issue (in sUbsection 1.2.4). 
Internal realists claim to have a reply to the argument 
from empirical underdetermination. They maintain that such 
an argument can never be justified, since it is impossible 
to predict future theoretical developments which may yet 
enable us to distinguish between two theories that are 
currently empirically equivalent. Such evidence may not 
come from any direct consequences of either theory. Ellis 
writes in support of this claim that 
"the point 1S a Duhemian one. Theor ies do not 
normally occur in isolation, and evidence for or 
against a theory can come from unexpected 
quarters" (ibid p.65). 
Evidence for or against the truth of a theory may include 
50 
"values such as ontological simplicity, 
coherence, and explanatory power" (P. M. 
Churchland, 1985, p.42). 
2.2.2 
As Paul Churchland rightly points out, these criteria are 
values and not straightforwardly observable kinds of 
evidence. Nor are the criteria mentioned here an 
exhaustive list of the values that it is possible to 
employ in the assessment of a theory. The drawbacks of 
Paul Churchland's view will be analyzed later on in this 
chapter in the course of the discussion of Clark Glymour, 
who holds similar opinions. 
Hence, the internal realists' criterion for the truth 1S 
more than one of correspondence to a transcendental 
world, and a rather more pragmatic one at that. Whilst 
they would not wish to claim that the true theory is 
simply equivalent to the best theory we have, they do not 
insist upon the separation of truth from epistemic 
values, such as rationality, as the metaphysical realists 
do. However, this can lead to parochial entrenchment 
within one's own theoretical preferences. What it is 
rational for one person to believe may not seem rational 
to another, or indeed, to a Martian!6 
However, the success of the scientific realist in 
escaping the difficulties of metaphysical realism 1S 
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debatable S1nce evaluative criteria like ontological 
simplicity and coherence may themselves incorporate 
implicit and untestable metaphysical assumptions. Clark 
Glymour writes that 
"scientists holding contrasting theories are 
bound to see the same evidence as having a 
different bearing, even if they are in full 
agreement as to the evidence itself" (Glymour, 
1980, p.121). 
Indeed, as the discussion of Patricia Smith Church land 
and Descartes in chapter 1 showed, the questions that 
philosophers ask are very much influenced by their 
preconceptions of the issues that they want to resolve. 
Moreover, if these questions are also phrased in such a 
manner that they filter out responses and evidence that 
would count against their theories, then they are as 
guilty of making unjustifiable assumptions as the 
metaphysical realists that they are so eager to 
criticize. Once more, philosophers are confronted with 
the problem of evidential bias as defined in Chapter 1, 
sUbsection 1.1.1. In Section B, the consequences of this 
argument for the mind/brain question will be discussed. 
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2.3 Scientific realism and the bootstrapping device 
It has already been explained (chapter 1, sUbsection 1.2.5, 
chapter 2, sUbsection 2.2.2) that the bootstrapping 
methodology has been regarded by scientific realists as a 
tool for deriving both specific and general views from the 
same initial evidence. 
This option is not open to the metaphysical realist, who 
assumes that the external world exists, but who cannot test 
his hypothesis because it takes the status of an a priori 
assumption. Similarly, we saw in chapter 1 that Gregory 
and Neisser were only able to account for individual cases 
in which our perceptions may mislead us uS1ng the 
assumption that our perceptions are generally reliable. 
They were unable to use the evidence presented by the 
senses to acquire both specific and general knowledge about 
the external world. 
Perhaps the best introduction to the topic of bootstrapping 
is given by Clark Glymour in his book Theory and Evidence 
(Glymour, 1980). It is essential to note from the outset 
that bootstrapping is a very complex methodology that can 
appear in a variety of different guises. 
itself merely a suggestion or model of 
possible to obtain support for general 
Since it 1S 
hypotheses from the same initial 
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how 
evidence, 
and 
it 
it may be 
specific 
is hardly 
2.3 
surprising that individual accounts and uses of the 
methodology will emphasize different aspects of the 
strategy and a variety of ways in which it is employed.? 
Moreover, Slnce the strategy is a device for acquiring new 
knowledge on the basis of sound evidence, it blurs the 
traditional 
justification. 
distinction between discovery and 
I shall begin by discussing the methodology as described by 
Glymour, prior to isolating the key features of the 
strategy and illustrating how they recur in the form of 
bootstrapping which better describes the arguments of the 
philosophers of mind discussed in section B. 
Glymour regards his own variation of the bootstrap strategy 
as deriving from theories of Reichenbach and Carnap. Both 
Reichenbach and Carnap sought a way of using evidence 
derived from our observations to confirm the individual 
hypotheses of a theory. Glymour writes that the Carnapian 
legacy within Glymourian theory is 
"a stratagem for making the connection between 
evidence and theory: use some of the hypotheses 
to deduce from the evidence statements, instances 
of other hypotheses" (Glymour, 1980, p. 62).8 
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However, Reichenbach and Carnap both held that such 
deductions were only possible if they were based on 
premises which incorporated both observational and 
theoretical predicates9 • Such premises are, rightly, 
rejected by Glymour because they are regarded by 
Reichenbach and Carnap as meaning postulates and have not 
been tested. Glymour comments that such premises 
"have a special status; they are not understood 
as hypotheses within the language but rather as 
meaning postulates that extend the language. 
Their truth is entirely stipulative" (Glymour, 
1980, p. 59) 
It is clear that philosophers who base their theories so 
firmly upon such premises cannot avoid the charge of 
drawing conclusions from indefensible assumptions any more 
successfully than the metaphysical realist. However, the 
bootstrap methodology need not necessarily rely upon such 
premlses. 
2.3.1 The Glyrnourian bootstrap method 
The following passage from Glymour's book encapsulates the 
essence of the bootstrap strategy. 
"Hypotheses are tested and conf irmed by produc ing 
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instances of them; to produce instances of 
theoretical hypotheses one must use other 
theoretical relations to determine values for 
theoretical quantities; these other theoretical 
relations are tested in turn in the same way. 
Ideally, one might hope for bodies of evidence 
that permit each hypotheses to be tested 
independently" (ibid, p. 52). 
2.3.1 
For Glymour, evidence does not confirm a hypothesis 
absolutely, but only relative to a theory. We proceed, in 
the first instance, by using a body of evidence EI together 
with an unconfirmed hypothesis HI to confirm a hypothesis 
H2 relative to a theory T (where T is simply a set of 
hypotheses HI + H2 + H3 + Hn , together with their 
supporting bodies of evidence, EI , E2 , etc). Thus far, 
there is nothing distinctive about Glymour I s procedure, 
except the emphasis upon the fact that EI is only evidence 
for H2 relative to T. Nor must it be possible for any 
evidence whatsoever to confirm H2 . What is unique about 
Glymour's bootstrap method is that it can then be inverted 
so that H2 and a fresh set of evidence E2 can be used to 
confirm HI relative to TID. 
In other words, Glymour' s strategy enables us to pull 
ourselves up by the bootstraps by uSIng relatively 
unconfirmed hypotheses to yield fresh information in the 
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form of further hypotheses, which may then ln turn be 
combined with new evidence to confirm the original 
hypotheses. In more general terms, an overall world view 
may be combined with observational evidence to confirm a 
more narrow hypothesis relative to a theory; the narrow 
hypothesis can then be used ln conjunction with fresh 
evidence to confirm the general hypothesis, again relative 
to the theory. In this way, Glymour might contend, we are 
able to tear down the veil-of-perception. 
Two examples follow of how the Glymourian bootstrap 
methodology may be used. The first is a rather informal 
treatment of the use of the strategy in the formulation of 
a theory about genius in composers. The second is more 
formal. It consists of a justification of induction based 
upon the bootstrap strategy. 
Example 1 - Genius ln composers 
Let T be the entire theory of the nature of genlus ln 
classical composers. 
Let HI be the unconfirmed hypothesis that all musical genll 
come from mainland Europe and El be knowledge of the ages 
at which those mainland European composers familiar to us 
first began to show signs of musical promise. So EI might 
consist of: 
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Mozart - gave public performances aged 6 
Bach - showed early promlse 
strauss (Richard) - composed from the age of 8 
Liszt - played in public aged 9 
Chopin - played in public aged 811 
2 . 3 . 1 
From this, we may deduce the hypothesis H2 that musical 
genius often begins at an early age. If we then use this 
hypothesis H2 together with the details of the birthplaces 
of those youthful composers familiar to us (E2 ), we can try 
to confirm the first hypothesis H1 that all musical genius 
comes from mainland Europe. For example, E2 may consist of 
the following data: 
Mozart was born ln Austria 
Handel was born ln Germany 
Bach was born in Germany 
strauss was born in Germany 
Liszt was born in Hungary 
Chopin was born in Poland 
Given that E2 does contain this information, then it would 
appear that H1 is conf irmed relative to the theory T. 
However, for the bootstrap strategy to avoid circularity, 
we must be able to say what sort of evidence would count 
against H1 . For example, if Purcell were to be included in 
E2 , then H1 would be falsified since Purcell was born in 
England. Hl would then need to be weakened to the 
58 
2 . 3 . 1 
hypothesis that "many musical genii come from mainland 
Europe". Similarly, we must be able to say what evidence 
El would have to include for it to falsify hypothesis H2 _ 
in this case, had we included Beethoven, who did not show 
much musical promise in his youth (despite his father I s 
attempts to make it seem otherwise), H2 would also need 
revision. 
Note that we could now go on to use H2 to formulate either 
another general hypothesis, H3 , such as all musical genii 
played the piano, or a more specific hypothesis H4 , such as, 
if Purcell was a musical genius, then it is likely that he 
composed pieces at an early age. (H4 1S conf irmed by 
further evidence E4 - Purcell did begin to compose when 
still a young boy.) In this fashion, our initial 
hypothesis Hl and evidence El permit inference of both 
specific and general facts. 
Example 2 - The use of the bootstrap strategy to justify 
induction 
A more formal example of the use of the bootstrap method in 
SC1ence 1S given in Hunt's (1990) examination of the 
question of induction. Hunt argues that the fact that only 
the existence of regularity can provide evidence for the 
view that there are necessary connections within our 
universe does not entitle Hume to infer that there can be 
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no empirical evidence for necessity. 
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The problem of 
necessity simply reduces to the problem of induction. If 
we can empirically justify induction, then necessity 
exists, even if we cannot know the precise nature of this 
necessity. This is where the bootstrap strategy comes in. 
Al though Hume can argue that inductive argument cannot 
guarantee the existence of a uniform world, it is not open 
to him to deny the very possibili ty that such a world 
exists. Call this possibility our theory T. We can ass1gn 
this possibility a finite positive probability. This 
probabili ty need not be very high. It therefore follows 
that we can assign all the hypotheses included in T (H 1 , H2, 
H3 ..... Hn) an equal probability of > o. 
If induction 1S valid (call this hypothesis H1 ), then it 
will tend to yield true hypotheses on the basis of the 
evidence available. So if the probability of T being true 
is > 0, then the probability of induction being valid is 
also> o. If evidence El is available which increases the 
probability of a second hypothesis H2 being true, given that 
the probability of induction being valid is > 0, then this 
in turn increases the possibility that nature is uniform 
and that induction is indeed valid. 
Once more, we are pulling ourselves up by the bootstraps 
since we are assuming that nature may be uniform and that 
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induction may be valid in order to demonstrate these very 
conclusions. 
because 
However, Hunt's argument 1S not circular 
"even though an inductive rule appears both as a 
rule of inference and as a conclusion, it 1S 
nowhere assumed as true but only, initially, as 
minimally probable" (Hunt, 1990, p. 243). 
Moreover, we can say what evidence would count against it. 
Hunt comments that 
" [t] he emergence of evidence supporting induction 
is an empirical matter and if contrary evidence 
appears the probability of [induction being 
valid] will become low" (ibid, p. 243). 
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2.4 Evaluation of the bootstrap strategy - part I 
Hunt's example shows how just how deep-rooted and useful 
the bootstrap strategy may be if it can withstand the 
criticisms that have been levelled at the metaphysical 
realist with respect to the testability of the premises of 
his theories. 
Just how satisfactory is this method of formulating and 
testing hypotheses? As we have seen ln our examples, it is 
possible to avoid the obvious objection of circularity. 
Glymour argues (p. 108) that the objection is not pertinent 
here, because we can restrict the evidence to confirm any 
hypothesis relative to the theory so that we are able to 
say at every stage of the process what would falsify the 
hypothesis. He writes that 
could "[t]hen it 
hypothesis would 
and it evidence, 
not be objected that the 
be confirmed whatever the 
could not be objected that 
anything confirms anything else with respect to 
any theory whatsoever" (Glymour, ibid, p.108). 
So Glymour seems to do better than the metaphysical 
realist, at least as far as the strong version of the veil-
of-perception issue is concerned. If new evidence calls 
one of his hypotheses into doubt, then Glymour is able to 
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reject either all or part of his theory. Compare this with 
the metaphysical realist who is unable to say what evidence 
would refute his theory that the external world exists, 
Slnce this theory is a prerequisite for the rest of his 
beliefs, and is, as we saw earlier in this chapter 
(subsection 2.2.1), not testable. 
But if hypotheses are only ever justified by evidence 
relative to a theory, how does Glymour fare against the 
problem of empirical underdetermination (see earlier, 
subsection 2.2.2)? What happens if there is more than one 
possible explanation for the observational evidence we 
have, so that the evidence supports rival theories in 
different ways? 
As we noted, this scenario may still cause difficulties for 
the scientific realist. There is little point in granting 
the existence of an external world if we cannot say which 
of our theories is a correct description of it. The 
scientific realist will not want to back the theory that 
merely saves the phenomena, rather than the one provides 
the correct explanation. Glymour comments that 
U[w]hat makes one theory better than another lS 
a diffuse matter that 1S not neatly or 
appropriately measured by any single scale" 
(Glymour, ibid, p. 153). 
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Nevertheless, as we noted above (subsection 2.2.2), Glymour 
believes that use of the bootstrap strategy does yield a 
few general criteria for deciding between theories. Such 
criteria include (ibid, pp. 153-4) preferring those 
theories of which the hypotheses are conf irmed by the 
evidence, rather than those containing disconfirmed 
hypotheses, those that have been tested against a wider 
variety of evidence, those that explain evidence ln a 
uniform manner, etc. As Glymour himself writes 
"[t]he criteria correspond to familiar 
methodological truisms, and, moreover, they are 
all aspects of the demand for better tested 
theories" (Glymour, ibid, p.154). 
These criteria are very similar to those mentioned in the 
discussion of scientific realism earlier in this chapter 
(subsection 2.2.2)12. 
However I believe that the scientific realists have not , 
won the day against the metaphysical realists simply by 
citing such criteria, since the criteria that they actually 
invoke in deciding which theory to adopt may in fact be far 
more metaphysically invidious. I state my case in 
SUbsection 2.5.2 of this chapter. 
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2.4.1 Achinstein's criticisms against Glyrnour and their 
implications 
Peter Achinstein has put forward another criticism of 
Glymour's theory, which is worthy of consideration. In 
Achinstein (1983), he argues that Glymour misconceives 
entirely the desired relationship between theory and 
evidence. This is because Glyrnour's concept of evidence 
cannot account for the role that background information 
generally plays in our decisions as to whether it 1S 
reasonable to believe a theory or not. Achinstein comments 
that Glymour's bootstrap strategy does not acknowledge one 
of the basic requirements of evidence, namely that it 
should increase the probability of the hypothesis that it 
1S intended to support being true (Achinstein, 1983, 
p.358)13. 
Nor 1S Glymour's cause helped any, Achinstein argues, by 
his (Glymour's) declaration that evidence (E1 ) is only 
evidence in support of a hypothesis (H) relative to one 
particular theory (T1 ), and not necessarily relative to any 
other similar theory (T2 ). For the logical consequence of 
this . V1ew is that we can only regard evidence as 
providing genuine support for H if we already know that the 
theory (T1 ) to which the truth of H 1S relativized 1S itself 
true. Yet, given Glymour's concept of evidence, we cannot 
derive any reasons for believing Tl to be true from the 
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evidence evinced in support of the other hypotheses 
which, together with H, make up T1 . Achinstein writes 
that 
"[a]lthough I know that (in Glymour's 
sense) ... [E] ... is evidence for [the hypotheses 
that make up T1 ] with respect to [T1 ], this fact 
does not enable me to know that [T1] is true, 
Glymour will probably say. Nor, indeed, does 
this fact give me a reason to believe [T1J" 
(Achinstein, 1983, p. 361)14. 
Achinstein implies (ibid, p. 361) that it is because of 
this flaw in the Glymourian concept of evidence that 
Glymour relies upon the general criteria mentioned 
earlier (subsection 2.4) as tools to decide which is the 
best theory from a number of rivals. However, Achinstein 
rightly comments that even 
"if one theory is better than another according 
to Glymour's criteria for comparing theories, 
this does not mean that the former is known to 
be true whereas the latter is not; nor does it 
mean that there is a good reason to believe the 
former to be true and the latter false" (ibid, 
p. 361) 
The implications of Achinstein's arguments are very 
clear. If my conclusions in SUbsection 2.5.2 (below) are 
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correct, then philosophers in co-evolutionary 
disciplines15 like the philosophy of mind should be wary 
of employing general evaluative criteria when they are 
comparing their own theories with those of their rivals , 
since this strategy may lead to the temptation to assess 
the theories against yardsticks that favour their own 
theories. Moreover, Achinstein has shown that this mode 
of evaluation can tell us nothing about the truth or 
falsity of the theory that best satisfies such abstract 
criteria. This means that the scientific realist's 
position would be dangerously close to collapsing into an 
instrumentalist stance (cf. chapter 1, sUbsection 1.2.1). 
The instrumentalist holds that it is meaningless to apply 
the terms "true" and "false" to theories, since theories 
are merely devices for predicting what will happen in the 
future. They do not describe anything. Consequently, 
the problem of empirical underdetermination rears its 
ugly head once more. If theories only predict, then it 
is perfectly plausible for two theories to predict events 
equally successfully. Only one, however, will be the 
true explanation. 
Clearly, it would be disastrous for the scientific 
realist to lose his grip upon the concepts of truth and 
falsity. It is perfectly correct to acknowledge that all 
theories should be testable and liable to revision should 
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hypothesis be falsified by the evidence, for this strategy 
cannot be applied without an understanding of what it means 
for a theory to be true or false. However, it is quite 
another thing to employ a method for evaluating theories 
that can have no bearing at all on whether they should be 
regarded as true or false. It is hard to see how the 
scientific realist could maintain that his theories have 
any more explanatory value than the instrumentalist's 
predictions. 
Achinstein's arguments also demonstrate that it is not 
automatically open to scientific realists who adopt the 
Glymourian bootstrap strategy to claim that they can indeed 
be sure that the resulting theories have some 
correspondence with external reality simply because they 
are supported by bodies of evidence. Glymour's theory of 
evidence makes no mention of the requirement that evidence 
in support of a hypothesis should a) make the truth of that 
hypothesis more probable by means of an explanatory 
connection between the two (which demonstrates that the 
evidence can be explained by the hypothesis) and b) take 
background information into account. This means that it is 
perfectly possible for an opponent to accuse the Glymourian 
scientific realist of selecting evidence which appears to 
fit 1n with his hypotheses even though the hypothes is 
cannot really explain the evidence. 
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A second accusation may also be justifiable, namely that 
the scientific realist 1S uS1ng Glymour's strategy to 
escape from the need to take relevant background 
information into account, including, perhaps, evidence that 
might tell against his chosen theory. If this accusation 
is correct, then the scientific realist would be no less 
guilty of the metaphysical realist of rendering his theory· 
immune from testability. In seventeenth century 
terminology, he would simply be hiding evidence against his 
theory behind the veil of perception, in the hope that 
critics of his work will not be discerning enough to notice 
this sleight of hand. 
2.4.2 The outlook for philosophers of mind who bootstrap -
Part I 
I have already noted (subsection 2.3) that the bootstrap 
strategy may be employed in slightly different forms, 
depending upon precisely how it is thought by individual 
philosophers to provide an explanation of our ability to 
support general and specific hypotheses upon the basis of 
the same initial evidence. 
I shall outline the bootstrap strategies of the 
philosophers of mind discussed in this thesis in greater 
detail in section B. Here, I shall confine myself to a few 
general remarks. 
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It is worth noting that the philosophers discussed all 
incorporate several key features of the Glymourian account 
into their bootstrapping strategies. Firstly, they all 
perceive the bootstrap strategy as a way of formulating 
general and specific hypotheses upon the same initial 
evidence, thereby allowing a structured search for further 
information. Secondly, they all claim to be aware of the 
importance of the possibility of evidence that will refute 
either one of their hypotheses, if they are to avoid the 
charge that any evidence whatsoever will support their 
hypotheses, thus effectively render ing them untestable. 
Like Glymour, they also try to provide at least two 
independently obtained sources of evidence in support of 
their hypotheses. This is intended to make the hypotheses 
independently testable and to allow for the possibility 
that one hypothesis may be accepted, and the other rejected 
if there is not sufficient relatively independent evidence 
to support it. For example, they may accept the general 
hypothesis and reject the more specific one, preferring to 
find a second specific hypothesis that is better supported 
by independently obtained evidence. 
However, there are also divergences from the Glymourian 
outline of the methodology. Philosophers of mind are 
concerned with formulating general theories of what the 
mind/brain is really like. They each proceed by 
formulating a general hypothesis about the nature of 
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processes and representations within the mind/brain (H 1 ) and 
citing evidence (E l ) which consists in facts that are best 
explained by such a hypothesis. They then postulate 
specific hypotheses (H2' H3I etc) about the nature of the 
mind/brain and how it should be studied on the basis of Hl 
and El . If further confirmation of H2 can be found in the 
form of an independently obtained body of evidence (E2) then' 
H2 1S supported, and HI may also be regarded as more likely 
to be correct. If, however, E2 contradicts H2 , then support 
for both hypotheses is weakened, and further confirmation 
for HI must be sought elsewhere. 16 
It might be argued that this verS10n of the bootstrap 
strategy avoids the Glymourian problem noted by Achinstein 
(see sUbsection 2.4.1) that evidence cannot provide support 
for a theory unless we presume the theory to be true, 
because the evidence does not make a hypothesis appear more 
or less likely to be true. If philosophers of mind cite 
some support for HI in the form of El , then this difficulty 
seems to be avoided. However, I shall demonstrate ln 
section B that the philosophers of mind do not succeed 1n 
avoiding these problems any better than Glymour, since the 
evidence that they cite 1n support of their hypotheses 
either systematically excludes sources of possible 
empirical refutation, or is merely compatible with the 
hypotheses, rather than genuinely explained by them. This 
can result, once more, 1n the possibility of er.1pirical 
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underdetermination. 
In section B, the theories of modern philosophers of mind 
will be examined to see if they fall into the traps of the 
bootstrap strategy outlined thus far. It seems that 
bootstrapping philosophers of mind may be caught on the 
horns of a three-way dilemma. Either 
a) they will maintain that their evidence provides us with 
good reason to believe that their theory is true: this is 
debatable in the light of my earlier comments, or 
b) they will adopt the more general evaluative criteria for 
jUdging their theories, in which case they will either 
i) run the risk of reducing their theories to the status of 
complex predictions (the accusation of instrumentalism), or 
ii) fall foul of the argument evinced in section 2.5 below, 
which concludes in sUbsection 2.5.2 that general evaluative 
cr iter ia are not sui table instruments for compar ing co-
evolutionary theories in philosophy of mind. 
These considerations indicate that the use of a bootstrap 
strategy will not automatically ensure that the scientific 
realist will avoid the difficulties associated with 
metaphysical realism. 
I shall now argue that co-evolutionary theories within the 
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philosophy of mind suffer from particular problems when 
employing the bootstrap strategy. These problems may be 
directly attributable to the novelty of their 
interdisciplinary approach. 
2.5 Evaluation of the bootstrap strategy - part II 
"Philosophers, for the most part, are 
constitutionally timid, and dislike the 
unexpected. Few of them would be genuinely happy 
as pirates or burglars. Accordingly they invent 
systems which make the future calculable, at 
least in its main outlines" (Bertrand Russell, 
Philosophy's Ulterior Motives, Unpopular Essays, 
1950) • 
It would perhaps surprlse Russell to know that many 
philosophers, including those who attempt to use findings 
from other disciplines in the construction of their 
theories, are in fact burglars, since they help themselves 
unjustifiably to implicit metaphysical, that lS, 
untestable, assumptions. 
This will become clear following an examination of an 
alternative view of the bootstrap methodology put forward 
by Jon J. Nordby ln his article "Bootstrapping Whi le 
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Barefoot" (henceforth referred to as Nordby (1989). Nordby 
believes that his suggestions apply to the use of the 
bootstrap strategy to solve serial crimes, rather than to 
its use in science. My view is that his criticisms of the 
formal aspects of the Glymourian bootstrap approach have a 
wider application than he thinks, and are particularly 
pertinent to those philosophers who attempt to develop co-
evolutionary theories uSlng both philosophical and 
scientific considerations. 
The remainder of this chapter has two central functions. 
Firstly Nordby's position will be examined. This will be 
followed by an outline of the major features of those 
theories that will fall into the same bootstrap category as 
Nordby's example. I shall then discuss the consequences 
for our key issues of evidence and realism . 
2.5.1 Nordby's account of bootstrapping 
Clark Glymour holds that the bootstrap strategy is at its 
most useful when new scientific theories are being evolved, 
rather than in more established areas of scientific 
activity. He writes that it is generally found 
"when quite novel theories are introduced, when 
systematic theorizing is extended to new subject 
matters, when theoretically based predictions go 
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wrong, and when fine-grained questions arise as 
to the relative importance of various experiments 
or observations" (Glymour, 1980, p. 172). 
2.5.1 
As we shall see in a moment, it is the very novelty of the 
co-evolutionary approach which renders inappropriate the 
use of the general evaluative criteria suggested by' 
Glymour17 and endorsed by philosophers of mind (see 
sUbsections 2.4 and 2.4.2 above) and which makes Nordby's 
comments so relevant. 
Nordby begins by making a comparlson between the models 
constructed ln science on a mathematical basis and those 
constructed to solve criminal investigations. Examples of 
mathematical modelling exist, he writes, in many different 
sciences ranging from geology to physics. Equations are 
formulated which reflect phenomena in the observable world, 
but which are not identical with them. Nordby writes that 
scientific models 
"are, for example, mathematical constructions in 
the form of equations that allow predictions and 
explanations of earthquakes. Equations are not 
the same things as moving geological masses" 
(Nordby, 1989, p. 387, note 3). 
Nordby takes a realist's view of the role that scientific 
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theories play in our relationship with the external world. 
They predict and explain natural phenomena. 
Like scientific models, crime models are simplified 
representations which aid our understanding of complex 
matters (Nordby, 1989, p. 374) and, like scientific models, 
crime models are in some sense idealizations. But whereas· 
the scientific models are evaluated according to their 
predictive and explanatory power, and 
"abstract certain elements at the expense of 
others and simplify the process of explaining and 
predicting phenomena" (Nordby, ibid, p. 373), 
crime type models18 are 
"constructed with legal definitions, which 
stipulate relevant conditions, and with varlOUS 
phenomenological laws, scientific theories, 
inducti ve inferences, and lore. These compose 
the alternative components identifying features 
of the model that defines a particular crime" 
(Nordby, ibid, p. 374). 
The differences between a scientific model and a crlme type 
model do not end here. A scientific model forms part of a 
scientif ic theory. As we saw in Chapter 1, sUbsection 
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1.2.1, theories are formulated to explain or predict the 
nature or occurrence of events uSlng law-like statements 
linking types of events. Consequently, evidence that tells 
against a scientific model will falsify some part, or 
perhaps even all, of the scientific theory in which it is 
embedded. The explanations provided by scientific theories 
and the models associated with them are intended to be laws· 
of nature which hold without exception. 
This 1S not true of cr1me type models. Nordby contends 
that the crime type model does not explain a crime in the 
same way as a scientif ic model explains a phenomenon in 
nature. In his view, the crime type model is 
"only a 
actual, 
376} 19. 
heuristic device for discovering the 
concrete token crime story" (ibid, p. 
Whereas the scientific theory will itself be confirmed or 
refuted by evidence gleaned from individual occurrences, 
the crime type model does not admit of either confirmation 
or refutation. Rather, it is the individual crime token 
models of concrete criminal acts that are confirmed or 
refuted by the evidence, and that are either true or false 
in that particular situation. The crime type model itself 
rema1ns valid even if a token model 1S ultimately 
discarded. This 1S because it may still apply to a 
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different crime. Nordby comments that 
"[t]he crime type model does not function as a 
theory since it . 1S underdetermined by any 
investigative outcome .... No matter how many times 
a model fails to lead us to the right crime 
story, it is always possible that there will be 
a time when it does" (ibid, pp. 376-7). 
2 .5. 1 
Nordby then goes on to explain in what way he thinks that 
bootstrapping in science differs from the use of the 
bootstrap methodology to solve ser ial crimes. Firstly, 
detectives are unused to creating novel hypotheses. They 
generally just employ the device of arguing to the best 
explanation from a range of those already avai lable. A 
decision as to what constitutes the best explanation 1S 
facilitated in cases of empirical underdetermination by the 
employment of scientific techniques from psychology, 
statistics and computer SC1ence, among others (Nordby, 
ibid, p. 378). Yet very few actual cases ever fit the 
models generated exactly. 
Secondly, Nordby comments that, although it 1S possible to 
cite numerous facts about the events surrounding a 
particular crime20 , it 1S not always easy for the 
detective to sort out which of the facts actually 
consti tute ev idence 1n support of one cr 1me type mode 1 
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rather than another, when he is trying to build up a crime 
token model of events. He writes that 
" [u] sing current investigative methods, we can 
show that a fact is relevant or irrelevant only 
given a specific model: there are no obvious 
principles governing model type component 
selection in serial homicide cases" (Nordby, 
ibid, pp. 379-80). 
For example, using a crime type model that a husband has 
murdered his wife, then the fact that she remortgaged their 
house without his knowledge may be evidence in support of 
that model, whereas her act may be accorded less weight 
using a crime type model which assumes that a woman may be 
murdered by her blackmail victim or by a complete stranger. 
This relationship between the selection of evidence and the 
crime model type that the detective is using should be 
compared with Glymour's claim that evidence will only ever 
support a hypothesis relative to a theory. 21 However, 
Nordby (unlike Glymour, see subsection 2.4.1 above) 1S 
aware of the relationship between evidence and probability. 
He writes that 
"[a] fact 1S relevant for an explanation if and 
only if it increases or decreases its 
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probability" (ibid, note 10, p. 387; see also 
note 9, p. 387). 
2.5.1 
As we have seen (subsection 2.4.2), this view 1S also 
incorporated into the form of the bootstrap strategy used 
in the philosophy of mind. 
So, on Nordby's account, the detective must decide which 
crime type models may be appropriate starting points for 
use in constructing a provisional crime token model for the 
events that he is currently investigating. He must also 
consider the kinds of evidence that would make each crime 
type model the most likely explanation. Then he may make 
use of the bootstrapping strategy to enable him to move 
from the evidence currently available to him to the 
formulation of a provisional crime token model. Using that 
token model, he then makes further use of the bootstrap 
strategy to predict what other evidence may yet be found. 
If the evidence is not forthcoming, or evidence is found 
which contradicts the provisional cr1me token model, then 
the model must be either rejected or partially revised to 
take account of this. 
Nordby's bootstrapping method follows a similar pattern to 
the one described by Glymour (Glymour, 1980) and employed 
by Hunt (Hunt, 1990) (see subsection 2.3.1 above). The 
strategy enables us to make inferences trom relatively 
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unconfirmed hypotheses to new evidence, which ln turn 
strengthens our belief in the hypotheses themselves. But 
whereas Glymour holds that scientific hypotheses yielded by 
the bootstrap method are confirmed relative to a theory, 
Nordby thinks that the constituent hypotheses of crlme 
token models gain credibility relative to a crlme type 
model when supporting evidence is discovered. This is not 
the same thing, since 
"crime type models are not theoretical models 
because they lack the surrounding support of 
scientific theory, and therefore do not provide 
the same kind of explanations ...... Although such 
models may have scientific theories as 
components, any attempt to build theoretical 
functions into these crime type models simply 
confuses them with theories or theoretical 
models" (Nordby, ibid, p. 386). 
The importance of this distinction is exemplified ln the 
question of empirical underdetermination. Detectives, like 
philosophers and scientists, have to face the problem of 
what to do in situations where the available evidence does 
not seem to point to anyone explanation as being more 
plausible than other possibilities. 
As we noted earlier, Glymour and many philosophers of mind 
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believe that, 1n cases of empirical underdetermination, we 
must rank alternative accounts of events according to such 
criteria as uniformity of explanation, number of hypotheses 
confirmed etc (see above, sUbsections 2.2.2, 2.4, 2.4.2). 
But Nordby holds that this is impossible when bootstrapping 
in criminology because no overall theory is available to 
determine which models or sciences should apply to the 
case under consideration. Nordby writes that 
"[a]pplying Glyrnour's formal criteria for theory 
choice does not provide firm grounds for crime 
model choice. Ultimately the choice depends on 
deciding that certain lore, or natural or social 
sciences apply, and that is not a decision based 
on formal grounds" (Nordby, ibid, p. 385). 
Nordby's use of the word "formal" 1S misleading in this 
context, since it implies that Glymour uses a rigid, almost 
algorithmic method for deciding between theories in cases 
where the evidence is equivocal between two or more rivals. 
Glyrnour's criteria might be better described as "abstract" 
or "non-particular". The implication in Glymour's work is 
that it is possible to assess rival theories in terms of 
how uniform an explanation of phenomena they provide, how 
many hypotheses of each theory are confirmed, what variety 
of evidence is obtainable in each case, etc, without ever 
considering the actual content of the different theories. 
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Nordby rejects these criteria for the purpose of solving 
the problem of empirical underdetermination in criminology 
because crime type models, unlike scientific models, are 
not embedded in wider theories which tell the detective how 
he should decide between competing models. 
So the essence of Nordby's position is that bootstrapping 
is a useful strategy for the detective to employ when 
trying to solve crimes, since it may help him both to 
explain the evidence currently available to him and to 
predict what evidence may be discovered at a later date. 
However, since crime type models, unlike scientific models, 
are not embedded in wider theories which determine which 
models are appl icable to indi v idua 1 phenomena, abstract 
criteria for deciding between rival theories are not 
appropriate tools for the detective. 
declares that 
Rather, Nordby 
" [ t] he issue instead rema l.ns wh ich sc ience (s), or 
other components composing the models, should 
apply to the problem" (ibid, pp. 382-3). 
In the next sUbsection of this chapter, I shall argue that 
co-evolutionary theories l.n philosophy also lack the 
support of a wider theory. Consequently, the difficulties 
for the detective isolated by Nordby of determining which 
scientific and sociological considerations are relevant to 
the crime currently under investigation will recur for co-
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evolutionary theorists who find themselves with no guidance 
as to which philosophical and scientif ic considerations 
should be allowed to carry any weight and which should be 
rejected. Once more, it seems that abstract evaluative 
criteria will prove to be inadequate for deciding between 
two theories whenever the problem of empirical 
underdetermination arises. 
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2.5.2 Criminal elements in Co-evolutionary Philosophical 
Theories 
It is worth noting from the outset that it is not enough 
for those philosophers of science who hold co-evolutionary 
theories to argue that the considerations raised by my 
discussion of Nordby do not apply to their theories by dint 
of the very fact that they are theories and not merely 
models. Did not Nordby himself draw a sharp distinction 
between scientific theories and the crime type models from 
which detectives begin their deliberations? 
This line of argument simply begs the question at issue, 
namely whether or not co-evolutionary theories do exhibit 
many of the features that create problems for the detective 
who must choose between crime type models. It 1S true that 
Nordby does distinguish between the way 1n which a 
scientific theory explains and the way 1n which a cr1me 
type model explains, but Nordby's examples are all drawn 
from theories which fall squarely within distinct branches 
of SC1ences such as physics, geology or biology. The 
mathematical representations used in the modelling of 
phenomena studied in these sciences are merely tools, and 
no mathematical conclusions are drawn from them except in 
so far as they can be transposed into geological theory. 
The geologist has no information to help the mathematician 
make new discoveries within his own field of expertise. 
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Nordby makes no mention of any more modern developments in 
sClence, such as the attempts to draw philosophical and 
psychological conclusions about the nature of the 
mind/brain from the study of the neurophysiology of the 
bra in and v ice versa. It lS therefore an open question 
whether or not these co-evolutionary theories exhibit the 
same features as geological theories, even though they are 
undoubtedly intended to explain phenomena in the same way; 
that lS, in terms of lawlike statements which apply 
universally to all phenomena of the same kind. 
Moreover, the differences highlighted by Nordby between 
scientific theories and crime type models may be at least 
partially obviated by bad scientific methodology. In 
Chapter One (see especially sUbsections 1.2.7, 1.2.8, and 
1.3) it was noted that it is possible to construct 
psychological theories so that some of their constituent 
hypotheses become untestable. Any failure to understand 
what kind of evidence is required to confirm or disconfirm 
a theory may well result in theories being retained when 
they should be, at the very least, revised. Philosophers 
of science may be guilty of allowing their own personal 
views about whether or not a theory is correct to influence 
their opinions about the nature of the tests and evidence 
that may be said to support their own theories and rival 
theories. This aspect of the bootstrap problem will be 
discussed more fully at the end of this chapter (subsection 
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2.6) • 
First, however, it is important to note further 
similari ties between Nordby's crime type models and co-
evolutionary theories. Nordby comments that 
scientific techniques 
"from sciences such as psychology, statistics, 
archaeology, physical anthropology, physics, and 
computer science" (Nordby, 1989, p. 378) 
many 
have been imported into criminology to assist detectives in 
finding the best explanation based upon the evidence 
available. 
Nordby writes that the resulting models which are made up 
using these components from scientific theories are not 
themselves scientific theories, since they 
"do not explain in the same sense that 
geological theories and tectonic plate models 
explain earthquakes" (Nordby, ibid, p. 378). 
However, although philosophers who advocate a co-
evolutionary approach are engaged in the search for nel,·; 
theories, they employ very similar methods. In philosophy 
of mind, for example, they examine not only traditional 
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philosophical concepts, but also the results and ~ethods of 
experimental psychology, neuropsychology and neurological 
research, before attempting to synthesize everything into 
one theory. 
The co-evolutionary approach to the mind/brain question is 
relatively novel, and hence, if Glymour is to be believed, 
the bootstrap strategy should be appropriate to their 
task22 • But it is precisely because this approach 1S so 
new, that Nordby's considerations regarding the bootstrap 
strategy apply. Like crime models, neurophilosophers lack 
any over-arching theory which determines which of the 
sciences should be considered in formulating their opinions 
and which should be ignored or given less weight. Again, 
this becomes a question for decision, and formal 
considerations do not apply. Nordby comments that 
"Glymour writes formally about bootstrapping and 
theory choice as if it had already been 
determined which models, or which SClences, 
having phenomenological laws embedded within 
them, apply. In criminal investigations, where 
there are real choices among competing cr1me 
narratives as they develop, this is not true" 
(Nordby, ibid, p. 383). 
Nordby goes on to argue that 
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"[u]sing explanations to bootstrap other 
explanations within an uncertain model describes 
bootstrapping while barefoot.. Detectives are 
barefoot in the sense that crime type models, 
unlike theoretical scientific models, lack the 
support of associated theory" (Nordby, ibid, 
p.383) . 
2.5.2 
However, many co-evolutionary theories will also lack this 
support. Paul Churchland, one of the ploneers of the co-
evolutionary approach to the study of the mind/brain 
comments that 
" [g] i ven our posi tion as proto-scientists, 
philosophers are seldom in the position of having 
a fully-developed theory ready for unambiguous 
experimental evaluation" 
1986a, pp. 6-7). 
(P. M. Churchland, 
Further details of the methodologies of the co-evolutionary 
theorists of the mind/brain will be given in Section B (see 
especially Chapters 5 and 6). Suffice it to say for the 
moment that it is one thing to recognize that there is a 
need for a guiding theory to govern this new approach, but 
quite another to avoid the pitfalls that its absence 
entails. 
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2.6 The outlook for co-evolutionary theories 
It is now easy to see how neurophilosophical, or indeed, 
all co-evolutionary theories may still fall foul of 
metaphysical dangers even whilst ostensibly maintaining a 
scientific realist position. If a hypothesis is simply 
assumed rather than properly tested, or if there 1S' 
insufficient empirical evidence available to support it, 
then it may be tainted with metaphysical realism (see 
above, sUbsection 2.2.1). 
Paul Churchland writes that 
" [0] ur discipl ine [neurophi losophy] appears to be 
a priori because the 'metaphysical' issues with 
which we deal generally are a fair distance 
removed from any obvious empirical resolution. 
But that is a reflection of the early stage of 
the inquiry, not of the superempirical nature of 
the subject matter" (P. M. Churchland, ibid, pp. 
6-7) . 
However, this stance is problematic. Even if we accept 
that co-evolutionary philosophers of the mind/brain are 
aware of the need for testability within their theories, 
two problems still rema1n. 
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Firstly, are these philosophers genuinely prepared to 
acknowledge that they will have difficulty ln providing 
evidence in support of their theories and that therefore 
their theories can only have a provisional status, or do 
they, like the detectives in Nordby's article (Nordby, 
1989, p. 383), sometimes forget that? This question will 
be discussed at length in Section B. 
Moreover, even if the philosopher is prepared to treat his 
theory as a provisional attempt to make sense of the 
evidence at hand, any methodology which involves on-the-
spot decisions about the admissibility of evidence from a 
variety of scientific disciplines and about the nature of 
satisfactory testing may still prove unsatisfactory. This 
is because such a methodology runs the risk of favouring 
those sciences and tests that yield the evidence that best 
supports a preferred theory. Equally, evidence cited in 
support of rival theories may be rejected out of hand 
because of a genuine but mistaken belief that this evidence 
does not come from a credible or important enough source. 
The difficulties are exacerbated owing to the disparate 
nature of the concepts at work in philosophy and in the 
realms of psychology and neurophysiology. As Hundert 
comments, 
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"the relationship of 'fact' to 'theory' is complicated here 
by the diversity of those three 'approaches to the mind' 
which we have brought together. As Aristotle warns us, 
what counts as a fact in a field like neurobiology 1S 
something fundamentally different from what counts as a 
'fact' in a field like existential psychiatry. The 'data' 
of shared phenomenological experience cannot be expected to 
be 'precise' in the same way as the 'data' of the action of 
growth associated proteins in the central nervous system" 
(Hundert, 1989, p. 300). 
In other words, not only must philosophers contend with the 
problems of conflicting theories (empirical 
underdetermination) and conflicting evidence, they must 
also deal with sources of evidence that do not really fit 
comfortably together. As a result we may agaln choose the 
evidence that supports our own theory best, when we should 
have retained the evidence that we have just discarded. 23 
Furthermore, the very way in which philosophers set up 
their theories may lead to the exclusion of tests that are 
likely to refuted preferred, but weaker hypotheses. This 
point has also been made by Ronald Giere (see Giere, 1983). 
Giere comments that it 1S perfectly possible for 
philosophers to formulate their theories so as to guarantee 
the desired results under test (with no intention to do so 
whatsoever) . They can do this by systematically building 
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into the theories and tests so many constraints about what 
constitutes a successful hypothesis, or about the nature of 
acceptable evidence, that the probability of the theory 
passing the test is greatly increased, but this does not 
make the test a good test. 24 Giere writes that 
"it is not in fact unlikely that a model designed 
to accommodate a given result should in fact do 
so. And this is true no matter whether the 
corresponding hypothesis is true or false. It is 
possible, therefore, to be justifiably mistaken 
about whether a given experiment constitutes a 
good test or not" (Giere, 1983, p. 286). 
Consequently, philosophers and scientists may well help 
themselves to metaphysical assumptions to which they are 
not entitled, even though they believe that they have 
subjected their theory to rigorous tests. By the time they 
realize their error, (if at all), it may be too late. 
Similarly, Nordby thinks that detectives may realise too 
late that they have been pursuing the wrong crime type 
model. The ways in which neurophilosophy falls into this 
trap will be illustrated in section B (notably in Chapter 
6) • 
This systematic failure to take account of all sources 01 
evidence that do not necessarily support one's preferred 
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theory 1S reminiscent of Achinstein's 
2.6 
cr i tic ism of 
Glymourian bootstrapping that the notion of evidence upon 
which it rests takes account neither of the need for 
evidence to increase the probability of a hypothesis being 
true, nor of all the relevant background information (see 
above, sUbsection 2.4.1). It appears that co-evolutionary 
philosophers of mind who are forced into deciding between' 
rival theories on the basis of decisions about what 
evidence is permissible may be liable to the same criticism 
if it can be shown that they systematica lly pay 
insufficient attention to possible empirical sources of 
evidence, and raise the probability of their theory's 
satisfying tests only by means of artificially imposed 
constraints. This supports my argument in subsection 2.4.2 
that although the bootstrap strategy employed by 
philosophers of mind ostensibly takes account of the need 
for evidence to lend increased support to the hypotheses of 
a theory, this is not in itself sufficient to remove 
Achinstein's criticism. The evidence must also be of the 
right kind. This will be illustrated with respect to the 
theories of the mind/brain discussed in section B. 
But perhaps Glymourian general evaluative criteria will be 
enough to decide between rival theories in the philosophy 
of the mind/brain. Paul Churchland certainly seems to 
think so. 
He writes that 
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"we must be guided by abstract considerations of 
simplicity, coherence with what we already 
presume to know, and intuitive plausibility" (P. 
M. Churchland, 1986a, pp. 6-7). 
2.6 
However, it may be argued, firstly, that this does not 
obviate the need for evidence in support of a hypothesis· 
relative to a theory to be good evidence and not evidence 
attained by poor testing. One could hardly argue that a 
theory is to be preferred to a rival because it contains 
more conf irmed hypotheses if these hypotheses were not 
properly confirmed by the evidence cited! 
Secondly, the charge of instrumentalism must still be faced 
by so-called scientific realists who rely upon general 
evaluative criteria to support their theories when these 
criteria cannot show that a theory is to be preferred 
because it is true (see above, pp. 54-5). This charge will 
also be discussed with reference to co-evolutionary 
philosophy in section B. 
I have contrasted internal realists with their metaphysical 
realist opponents. I will now turn in section B to a 
closer investigation of the metaphysical tendencies 
inherent in the theories of philosophers of the mind/brain 
who purport to be scientific realists, and evaluate the 
implied criticisms of Chapter 2. 
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1. See Introduction for a brief explanation of this term. Co-
evolutionary theories in the philosophy of mind will be discussed 
in detail in Section B. 
2. Even if such accuracy were possible, this would still not 
provide us with objective knowledge. cf. Thomas Nagel "What is 
it like to be a bat?", in Nagel (1979). 
3. The term "materialist" is used here to denote the general 
belief that physical matter exists over and beyond our 
sensations, rather than in the more narrow sense used by 
philosophers of mind to indicate that mental processes can be 
redescribed in terms of brain processes. To avoid unnecessary 
confusion, I shall refer to this latter group of philosophers as 
"physicalists". 
4. This is a very simplified description of what may, ln fact, 
be a very complicated methodology with many hidden pitfalls. The 
problems inherent in this approach will be discussed in the 
course of this thesis. 
5. See, for example, Newton-smith (1981), pp. 40-43. 
6. cf: my discussion of Paul Churchland in Chapter 1, sUbsection 
1.1.1. By contrast, Ellis (ibid, p. 72) feels that we should not 
concern ourselves with such matters. We should only worry about 
the human position. 
7. Note that Glymour himself defends his choice of cases from 
the history of science to illustrate the bootstrap strategy on 
the grounds that "[ t] hey are diverse in their subj ect matter, and 
reveal not only different applications of the strategy ... , but 
also different features of that strategy" (Glymour, 1980, p. 177) . 
8. For an example of this, see Dorling, 1971. 
9. This is a very simplistic explanation of the views held by 
Reichenbach and Carnap. However, I shall not be concerned with 
their theories, except in so far as they are precursors of the 
Glymourian position, so a more detailed exposition of their 
arguments would be inappropriate here. 
10. Peter Achinstein defines the bootstrap condition in terms 
of the first part of Glymour' s strategy only. The bootstrap 
condition is "that e is evidence that h with respect to theory 
T if and only if using T it is possible to derive from e an 
instance of h, and the derivation is such as not to guarantee an 
instance of h no matter what e is chosen" (Achinstein, 1983, 
p.355). Whilst this aspect of the methodology is important, I 
do not think it is the whole story, nor does it merit the title 
of bootstrapping. We pull ourselves up by the ~ootstraps on~y 
if we are able to confirm the hypotheses from WhlCh we began ln 
the light of new evidence. If these hypotheses remaln 
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unconfirmed (or, in any event, no more probable than before the 
new evidence was brought to bear [cf. my discussion of Hunt 
. ' 1990, p.OOO)), then we are not bootstrapplng, but merely building 
castles in the air. 
11. All the biographical details in this example are taken from 
Chambers Biographical Dictionary, Revised Edition, ed. J. o. 
Thorne & T. C. Collocott, W & R Chambers Ltd, Edinburgh, 1984. 
12. It is worth pointing out that although Glymour adopts 
similar criteria for deciding between empirically equivalent 
theories as do many other scientific realists, he does not share 
their belief in naive holism. Rather, he maintains that it is 
possible to regard a body of evidence as supportive of part of 
a theory, but not necessarily all of it. We may thus reject some 
of the theory, whilst retaining the rest. 
13. Note that Hunt's use of the bootstrap strategy does not 
suffer from this difficulty since he combines the basic 
bootstrapping method with probability theory (cf. section 2.3.2 
above) . 
14. I have changed Achinstein's notation in this quotation to 
fit with mine so that it follows more naturally from my text. 
The amended notation is given in square brackets. This does not 
alter the sense of Achinstein's words in any way. 
15. See note 1 above. 
16. Of course, the process may be more haphazard in reality than 
this description might suggest. For example, Marr (1982a, p. 
331) comments that "part of the fun is that we never really know 
where the next key is going to come from". 
17. This difficulty with the general evaluative criteria for 
choosing between theories put forward by Glymour does not 
diminish the importance of the additional problems with these 
criteria set out in my discussion of Achinstein (1983) in 
sUbsections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 above. Indeed, as will be seen in 
Chapter 4, subsection 4.5, Achinstein's criticisms of Glymour, 
taken together with my comments in sUbsection 2.4.2, suggest that 
Nordby's remarks are very relevant to the phi losophy of the 
mind/brain. 
18. Nordby's distinction between crime type models and crime 
token models is exactly congruent with the standard philosophical 
type/token distinction. In the case of the crime of unla .. ·;ful 
killing, for example, there may be one crime type model for the 
crime of a jealous lover, another for patricide, and still 
another for the opportunistic murder of a complete stranger. The 
details that make up each model will be generic features which 
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frequently recur in killings of these types (eg: a missing wallet 
at the scene of an opportunist murder). The crime token model 
of the unlawful killing of John Smith, however, will only contain 
details of the facts specific to that one crime. 
19. Once more the bootstrap methodology is being used to 
construct a general hypothesis and a specific hypothesis from the 
same initial body of evidence. 
20. Nordby uses the example of serial homicide cases throughout 
his article. In other ciimes, such as rape, it is not always as 
easy to establish the facts about what took place. I am indebted 
to Dr. Ian Morley for this point. 
21. The two situations are not identical, because Nordby 
believes that crime models do not constitute theoretical models, 
because criteria of confirmation and disconfirmation do not apply 
to them. However, my concerns are not Nordby's, and this aspect 
of his paper does not affect my central argument that co-
evolutionary theories in the philosophy of science may well share 
precisely those features of criminology that make Glymourian 
considerations an inappropriate characterization of the actual 
kind of bootstrapping that takes place. 
22. The positive attitude of many philosophers of mind towards 
bootstrapping will be discussed in section B. 
23. For concrete examples, see my discussion of Marr and 
Churchland in Chapter 6. 
24. See Chapter 6 for some concrete examples of this tendency. 
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section B - Bootstrapping and Realism in the Philosophy 
of Mind 
Introduction 
B1 The story so far 
As we have already noted in the previous two chapters, it 
is perfectly reasonable for the realist to acknowledge the 
existence of an external reality and to make mention of 
such a reality in his theories. However, the metaphysical 
realist encounters problems because he fails to see that 
this very positing of an external reality should itself be 
regarded as part of a scientif ic theory. Instead, the 
metaphysical realist founds his individual theories about 
phenomena on the basis that this external reality must be 
assumed to exist for any further scientific activity to be 
possible. 1 
For a theory to be classed as scientific rather than 
metaphysical it must be possible to refute it by citing 
empirical observations which conflict with it. As Popper 
points out, it is impossible to refute pure existential 
statements in this manner, because 
Ita strict or pure existential statement applies 
to the whole universe, and it is irrefutable 
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simply because there can be no method by which it 
could be refuted" (Popper, 1969, p. 196). 
81 
Clearly, the statement "there exists an external reality 
beyond appearances which permits the practice of science" 
falls into this category of pure existential statements, 
and is therefore, in Popper's opinion at least, irrefutable 
and hence unscientific. 2 
My discussion of the veil-of-perception issue (Chapter 1, 
sUbsections 1.2.3 1.2.8) highlighted the problematic 
features within the theories of metaphysical realists. It 
should be clear by now that these theories are full of 
irrefutable (because untestable) statements of the kind 
condemned by Popper. 
By contrast, Popper is prepared to bi te the bullet and 
agree with the Kantian view that 
"we cannot possess anything like full knowledge 
of the real world with its infinite richness and 
beauty" (ibid, p. 194). 
The bootstrap strategy is intended to provide a way out of 
this difficulty for scientists and philosophers who accept 
that the problems raised for realism by the veil-of-
perception issue are genulne, but who are reluctant to 
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adopt anything other than a full-blooded realist stance 
towards the existence of a reality beyond our perceptions. 
However, as I argued in chapter 2 (subsection 2.2.2), these 
scientific realists are really defending the V1ew that an 
external reality exists on the grounds that this general 
hypothesis provides the best explanation for the success of 
more specific scientific hypotheses in explaining and 
predicting phenomena in individual fields of study. 
If this view 1S compared with the claim of the metaphysical 
realist that there exists an external reality that permits 
the very inception of scientific activity, we can see that 
the scientific realist, unlike the metaphysical realist, 
succeeds in formulating a theory that seems to live up to 
the Popperian challenge of meeting his criterion for 
science. If empirical evidence can be found which refutes 
the specific scientific hypotheses, then the general 
hypothesis that the world exists is also rendered doubtful. 
This is because these specific hypotheses play a dual role 
in the scientific realist's framework. Not only are they 
intended to help us to explain and to predict phenomena, 
their success 1n doing so also constitutes evidential 
support for the general hypothesis that the world exists 
beyond our perceptions (and, of course, for any further 
general hypotheses about what this external reality must be 
like) . This is the essence of the bootstrap strategy 
discussed in section A. 
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However, we also saw in chapter 2, subsection 2.2.2, that 
it is not enough for philosophers simply to pay lip service 
to the principles of scientific realism if they are to 
avoid the problems that have thus far been associated with 
metaphysical realism: if their methodology 1S faulty, they 
may be equally guilty of making unwarranted metaphysical 
assumptions. 
Scientific realists are therefore charged with the 
obligation of producing theories which provide a true 
explanation of events rather than theor ies which simply 
save the phenomena (see Chapter 2, subsection 2.2.2). We 
have already noted that this is no easy task. The method 
of bootstrapping . 1S often used by scientists and 
philosophers alike to enable them to derive both specific 
and general conclusions from the same initial evidence. 
All of the conclusions derived from use of the bootstrap 
strategy should be regarded as hypotheses which must be 
rejected or revised if new evidence contradicts them. 
It has already been argued in the early parts of this 
thesis that successful use of the bootstrap methodology 
depends upon overcom1ng problems surrounding the criteria 
available for deciding between competing theories (Chapter 
2, section 2.5.2). It is very difficult for the scientific 
realist to use abstract evaluative criteria (as suggested 
by Glymour; see chapter 2, sUbsection 2.4) without either 
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interpreting 
(deliberately 
them 
or 
1n a subjective 
unwittingly) , or 
instrumentalist position. 
or biased 
lapsing 
82 
fashion 
into an 
Further, I have intimated that the use of the bootstrap 
methodology in new realms of co-evolutionary research lacks 
the safeguard of an overarching theory which may help us to 
determine which kinds of evidence should be admissible and 
which rejected. Again, the chances of obtaining unbiased 
use and interpretation of sources of evidence are 
significantly diminished. 
The remainder of this thesis constitutes an evaluation of 
the use of bootstrap strategies in both traditional 
analytic theories in the philosophy of mind (Chapters 3 and 
4), and in the more modern co-evolutionary theories 
(Chapters 5 and 6) in the light of these considerations. 
I shall be particularly concerned with the question of 
whether their use of the strategy does enable them to avoid 
the pitfalls of metaphysical realism. 
B2 Application of the veil-of-perception issue to theories 
of the mind/brain 
If theories are to be genuinely explanatory, they must be 
testable. Problems may arise if an explanatory account is 
systematically protected from thorough, unbiased testing. 
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This is precisely the situation delineated by the 
traditional veil-of-perception issue. Moreover, anyattenpt 
to explain what is going on in our minds by reference to 
what is going on in our brains should also be testable. 
How can we explain the activities of our minds in terms of 
what goes on in our brains? As Kant saw (vide Churchland, 
1986a, pp. 46, 248-9), any attempt to understand such 
activity by means of pure introspection will by no means be 
assured of success, since our perceptions of ourselves are 
no less fallible than those we have of the world around 
us. 3 Scientific theories of the mind/brain exhort us to 
abandon introspection and to regard our mental experiences 
as just another subject for scientific study. The theories 
discussed in this section embrace a range of different 
views concerning the best ways to learn about the operation 
of the mind/brain. 
Of course, in practice, it may be very difficult to 
separate what we would normally think of as the workings of 
the mind from those of the brain. Furthermore, modular 
theories of mind have cast doubt upon the traditional image 
of man as a uni ted self which confronts the rest of 
reality. 
Chapter 
The discussion of modular theories of the mind in 
5 is included to demonstrate that the veil-of-
perception issue does not simply disappear if the 
traditional gap between the self and the external world is 
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displaced, and relocated as a gap between perception and 
cognition as Fodor (1983) suggests. This is because the 
veil-af-perception issue is really only an illustration of 
the more fundamental and underlying problem of explanation 
that all theories of the mind/brain must confront if they 
are to be acceptable in the light of scientific criteria. 
It is one of the major ironies within the current state of 
the philosophy of mind that philosophers working in this 
field are scathing about the importance of the original 
veil-of-perception issue, and yet fail to understand the 
more general problems of explanation that the lssue 
illustrates so well. For example, McGinn remarks that 
" [t] a suppose that the involvement of an inner 
experience produces perceptual indirection, or 
enclosure in a world of merely mental objects of 
acquaintance, is the analogue of use-mention 
confusion. This is not to say that it is false 
that we are acquainted with our own experlences -
we are, on the contrary, acquainted with them in 
acts of introspection - but it does not follow 
that we are not also and primarily acquainted 
with external objects" (McGinn, 1982, p.45). 
I am not concerned with the validity of McGinn's criticisms 
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of the veil-of-perception issue per se, but wish merely to 
note that no mention is made in his work of the 
difficulties of explanation that lie behind the lssue. 
This may perhaps account for his failure to avoid these 
very difficulties in his treatment of the issue of 
consciousness. It will be demonstrated ln Chapter 3 
(especially in sUbsection 3.2.5) that it is ln fact 
possible to discern in McGinn (1990) the very line of 
argument that was identified in Chapter 1 as symptomatic of 
the difficulties associated with the veil-of-perception 
issue. 
David Papineau (1987) has suggested that nothing is to be 
gained by incorporating the veil-of-perception issue into 
an examination of the questions surrounding representation 
within the mind/brain. Papineau holds that the talk in 
terms of a veil-of-perception fosters an unwarranted 
sympathy with the cartesian notion of a dichotomy between 
what is "given" to the conscious mind and what is outside 
it. I think that Papineau is mistaken for two reasons. 
Firstly, I have already shown Section A4 that the 
si tuation set up by the veil-of-perception issue can be 
described in terms of explanation and testability that make 
no reference to notions of the "given", and that are 
currently widely used by the scientific community. 
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However, this may not be enough to dissuade Papineau, Slnce 
he too (1987) believes that the essential question raised 
in the issue of the veil-of-perception can be rephrased. 
I need to demonstrate that the veil-of-perception issue 
presents the problem in a manner which 1S positively 
advantageous for my argument and that its terminology is 
not responsible for seducing those philosophers who do' 
recognise its importance for the study of the mind/brain 
issue, such as P.S. Church land (1986a, pp.246-8), into 
believing that there are unassailable glvens 1n the 
philosophy of mind. 
Churchland comments that 
"common sense is theory laden, that there is no 
Given, that there are neither epistemological 
foundations nor unrevisable theories nor even 
First Philosophies. I unabashedly avow my 
persuasion to these claims" (P. S. Churchland, 
1980a, p.153). 
Moreover, Churchland discusses the use of the bootstrap 
strategy in terms which strongly suggest that she sees it 
as a solution to the problems of explanation and evidence 
raised by the veil-of-perception issue. She writes that 
" [a] remarkable thing about the human bra in 15 
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that it can use primitive theories to 
bootstrap its way to ever more comprehensive and 
powerful theories - to find the reality beyond 
the appearances" (P.S. Churchland, 1986a, p.265). 
B~ 
It is precisely because there are no indubitable glvens 1n 
philosophy or in science that the bootstrap strategy is so' 
necessary for explanations of mind/brain activity. Indeed, 
bootstrapping 1S the key feature of Churchland's co-
evolutionary methodology. She comments that 
"the co-evolutionary process [is like] two rock 
climbers making their way up a wide chimney by 
bracing their feet against the wall, each braced 
against the back of the other" (P.S. Churchland, 
1986a, p. 374). 
Unlike McGinn and Fodor, who are quite happy to rely upon 
the traditional linguistic representations of the world as 
a basis for any theory of representation within the 
mind/brain, Churchland takes a far more open-ended stance. 
Whilst she does not object to the use of the sentential 
paradigm as an initial starting-point, Church land does not 
believe that we are entitled to simply postulate the 
existence of such representations inside the head without 
any independent proof. Indeed, she bel ieves that these 
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starting-points may well be revised once we know more about 
our internal representational systems. Hence, far from 
being seduced into the opinion that these starting-points 
constitute Cartesian "givens", she takes the view that 
they may well be leading us down the garden path. It will 
become clear in my discussion of Churchland in Chapter 6 
that she genuinely believes that she endorses only testable 
hypotheses. However, there are systematic flaws in her 
methodology that render some of her hypotheses untestable. 
Nonetheless, Papineau has still not won the day, since it 
is the very use of the veil-of-perception 1ssue that 
demonstrates these flaws in Churchland's argument, hence it 
1S far from useless within the philosophy of the 
mind/brain. 
B3 - An Introduction to the issue of representation in the 
mind/brain 
All the theories examined in this section of the thesis are 
concerned how information is represented within the 
mind/brain. For this reason, a few introductory comments 
upon the importance of representation for the philosophy of 
mind (and, in particular, for those theorists discussed 1n 
this section) are in order. 
Both cognitive psychologists like Jerry Fodor and co-
evolutionary theorists like Marr and Church land accept ~he 
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idea that the mind/brain operates by means of computations 
upon symbols or representations. This is the traditional 
idea of the mind/brain as an information processor. 
There 1S also extensive agreement about the purpose of 
representations within the mind/brain. Teleological 
accounts of representational systems abound among" 
philosophers of mind. Creatures, including human beings, 
need an accurate representation of the world in which they 
live in order to survive. McGinn writes (1982, p. 82) that 
n[e]volved creatures are intent upon preserv1ng 
their lives, and bodily action is (for many of 
them) essential to their survival; but actions 
need to be guided by information about the world 
if they are to serve the end of survival". 
Similarly, Church land comments that 
"[o]bviously, the organ1sm that flees in the 
absence of predators and feeds willy-nilly 
doomed to be prey for those more lucky organisms 
. 1S 
fitted out with cells coordinating 
representations of the world with movement in the 
world" (P.S. Churchland, 1986a, p. 1, her 
italics) . 
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In a later article, she writes that 
" [i]mprovements in sensorimotor control confer an 
evolutionary advantage: a fancier style of 
representing is advantageous so long as i t ~s 
geared to the organism's way of life and enhances 
the organism's chances of survi val" (P. s. 
Churchland, 1987, p.548, her italics). 
Marr comments along the same lines that 
" [t] he usefulness of a representation depends 
upon how well suited it is to the purpose for 
which it is used. A pigeon uses vision to help 
it navigate, fly, and seek out food. Many types 
of jumping spider use V1S1on to tell the 
difference between a potential meal and a 
potential mate..... because vision 1S used by 
different animals for such a wide variety of 
purposes, it . 1S inconceivable that all see1ng 
animals use the same representations; each can 
confidently be expected to use one or more 
representations that are nicely tailored to the 
owner's purposes" (1982a, p.32). 
Jerry Fodor, too, thinks that an 
III 
"organism has available means for representing 
not only its behavioural options but also: the 
probable consequence of acting on those options, 
a preference ordering defined over those 
consequences and, of course, the original 
situation in which it finds itself" (Fodor, 1976, 
p. 31) . 
B3 
Nevertheless, these quotations provide a suggestion that 
this alliance is uneasy and at best superficial. There is 
little or no agreement as to the way ln which the 
teleological representations are realized within the 
mind/brain. For example, Colin McGinn is happy to talk in 
terms of folk psychological concepts such as beliefs and 
desires. Jerry Fodor, on the other hand, postulates the 
existence of a language of thought or Mentalese, which 
literally consists of sentences in the head. 
wi thin these sentences are combined by 
The symbols 
means of 
computations over their syntax. In Fodor's opinion, the 
language of thought constitutes the paradigm of 
representation. For example, he comments that 
"only sentences ln the language of thought 
represent in, as it were, the first instance, and 
they represent in virtue of the natural teleology 
of the cognitive mechanisms. Propositional 
attitudes represent qua relations to sentences in 
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the language 
representation 
attitudes of 
247) . 
of thought. All other 
depends upon 
symbol users" 
the propositional 
(Fodor, 1984b, p. 
83 
McGinn does not share Fodor's computational view of 
internal representation. He writes that if 
" we compare the manipulation of sentences in 
thought to the operations performed by computers 
on the sentences of the languages with which 
they are programmed ..... [this] ... is suspect 
because the 'languages' used by computers are not 
languages in the ordinary and required sense: the 
computer does not understand the sentences it 
operates on, and printing out symbols on a tape 
is not a kind of assertion" (McGinn, 1982, p. 67) . 
Fodor does show some signs of acknowledging this objection, 
Slnce he comments (Fodor, 1980) that the meaning of the 
sentences which constitute the language of thought 1S not 
given by the computations that are performed upon the 
constituent symbols. 
view unproblematic. 
detail in Chapter 4. 
However, th i s does not render his 
Fodor's arguments are examined 1n 
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I have already alluded to MarrIs V1ew that different 
. 
spec1es employ different representational systems that are 
orientated towards the specific information about the world 
that is essential for their survival. other information is 
irrelevant and needs to be filtered out by the 
representational system. Consequently, although we need to 
understand the neurophysiological facts to fully appreciate" 
how vision works, this should not be our main concern. 
Rather, our study of vision should be dictated chiefly by 
an attempt to isolate the abstract, high-level 
computationa1 5 constraints that govern the information 
selected for representation by each species in the light of 
the singular problems that it must overcome in order to 
survive. Marr writes that 
"[w]hat higher nervous systems must do 1S 
determined by the information-processing problems 
that they must solve" (Marr, 1982a, p. 349). 
This is why 
"one has to exercise extreme caution in making 
inferences from neurophysiological findings about 
the algor i thms and representations being used, 
particularly until one has a clear idea about 
what information needs to be represented and ~hat 
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processes need to be implemented" (ibid, p. 26). 
Marr's views will be examined in greater detail ln Chapter 
6 (subsections 6.1 - 6.1.4). 
Patricia Smith Churchland disagrees fundamentally with both 
Fodor and Marr, particularly over the correct method of" 
studying the mind/brain. 
Churchland's own view is that there is little to be gained 
from the Fodorean method of studying the mind/brain which 
merely assumes the validity of folk psychological concepts 
such as knowledge, belief, and desire. Rather, we should 
be prepared to renounce even these, our most familiar and 
entrenched ways of seeing the world and our own activity 
within it, 
are better 
if other, more neurophysiological descriptions 
supported by the available evidence. For 
example, Churchland comments that although Fodor recognizes 
that 
"it is indeed an empirical question whether the 
sentential presupposition ... is actually true, 
.. he is nonetheless quite innocent of any real 
suspicion that it might be false, or that the 
stresses and strains already visible in the 
sentential approach could be signs that we have 
to re-assess the prospects of that dear and 
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comfortable old shoe, the common sense 
psychological theory" (P.S. Churchland, 1980a, p. 
154) . 
B3 
This view is also supported by Paul M. Churchland, who 
wrote as early as 1975 that 
" [0] ne could of course nurture a hope that the 
structure, elements, and operations of human 
language systematically reflect or mirror all of 
the theoretically relevant structures, elements 
and operations of the brain, but there is no 
empirical evidence to sustain such a hope, and 
one would expect on the contrary that linguistic 
structures/operations reflect brain 
structures/operations only very grossly, 
selectively, and superficially" (P.M. Churchland, 
1975b, p. 156). 
Indeed, Patricia smith Churchland 1S sharply critical of 
Fodor's theory of the language of thought, precisely 
because she rightly believes that he does not sufficiently 
concern himself with the dearth of satisfactory and 
testable evidence in support of his view. For example, she 
claims that 
"[s]urely there is something bizarre about the 
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idea that a theory of meanlng that has nothing 
whatever to do with human psychology or 
neurophysiology can explain the meaningfulness of 
language and how representational structures 
relate to the world?" (ibid, p. 545) 
and denies that 
"knowledge in general lS sentential; rather, 
representations are typically structures of a 
quite different sort" (P.S. Churchland, 1987, 
p.545). 
B3 
In Chapter 4, I shall demonstrate that her criticisms can 
be reformulated as an accusation against Fodor of 
metaphysical realism. 
Churchland also rejects the amount of emphasis placed on 
abstract, high-level constraints upon the nature of 
representation within the mind/brain in David Marris theory 
of vision. In her view, the co-evolutionary approach 
should be more thoroughly orientated towards the importance 
of "bottom-up" neuroscientific study. She writes that 
"[w]e want a theory of how the mind-brain 
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represents whatever it represents, and of the 
nature of the computational processes underlying 
behavior. The collective effort to devise such 
a theory will be constrained by empirical facts 
at all levels, including neurophysiological, 
ethological, and psychological facts" (P. S. 
Churchland, 1986a, p. 5). 
B3 
In sharp contrast to McGinn and the early Fodor, Churchland 
rejects the traditional methodology of conceptual analysis 
within philosophy and advocates a strongly empirical 
approach. She notes that 
"it is the alm of neurOSClence to discover how 
the mind-brain represents, how information about 
the world is filtered, stored, and transmitted, 
and in so discovering, to provide a theory 
characterizing 'information' and 'information 
processing'" (P.S. Churchland, 1980b, p.194). 
It should be clear by now that it is possible to describe 
the activity of the mind/brain at different levels. Sloman 
makes a similar point. He writes that 
"in some cases, the intelligent thing to do is to 
find a special-purpose representation, tailored 
to the problem domain. Of course ,it would be 
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even more intelligent to have a deep 
understanding of the nature of the representation 
and the reasons why it is appropriate. It may 
prove best for the second-order reasoning to use 
a quite different type of representation, eg: 
logic" (Sloman, 1985, p.175) 
B3 
Like Sloman, Churchland is quite prepared to acknowledge 
that there are different levels of description that may be 
applied to the mind/brain. Her insistence that we must not 
allow temporary constraints upon the language available to 
us for this task to bias our judgements on ontological 
facts about the mind/brain is wholly consonant with her 
remarks about the dubious validity of the sentential 
paradigm as a representational model for the mind/brain (as 
described above) 6. Hence her comment that 
"it would be foolish to suppose folk psychology 
must be true because at this stage of science to 
criticize it implies using it. All this shows is 
that folk psychology is the only theory available 
now" (P. S. Churchland, 1986a, p. 397, her 
italics) . 
Churchland believes that judicious use of the bootstrap 
strategy opens up the possibility of other more appropriate 
means of describing the mind/brain and its functions. This 
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belief will be evaluated ln Chapter 6 (subsections 6.2 -
6.2.5) . 
All the theories delineated above will be evaluated in the 
light of the issues of realism and explanation discussed in 
section A. 
B4 - structure of section B 
I shall begin in Chapter 3 by discussing the work of Colin 
McGinn on the nature of consciousness, as McGinn can be 
regarded as representative of the tradition of conceptual 
analysis within the philosophy of mind. 7 This will be 
followed in Chapter 4 by an evaluation of the 
Representational Theory of Mind (or sentential paradigm) 
endorsed by Jerry Fodor. I shall demonstrate that both of 
these philosophers employ the bootstrap method, but without 
regard to the need for their hypotheses to be supported by 
suff icient and systematically testable ev idence. As a 
result, they may both be regarded as metaphysical realists 
within the philosophy of mind, despite any protestations to 
the contrary. 
In the final chapters of this section (Chapters 5 and 6), 
the discussion will be extended to cover those theories of 
the mind/brain that claim to take more account of evidence 
from other disciplines, such as psychology or 
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neurophysiology. These are the co-evolutionary theories of 
the mind/brain, and include the modularity theories of 
Jerry Fodor and Howard Gardner, the theory of vision put 
forward by David Marr and the eliminative materialism of 
Churchland. I shall show that the incorporation of further 
sources of evidence in support of hypotheses does not 
necessarily yield the desired result of a theory of the 
mind/brain that can truly be said to avoid the problems of 
metaphysical realism so clearly exemplified in my earlier 
discussion of the veil-of-perception lssue (Chapter 1, 
sUbsections 1.2.4, 1.2.5 and Chapter 2, sUbsection 2.2.1). 
Indeed, I shall argue that, in these theories at least, 
these difficulties are exacerbated by the inclusion of 
findings from a variety of disciplines, because of the 
resemblance of the bootstrap argument employed by these 
theorists to the methodology employed by detectives 
described in Nordby (1989) (see sUbsections 2.5.1, 2.5.2). 
1. See especially subsections 1.2.4, 1.2.5 and 2.2.1 for 
relevant discussion. 
, This is not to say that Popper regards such metaphysical 
;tatements as meaningless or false. On the contrary, they may 
:orm part of rational theories which have evolved as attempts to 
)rovide solutions to problem-situations. They may still be 
=ritically discussed in this context, even though they can never 
)e refuted. To declare that metaphysical statements are 
~eaningless is, in Popper I s eyes, to confuse the qu7stion of 
leaning with the question of demarcation between SClence and 
letaphys ics. 
I. For an outline of the Kantian influence upon Churchland's 
~heory of the mind/brain, see Chapter 6, subsection 6.2.1. 
121 
4. See especially Chapter 1, subsections 1.2.4, 1.2.5 and 
Chapter 2, subsection 2.2.1. 
5. Marr is uSlng the term "computational" in a much narrower and 
specif ic sense than Fodor or McGinn. For Marr, true 
computational constraints are high-level, abstract, 
specifications of a problem that needs to be solved by the 
representational system of an organism. The solution is then 
provided by a lower-level algorithm which determines the details 
of how information is represented and manipulated within an 
organism and which is instantiated by neurons (in a biological 
organism - it is worth noting that Marr's three-level theory of 
vision could also be applied to computers). Clearly, the 
Fodorean sense of "computational" is more nearly reflected in 
Marr's theory at the algorithmic level. 
6. cf: Paul M. Churchland's insistence that there is no such 
thing as a theory-neutral foundation for knowledge (see Chapter 
1, sUbsection 1.1.1). In essence, it will be recalled, he 
believes that we must be aware of the bias which is inherent in 
our use of language and in the theories which govern our 
observations and avoid drawing rash ontological conclusions. 
7. McGinn himself remarks that "the philosopher seeks to 
discover a priori necessary truths about the phenomena of mind -
truths that can be ascertained without empirical study of the 
mind and its operations, and truths that hold good for any 
conceivable exemplification of the mental phenomenon in question" 
(McGinn, 1982, pp. 3-4). 
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Chapter 3 - Metaphysical Elements in McGinn's Account of 
Consciousness, Modularity and the Mind 
3.1 Introduction 
As I noted ln section A, it is perfectly reasonable for the 
realist to acknowledge the existence of an external reality 
and to incorporate the notion of such a reality in his 
theories. However I the metaphysical realist encounters 
problems because he fails to see that this very positing of 
an external reality should itself be regarded as part of a 
scientific theory. This means that it may be subjected to 
systematic and rigorous empirical testing and revised if 
necessary in the light of new evidence. 1 Instead, the 
metaphysical realist bases his individual theories about 
phenomena on the assumption that this external reality must 
be assumed to exist if any further scientific activity is 
possible. The problems delineated in my discussion of the 
veil-of-perception issue (Chapter 1, Sections 1.2.3 
1.2.8) characterise the theories of metaphysical realists. 
However, we also saw in chapter 2, subsection 2.2.2 that it 
is not enough for philosophers simply to pay lip service to 
the principles of scientific realism if they are to avoid 
these metaphysical difficulties: if their methodology is 
faulty, they may be equally guilty of making unwarranted 
. 1 t' 2 metaphyslca assurnp lons. 
123 
Scientific realists 
3.1 
are therefore charged with the 
obligation of producing theories which provide a true 
explanation of events rather than theories which simply 
save the phenomena. As I remarked in Chapter 2, sUbsection 
2.2.2, this is no easy task. The method of bootstrapping 
is often used by scientists and philosophers alike to 
enable them to derive both specific and general conclusions· 
from the same initial evidence. All of these conclusions 
should be regarded as hypotheses which may be subjected to 
tests, and rejected or revised if new evidence contradicts 
them. 
However, I have argued that successful use of the bootstrap 
methodology depends upon overcoming problems surrounding 
the criteria available for deciding between competing 
theories (Chapter 2, sUbsection 2.5.2). It 1S very 
difficult for the scientific realist to use abstract 
evaluative criteria (as suggested by Glymour; see chapter 
2, subsections 2.4, 2.4.1) without either interpreting them 
in a subjective or biased fashion (deliberately or 
unwittingly), or lapsing into an instrumentalist position. 
Further, I argued that the use of the bootstrap methodology 
in new realms of scientific and philosophical research 
lacks the safeguard of an overarching theory which may help 
to determine in a systematic and impartial manner which 
kinds of evidence should be admissible and which rejected. 
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Again, the chances of obtaining unbiased use and 
interpretation of sources of evidence are significantly 
diminished. 
3.2 Metaphysics and McGinn 
This chapter examines the way in which traditional 
conceptual analysis can fall foul of the metaphysical 
problems associated with the veil-of-perception lssue, even 
though it is claimed that the concerns of scientific 
realism are of paramount importance. The example I have 
chosen is Colin McGinn's (1991) treatment of the problem of 
consciousness. Al though it is possible to identify a 
bootstrap argument within his discussion, his understanding 
of the need to subject his hypotheses to . rlgorous and 
systematic tests is minimal. Thus his views may be 
regarded to all intents and purposes as those typical of a 
modern metaphysical realist. 3 
Al though I have chosen to illustrate the metaphysical 
difficulties that McGinn creates for himself in just one 
text, The Hidden structure of Consciousness in McGinn, 
1991, (pp. 89-125), his work is littered with unjustifiable 
metaphysical assumptions. 4 
It will be pertinent to begin with a brief outline of the 
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structure of McGinn's argument. 
3.2.1 An outline of McGinn's theory of consciousness 
The first part of McGinn's argument for the hidden 
structure of consciousness is grounded ln largely 
philosophical considerations about the role 
consciousness in our mental life, and about the nature of 
the link between . consclousness and physical processes 
within the mind/brain. 
McGinn draws an analogy between language and consciousness 
to argue that the true logical structure of our conscious 
thoughts is not the one revealed to us by introspection. 
He comments that 
"[e]arlier logicians had mistakenly assumed that 
the real inner nature of propositions is made 
manifest in their ordinary linguistic vehicles, 
and it was this assumption that retarded the 
progress of logic. What has to be recognized 1S 
that language (meaning) possesses a level of 
structure that transcends, or underlies, the way 
it presents itself to us" (McGinn, 1991, p.93). 
Similarly, McGinn continues, the deep structure of our 
conscious thoughts 1S not that revealed to us by 
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introspection. In fact, McGinn argues that it is this very 
division between the surface properties and the deep 
structure of our conscious thoughts that is responsible for 
the corresponding structural dichotomy within language. 
McGinn's view that introspection may not tell the whole 
story derives at least some initial plausibility from the 
well-known experimental evidence that introspection 1S 
unreliable when it comes to giving reasons for our actions. 5 
However, this evidence simply indicates that we are 
sometimes influenced by thoughts of which we are unaware. 
It sheds no light whatsoever upon the question of whether 
the thoughts of which we are aware have some hidden 
structure beyond that revealed to us by introspection. 
This remains an empirical question. 
McGinn's suggestion 1S 
consciousness without 
that it 1S impossible to explain 
reference to hidden structure, 
despite the reluctance of most philosophers to even 
consider this as an option. Moreover, he argues, we have 
every reason for adopting an attitude of scientific realism 
towards the hidden structure of consciousness, just as we 
have done towards other hidden structures such as DNA. Such 
a structure would furnish us with a better understanding of 
the true logical character of our thoughts. It would be a 
"stratum of mental reality, an 1nner 
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configuration of conscious states themselves, 
predating the development of the notation that 
captures it" (McGinn, ibid, p.99). 
3 .2. 1 
McGinn goes on to suggest that the hidden structure of 
consciousness would provide an (in his opinion, necessary) 
additional link between the surface properties of' 
consciousness and the physical facts which cause them. 
There are many difficulties inherent in McGinn's view, but 
comment upon these will be deferred until sUbsections 3.2.3 
- 3.2.6 of the chapter. For the present, I am solely 
concerned with the structure of his argument. 
McGinn writes that 
II [t] he considerations advanced ln the prevlous 
section in support of the idea of a hidden 
structure to consciousness are of a broadly 
metaphysical character; they concern the 
philosophical problems that might be solved by 
accepting that idea. In this section I shall 
argue that there also exist empirical data that 
are best explained by adopting the idea; we now 
have empirical evidence for the thesis that 
consciousness extends further than it 
introspectively seems" (ibid, p. 109) 
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McGinn then goes 
evidence that he 
3.2.2 
on to discuss the kinds of empirical 
thinks supports his theory of the 
existence of a hidden structure of consciousness, including 
the phenomenon of bl inds ight. These arguments will be 
considered in sUbsection 3.2.5 of this chapter. 
3.2.2 The bootstrapping device in McGinn's argument 
McGinn starts his chapter with a statement of his purpose, 
namely, to establish that conSC1ousness has a hidden 
structure in addition to the surface structure revealed to 
us by introspection. He cites three reasons for accepting 
this argument right at the outset (ibid, p. 91): i) it is 
needed to provide an explanation of the logical properties 
of conscious thoughts, ii} the need for an explanation of 
the relationship between conscious states and the physical 
body and iii) it explains phenomena such as blindsight. 
However, the points at which these reasons are introduced 
into the main thread of the argument, the work that they 
each do and the manner in which they support each other 
indicate that McGinn is using a bootstrapping argument. It 
is possible to reconstruct McGinn's line of argument using 
the same notation as I have employed in previous chapters. 
Within the theory of consciousness, T, let Hl be the general 
hypothesis that consciousness plays an important role 1n 
our mental 1 i ves, and that it 1S somehow rooted ln a 
129 
3 • 2 • 2 
physical process within our brains6 , yet the properties of 
consciousness of which we are aware do not seem to account 
for the central role it plays, nor for this connection 
between the mental and the physical. El is the evidence 
that McGinn thinks we have from a commonsense empirical 
consideration of our experience coupled with conceptual 
analysis that consciousness does indeed play an important 
role in our mental lives, but that surface properties of 
consciousness (revealed to us through introspection) are 
neither able to provide an adequate account of how this is 
possible, nor to yield a satisfactory explanation of the 
nature of the link between the mental and the physical 
aspects of consciousness.? 
As a result of the considerations arising from a 
combination of Hl and El , McGinn formulates a more specific 
hypothesis H2 • H2 asserts that there is a deeper structure 
to consciousness hidden beneath the surface aspects that 
alone are accessible to introspection. 
McGinn continues to combine conceptual and empirical 
arguments and evidence in seeking support for the existence 
of the hidden structure of consciousness put forward in H2 • 
This evidence, E2 , consists in a discussion of phenomena 
such as blindsight, which McGinn regards as supportive of 
hypothesis H2 · 
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The bootstrapping device is operative in McGinn's argu~ent 
since he is using his second specif ic hypothesis of the 
hidden structure of conSC10usness and the phenomena of 
blindsight to provide further confirmation of his first , 
more general hypothesis that consciousness is able to play 
a major role in our mental lives and yet is linked in an 
explicable manner to the physical. This role is better 
understood and explained if we postulate a hidden structure 
within conSClousness. Similarly, El (our introspective 
awareness of consciousness) vindicates the role attributed 
by McGinn to consciousness in Hl , and the two together 
suggest the possibility of the hidden structure of 
consciousness postulated in H2 , relative to McGinn's overall 
theory of consciousness, T. 
We have already seen that McGinn advocates taking a 
scientific realist's attitude to the issue of 
consciousness. Further, he is making use of the bootstrap 
strategy. We have already seen in Chapter 2 (subsections 
2.3, 2.4.2) that this is a device frequently employed by 
those who uphold the principles of scientific realism 
(including philosophers of mind) to ensure that their 
hypotheses are informative and explanatory, and yet are 
properly supported by suff icient evidence. However, we 
a lso noted in the course of Chapter 2 (subsect ion 2. 3) 
that, if the bootstrap strategy is to have any real 
success, it is preferable for each hypothesis wi thin the 
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theory to be supported by relatively independent bodies of 
evidence. Moreover, it is essential that each hypothesis 
1S genuinely and systematically testable, that is, we must 
be able to say what kind of evidence would count against 
it. 
These considerations make it clear that McGinn cannot claim' 
that his theory 1S a good one by simply stating that he is 
an adherent of scientific realism. The following four 
sUbsections examine the evidence that he cites in support 
of his hypotheses in greater detail to see if they meet the 
strict criteria for a successful bootstrapping strategy 
outlined in the preceding paragraph. 
3.2.3 Putting the con into consciousness 
We will begin with a consideration of what McGinn himself 
has termed the metaphysical side of his argument (ibid, p. 
109) . 
McGinn implies that consciousness is involved in a very 
large proportion of our mental activity, although he does 
mention the existence of 
"unconscious beliefs and desires of 
psychoanalysis [and] the subpersonal states 
of computational psychology" (ibid, p. 98).8 
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Indeed, when discussing the phenomenon of blindsight, 
McGinn comments that 
"[o]n some possible interpretations of the data, 
["sight"] would not be the right word, since the 
assumption of those interpretations is that 
nothing mental is going on in these cases; the 
conscious experience is wholly abolished, leaving 
only mechanisms that at best accompany 
experiences" (ibid, p. 114, McGinn's italics, 
underlined emphasis mine) . 
Leaving aside McGinn's specific interpretation of the 
phenomenon of blindsight for the moment, this quotation is 
still very important for it demonstrates that McGinn 
readily slips into a cartesian identification of the mental 
with the conscious. Clearly, it is an empirical question 
just how much of our mental activity falls within the 
domain of conscious activity. Freud, for one, argued that 
this identif ication is far from correct. Moreover, the 
doctrine of functionalism raises the whole question of 
whether or not the qualia that are traditionally associated 
with our mental experiences are in truth an essential 
aspect of our mental states. McGinn may be correct to 
argue that it is poor methodology to refuse to ascribe a 
hidden structure to consciousness, on the grounds that 
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"[i]t simply begs the question against the thesis 
of hidden structure to insist that what is hidden 
must ipso facto belong to something other than a 
state of consciousness" (ibid, p.98). 
3 . 2 • 3 
However, the onus is on McGinn to provide us with some 
satisfactory evidence that consciousness is indeed" 
responsible for so much of our mental activity. If he is 
not able to do so, then it is questionable whether he is 
really entitled to the very assumption that motivated him 
to postulate the hidden structure 1n the first place. 
Perhaps it 1S he, and not his opponents, who is begging the 
question. Consequently, doubt may be cast upon that part 
of Hl which states that consciousness plays such an 
important role in our mental lives. This in turn renders 
his argument for H2 much weaker, since he has less reason 
to declare that 
"the demands of theory make the attribution of 
hidden structure to consciousness unavoidable. 
Only thus can we explain what needs to be 
explained" (ibid, p.91). 
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3.2.4 Consciousness and the brain 
Even if we accept McGinn's view that consciousness 1S so 
vital a component in our mental lives for the moment, there 
are still other difficulties inherent in McGinn's body of 
evidence (E l ) that the important role of consciousness and 
the link between the mind and the body cannot be accounted' 
for by the surface properties of consciousness. He writes 
that 
" [c] onscious states, we know, depend causally and 
constitutively on physical states, but the way 
these states appear to us renders the dependence 
problematic. The physical sciences tell us about 
the nature of body and brain, and this nature 
seems far removed from the nature of 
consciousness; yet it must somehow be in virtue 
of physical facts that conscious states come to 
exist in the first place and have their causes 
and effects." (ibid, p.100). 
McGinn continues 
"The surface properties are not enough on their 
own to link conscious states intelligibly to the 
physical world, so we need to postulate some deep 
properties to supply the necessary linkage." 
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(ibid, p.lOO) 
This argument is not a good one. McGinn . 1S simply 
asserting that because he cannot see intuitively how the 
surface properties relate to physical properties of the 
brain, then the two cannot be identified with one another, 
and must be linked via a third set of properties, namely 
those which pertain to the hidden structure of 
consciousness postulated by There are obvious 
parallels with the fallacious argument that, since I know 
the identity of my father, but do not know the identity of 
the masked man, then the masked man cannot be my father. 
In other words, McGinn dismisses summarily the possibility 
that the surface properties of consciousness may themselves 
be redescribable in terms of physical processes, without 
any need for a hidden structure of consciousness. Yet this 
possibility remains a live one irrespective of whether 
McGinn I S own knowledge of these properties extends that 
far, provided that we are able to say what kind of evidence 
would count against this hypothesis, thus ensuring that it 
is systematically testable. It would seem therefore that 
there is a degree of empirical underdetermination between 
McGinn's inference to H2 relative to T and the possibility 
of a rival hypothesis within a second theory of 
consciousness, T2 , claiming that we may be able to 
redescribe the surface properties of conSC1ousness 1n 
physical terms. The evidence cited by McGinn in favour of 
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his own view . 1.S inadequate. A mere analysis of what he 
perceives to be possible is not a systematic or rigorous 
test of a hypothesis, but rather a systematic, a priori 
exclusion of evidence from other sources that may refute 
his preferred view. 
Of course, it is perfectly possible that McGinn's 
hypothesis that consciousness has a hidden structure is 
correct, even if his arguments that such a structure 1.S 
necessary for our understanding of consciousness are, 1.n 
themselves, poor. Further, if McGinn's hypothesis were 
correct, this would indeed cast doubt upon an 
identification of the surface properties of consciousness 
with physical processes. However, McGinn's body of 
evidence (E2 ) which he claims provides independent support 
for his specific hypothesis (H 2 ) is also quite simply 
inadequate, 1.n spite of McGinn's assertion that the 
operative properties of the hidden structure 
consciousness 
"really would explain how it 1.S that chunks of 
matter can develop an inner life. There would be 
nothing hard-to-swallow or take-it-on-faith about 
the theory that detailed the powers of these 
properties" (McGinn, ibid, p. 104) 
These properties would be 
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"neither at the phenomenal surface nor right down 
there with the physical hardware; they would be 
genuinely deep and yet they would not simply 
coincide with physical properties of the brain. 
Somehow they would make perfect sense of the 
psychophysical nexus, releasing us from the 
impasse that seems endemic to the topic." (ibid, 
p. 104) 
Yet, just as we are all set to hear further details of 
these hidden aspects of consciousness, McGinn pours cold 
water upon our expectations by informing us (ibid, p. 104) 
that our conceptual apparatus is simply not up to working 
out these details. This is no mere contingent situation; 
McGinn is not making the point that our scientific study of 
the mind/brain is not yet sufficiently developed to enable 
us to discover the precise nature of the hidden structure 
of consciousness10 • On the contrary: our 19norance of 
these facts is a necessary consequence of the way that our 
conceptual apparatus is constructed. McGinn refers the 
reader to Chapter One of the same volume for further 
elaboration upon this topic and it will be instructive to 
take a brief look at his arguments as they appear there. 
He begins by defining the concept of cognitive closure: 
"[a] type of mind M 1S cognitively closed with 
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respect to a property P (or theory T) if and only 
if the concept-forming procedures at Mis disposal 
cannot extend to a grasp of P (or an 
understanding of T) But such closure does 
not reflect adversely on the reality of the 
properties that lie outside the representational 
capacities in question; a property is no less 
real for not being reachable from a certain kind 
of perceiving and conceiving mind Thus 
cognitive closure with respect to P does not 
imply irrealism about P." (ibid, p. 3) 
3 .2. ~ 
We noted in Chapter 2, sUbsection 2.2.2 that the scientific 
realist is able to postulate the existence of a reality 
which lies beyond his perceptions on the grounds that such 
a hypothesis yields the best explanation of those very 
perceptions. However, McGinn I s stance deviates from a 
genuine attempt at scientific realism on two counts. 
Firstly, he is prepared to postulate the existence of 
properties which we are not only unable to perceive, but 
which also fall outside the scope of our conceptual 
understanding. Secondly, he fails to see that the 
scientific realist must, at the very least be able to say 
what kind of evidence would support or refute the existence 
of any non-observable entities. Moreover, this evidence 
must be obtainable, at least in principle. McGinn, on the 
other hand, denies that introspection, conceptual analysis 
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or neuroscience can ever yield any evidence in support of 
his hypothesis. Consequently, any arguments that a hidden 
structure of consciousness may provide the best explanation 
for the situation described in his general hypothesis (HI) 
are cut off at a stroke. For example, McGinn writes that 
"the property of consciousness IS cogni ti vely 
closed with respect to the introduction of 
concepts by means of inference to the best 
explanation of perceptual data about the brain." 
(ibid, p. 13) 
But if McGinn systematically disallows the possibility of 
any empirically testable inferences to the truth of his 
hypothesis (H2 ) that consciousness has a hidden structure, 
then his claim to have succeeded in showing that there is 
nothing metaphysically strange or problematic about the 
link between consciousness and the brain is unwarranted. 
By his own admission, we can never know anything about the 
properties of such a hidden structure. McGinn's assertion 
that there is nothing non-naturalistic about this structure 
is simply begging the very point at issue. Indeed, McGinn 
IS hoisting himself on his own petard, since the very 
arguments he employs to show that we must be pessimistic 
about our chances of ever discovering the true explanation 
of the link between consciousness and the physical brain 
are the very arguments which must also preclude his 
140 
3.2.5 
optimism concerning the character of this explanation, and 
the reason why his theory lacks testability. 
3.2.5 Blindsight and blind judgment 
McGinn attempts to mitigate these difficulties by providing 
us with some indirect evidence for the hidden structure of 
consciousness. Perhaps the phenomenon of blindsight will 
provide us with some support for his specific hypothesis 
that consciousness has a hidden structure thereby providing 
further confirmation of the original, more general, 
hypothesis, HI' that consciousness plays an important role 
in our mental lives and is somehow rooted in physical 
processes in the mind/brain. 
McGinn begins this section of his argument (McGinn, 1991, 
p. 110) by asserting that the need for a hypothesis of a 
hidden structure within consciousness would be obviated if 
it could be demonstrated that whenever the phenomenal 
features associated with any particular ability are absent, 
then that ability breaks down too. Here, McGinn does 
attempt to describe the kind of evidence that would refute 
his hypothesis. However, he can afford to be generous in 
this respect, since the findings of neuropsychological 
research present evidence that the reverse is sometimes the 
case. There are instances 1n which a person has no 
conscious awareness of being able to see and is yet able to 
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locate and identify shapes presented in their former visual 
field with a level of accuracy that is better than chance. 
This is the phenomenon of blindsight. 
McGinn comments, correctly, (ibid, p. 111) that this 
phenomenon illustrates that the sUbjective experience of 
seeing is sometimes dissociated from the actual ability to 
see. Moreover, he continues 
"I take it that what is most controversial in my 
interpretation of blindsight is the thesis that 
it demonstrates a hidden causal structure to 
conscious visual states themsel ves. It would 
presumably not be denied that some causal 
structure exists in common to ordinary sight and 
blindsight; the moot question is whether this 
structure is intrinsic to experience itself or 
merely exists alongside it" (ibid, p. 112). 
McGinn 1S quite right to anticipate objections to this part 
of his interpretation of blindsight. Of course, it is not 
impossible that the causal structures responsible for the 
preservation of some of the blindsight subject's ability to 
see may be situated within that part of consciousness that 
McGinn claims is not open to introspection. 
evidence by no means supports this 
However, the 
interpretation 
unequivocally. Indeed, Weiskrantz, who was responsible for 
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much of the pioneering work in this field, is chary about 
drawing too many inferences concerning the nature of these 
structures. Whilst he admits that it is important for us 
to consider the dissociation of function from experience, 
he goes on to comment that this 
"does not mean that philosophical questions 
regarding it are not tangled and complex, and we 
make no absurd claim here to find a ready answer 
to mind-body problems." (Weiskrantz, 1986, p. 
165) 
Further, it is interesting to note that one of Weiskrantz's 
few remarks concerning the implications of the gap between 
the verbal reports of blindsight subjects and their 
preserved visual abilities takes us In completely the 
opposite direction from the one advocated by McGinn. 
Weiskrantz writes that 
" if it is universally accepted by ordinary men 
and women that we all have phenomenal experience, 
then what would be the evolutionary value of such 
a claim: not only for our belief In its 
existence, but even beyond to the reason for its 
very existence? The phenomenon of blindsight, 
and other "non-conscious II processes, does at 
least challenge one to speculate about this and 
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ln doing so, to put the matter in a biological 
and hence scientific context. II (ibid, p. 165, my 
italics) 
3 . 2 . 5 
This quotation demonstrates that it is equally possible to 
interpret the phenomenon of blindsight as evidence against 
McGinn's theory of consciousness. weiskrantz suggests that· 
blindsight is a non-conscious process, rather than one 
created by the preservation of the deeper structures within 
consciousness when its surface properties have been 
destroyed. Moreover, Weiskrantz implies that the discovery 
of such phenomena calls into question the importance that 
we have hitherto assigned to conscious experiences. 
Consequently, McGinn's discussion of blindsight, far from 
strengthening his argument, may shed further doubt upon his 
initial hypothesis that consciousness plays such a major 
role in our mental lives. McGinn's failure to discuss the 
merits of such alternative interpretations of blindsight 
demonstrates a strong bias in favour of the story that will 
support his own hypothesis. 11 Once more, McGinn has 
systematically neglected to consider sources of empirical 
evidence that may refute his theory. 
Further, McGinn's arguments in favour of his interpretation 
of bl inds ight are themse 1 ves not good. Once more, his 
insistence that we are constitutionally incapable of 
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discovering the precl.se nature of the deep structure of 
consciousness precludes the possibility of our ever being 
able to test his claim that such a structure is responsible 
for the preservation of visual capacities in blindsight 
subj ects . 12 This means that the bootstrap strategy he 
employs . l.S dealt a severe blow, for he needs to assume 
hypothesis H2 (the existence of a hidden structure within 
consciousness) in his interpretation of blindsight 
(evidence E2 ). McGinn is once more begging the very point 
that he is trying to prove. 13 
Secondly, McGinn relies upon linguistic arguments to 
support his view that the structures responsible for the 
preservation of the visual capacities of blindsight 
subjects are intrinsic components of consciousness. This 
strategy is perverse to say the least, Sl.nce one of his 
mal.n initial arguments for the postulation of a hidden 
structure within consciousness was based upon an analogy 
with the ways in which our linguistic expressions of our 
thoughts fail to provide an accurate reflection of the true 
logical structure of those thoughts. For example, McGinn 
writes that 
"the apparent form of sentences actively tempts 
us into certain kinds of logical and metaphysical 
error; the surface of language naturally 
generates various intellectual illusions, ~hich 
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can only be avoided by discounting or downplaying 
the appearances and acknowledging a level of 
hidden logical structure." (McGinn, 1991, p. 93) 
Yet he comments elsewhere that 
"[w]e explain 
precisely by 
my discriminative behaviour 
saying that I have visual 
experiences of certain kinds; they are the causal 
ground of my discriminative behaviour. We do not 
say that I have these experiences and there is 
some other causal source at work inside me" 
( ibid, p. 112) 
3 • 2 • 5 
By the lights of his earlier arguments, McGinn should 
possibility that our ordinary way of 
visual experiences may be radically 
that the very postulation of mysterious 
acknowledge the 
talking about 
misguided, so 
causal powers within a hidden structure of consciousness is 
itself a source of "metaphysical error" and "intellectual 
illusion". Hence, that part of evidence (E2 ) that is 
concerned with blindsight does not provide McGinn with any 
satisfactory support for H2 • His bootstrap argument is 
therefore proved to be unsatisfactory ln yet another 
respect. 
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3.2.6 McGinn and the veil-of-perception issue 
We saw in sUbsection 3.2.4 that McGinn maintains that our 
cognitive closure with respect to the hidden depths of 
consciousness does not prevent him from asserting the 
existence of these depths, nor from knowing that their 
properties bear no resemblance to previously suggested" 
solutions to the problem of how consciousness can exist 
within a physical substance. His line of argument 1n 
support of H2 involves the acceptance of all four of the 
following claims: 
i) there is a hidden deep structure of conSC10usness 
beneath the surface properties 
ii) this structure 1S causally responsible for much of 
our mental life 
iii) we only ever have direct awareness of the surface 
properties of consciousness; these introspectable 
surface properties mediate between the deep structure 
of consciousness and our day-to-day experiences and 
thought processes. We are constitutionally incapable 
of direct knowledge of the hidden structure of 
consciousness. 
i v) yet this hidden structure exists and that it 
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provides a naturalistic and non-occult explanation of 
the link between consciousness and the physical brain, 
since nothing else that we know of can account for 
this link. 
McGinn's argument exhibits the very kind of difficulties 
that have traditionally been associated with the veil-of-
perception issue (see Chapter 1, subsection 1.2.4). The 
four claims above form a semantically inconsistent tetrad 
similar to that isolated in the original veil-of-perception 
lssue. They therefore fail to provide a satisfactory 
argument for the existence of a hidden structure wi thin 
consciousness. since we are constitutionally incapable of 
direct knowledge of such a structure (claim iii), we have 
no independent corroborating evidence for claims ii) and i) 
respectively, namely that this structure is causally 
responsible for so much of our mental life, or indeed, that 
it exists at a11 14 • McGinn's argument therefore exhibits 
the difficulties that I identified with the strong or 
ontological versl0n of the veil-of-perception issue 
(Chapter 1, subsection 1.2.4). 
Further, even if we grant McGinn's assumption that 
consciousness does have a deeper hidden structure, we still 
have no reason to believe that this structure will provide 
a non-occult, naturalistic explanation of the link between 
consciousness and the brain (claim iv). Therefore, 
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McGinn's argument exhibits the weaknesses that I have 
associated with the weak or epistemological version of the 
veil-of-perception issue, as defined in Chapter 1, 
sUbsection 1.2.4. 
Scientific realists must allow for the possibility that 
their hypotheses may be refuted as a result of empirical' 
evidence against them that is discovered in the course of 
rlgorous and systematic searches for evidence. In claiming 
a priori that we shall never know the structure of the 
hidden part of consciousness, McGinn fails to be a true 
scientific realist. Rather, he is a metaphysical realist 
who pays lip service only to the concepts of the modern 
philosopher influenced by science. 
It is clear from the above that McGinn fails to understand 
the burden of proof that the scientific realist is required 
to provide ln support of hypotheses which make reference to 
non-observable entities. His bootstrap argument has wholly 
failed to screen out hypotheses that are really based upon 
metaphysical assumptions rather than upon solid, 
empirically testable foundations. 
McGinn regards his theory as an advance upon those that 
have postulated occult entities such as i~material 
sUbstances and disembodied minds (McGinn, 1991, pp. 105 -
107) . Such cartesian entities are, in his vie~, dreamt up 
1 .. 9 
3 . 2 • 6 
as a consequence of paying too much attention to the 
illusions created by introspection. However, given that 
McGinn admits that we have no way of knowing the nature of 
the deep hidden structure of consciousness, his own theory 
seems no less occult. Locke I S arguments concerning the 
validity of our use of the general term "substance" would 
be just as appropriate here. Locke wrote that 
"here, as in all other cases where we use words 
without having clear and distinct ideas, we talk 
like children; who, being questioned what such a 
thing is, which they know not, readily give this 
satisfactory answer that it is something; which 
in truth signifies no more, when so used, either 
by children or men, but that they know not what, 
and that the thing they pretend to know, and talk 
of, is what they have no idea of at all" (Locke, 
1981, p.186). 
It is hard to see precisely why McGinn is so adamant that 
his hypothesis that consciousness has a hidden structure 
will be so useful when we are necessarily incapable of 
discovering its nature. 
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3.2.7 Conclusion - McGinn the metaphysical realist 
We are left with the uncomfortable impression that McGinn's 
self-avowed scientific realism is an illusion, and that his 
arguments contain more than a few unwarranted metaphysical 
assumptions. It is acceptable to postulate hypotheses that 
are as yet unproven, and equally acceptable to attempt to' 
describe the benefits that will accrue for philosophers and 
scientists if the hypotheses turn out to be correct. 
However, it is not acceptable to extol the virtues of a 
hypothesis which contains within itself the seeds of its 
own inherent untestability. Nor is it acceptable to ignore 
in a systematic fashion interpretations of empirical 
evidence that tell against one's hypotheses. Such 
strategies bear the unmistakable stamp of metaphysical 
realism. 
McGinn is aware to some extent of the metaphysical status 
of the assumptions that are incorporated into his theory. 
He writes that 
"the metaphysical merits of the present 
conception should be allowed to overrule any 
discomfort it may induce in the epistemologically 
sensitive" (ibid, p.122). 
However, he fails to realise the import of what he . ~s 
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saying for his intended stance of scientific realism. This 
tension between the metaphysical realist and the scientific 
realist runs throughout McGinn's argument. Unfortunately, 
McGinn's neglect of the importance of systematic and 
rigorous testing of hypotheses within a bootstrapping 
argument result in victory for the metaphysical realist. 
1. See also my comments on Popper in the Introduction to section 
B, subsection B1. 
2. This point will be made illustrated repeatedly in the course 
of this section of the thesis. 
3. I shall justify this rather contentious statement l.n the 
course of this chapter. 
4. See, for example, his comments in Could A Machine Be 
Conscious? (ibid, pp. 202-213) that a chemical substance in the 
brain 
"would not be the kind of thing to explain 
consciousness" (ibid, p. 208). 
These comments are not backed up by any kind of convincing 
philosophical arguments. Moreover, the lines of argument 
employed in Could A Machine Be Conscious? are very similar to 
those used in the chapter under scrutiny here. This indicates 
that the problems that I am about to highlight are endemic in 
McGinn's work. 
5. Hofstadter and Dennett (1982) contains a useful bibliography 
of relevant literature. 
6. This hypothesis is implicit in McGinn's whole discussion of 
why it is so important for us to be scientific realists about 
consciousness, rather than stated explicitly. 
7. See, for example, McGinn's comments that "Nothing overt is 
up to the job [of accounting for the place of consciousness in 
the physical world] .... There has to be more to consciousness 
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than there seems to be or else it could not depend upon the 
physical world in the way we know it does. As it were, nature 
could not create consciousness out of living matter without 
first constructing a substructure for consciousness to rest on; 
levitation is not an option" (ibid, pp. 100-101). 
8. Compare my earlier comments in sUbsection 3.2 on the 
existence of thoughts that are not revealed by introspection. 
9. However this does not stop McGinn from postulating some kind 
of direct link between the surface properties of consciousness 
and physical properties of the brain when it suits him. For 
example, he indulges in speculation as to what might happen to 
a person if "by surgery, we took away the surface structure of 
his thoughts and left him with only their hidden logical 
structure" (ibid, p. 113). 
10. A point frequently made by many neurophilosophers eg: Paul 
Churchland. Paul Churchland comments (P. M. Churchland, 1984, 
p.160) that our introspective powers will become increasingly 
discriminating as we acquire more concepts with which we can 
describe our experience. Hence, eliminativism does not deny that 
consciousness exists as McGinn (1991, p. 122) implies; rather, 
it claims that the vocabulary that we use to describe our 
conscious experiences may be in need of revision. 
11. This omission on McGinn's part is particularly striking in 
view of the central role played by Weiskrantz in the study of the 
blindsight phenomenon. Indeed, McGinn himself refers to 
Weiskrantz's work (McGinn, 1991, p. 110, n. 26). 
12. This aspect of McGinn's arguments also prevents him from 
giving a satisfactory account of why functionalism is an inferior 
explanation of the phenomenon of blindsight (cf: McGinn, 1991, 
p.11S) . 
13. Moreover, McGinn cannot claim that this hypothesis is simply 
the best explanation of blindsight that we have, since he has not 
argued sufficiently well against the alternative interpretation 
suggested by Weiskrantz. The most favourable outcome possible 
for McGinn under the circumstances is, once more, empirical 
underdetermination. 
14. Recall that McGinn himself asserts that introspection gives 
us no awareness of this deeper aspect of consciousness, so the 
claim within statement (iii) that the surface properties of 
consciousness mediate between it and our experiences remains 
uncorroborated except for the assumption that there is no other 
possible explanation for much of our behaviour. However, as I 
have already mentioned, this assumption is the very point at 
issue and cannot therefore be regarded as evidence in support of 
the hypothesis without begging the question. 
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Chapter 4 - Taking Fodor to task: Churchland, Mentalese 
and metaphysical realism1 
4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is two-fold. Firstly, it is 
intended to yield further illustration of the point made in 
the preceding discussion of Colin McGinn's theory of 
consciousness (Chapter 3), namely, that the difficulties 
traditionally associated with metaphysical reali~m are nnt 
necessarily avoided through the mere use of a bootstrapping 
line of argument to derive specific and general theories 
about the mind/brain from the same evidence. Here, these 
. lssues are discussed in the context of Fodor's 
representational theory of mind. 
Like Colin McGinn, Fodor relies chiefly upon conceptual 
analysis to establish his conclusions that sentential 
representations exist within the mind/brain and are 
causally responsible for our overt linguistic abilities. 
However, some attempts are made to consolidate his views by 
reference to psychological findings, notably . ln Fodor 
(1976) . It will be demonstrated that these attempts by 
Fodor to provide evidence in support of his bootstrap 
argument are unsatisfactory, and do not exonerate him from 
the charge of metaphysical realism, not withstanding his 
154 
4.1 
claims to the contrary (see, for examples, my subsection 
4.3 below). 
The second, sUbsidiary aim of this chapter is to establish 
that the criticisms made of the Fodorean representational 
theory of mind by Patricia smith Churchland amount to the 
claim that the theory suffers from the very difficulties 
relating to explanation that may be illustrated by the 
veil-of-perception issue, and that Fodor is therefore a 
metaphysical realist. Such an awareness of the questions 
associated with realism as they apply to other theorists of 
the mind/brain should, we hope, yield more positive efforts 
on Churchland's part to avoid being hoisted upon the same 
petard when developing her own position. However, I shall 
show in Chapter 6, sUbsections 6.2.3 - 6.2.5 that her own 
regard for the principles of scientific realism lacks any 
real depth. I am using the Fodorean position as a stalking 
horse, so that Churchland's own ambivalent attitude can be 
more clearly exposed. 
I shall begin by describing some of the main features of 
Fodor's Representational Theory of Mind, then go on to 
highlight the use of the bootstrapping argument . ln the 
creation of the theory. In the second half of the 
chapter, Churchland's criticisms of Fodor and the Fodorean 
line of defence will be examined, and then evaluated in the 
light of the discussion of realism, explanation and the 
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veil-of-perception issue in Section A. The chapter will 
conclude with a short summary of the contribution that this 
chapter makes to the overall argument of the thesis as a 
whole. 
4.1.1 What is mentalese? 
In developing a representational theory of mind, Fodor's 
main line of argument is for the existence of a language of 
thought or mentalese in Fodor (1976). However, the basic 
theory is amplified and defended in later works (Fodor 
1980, 1981, 1984b, 1985a, 1986a, 1986b, 1987), although its 
main features do not undergo any radical change. 
Fodor adopts a stance consonant with realism towards mental 
representations or symbol systems, claiming that they 
literally exist within the mind/brain. Mental processes 
consist in computations which are defined over these 
representations. computations are symbol manipulations 
which are only possible because the symbols possess a 
structured syntax by virtue of which they may be combined 
to generate further mental processes, or to instigate overt 
action or speech. 
It is this symmetry between syntax and semantics that, 
Fodor's view, makes a language of thought hypothesis 
. ln 
possible. He writes that 
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"[w]hat makes the story a Language of Thought story, 
and not just an Intentional Realist story, is the idea 
that these mental states that have content also have 
syntactic structure constituent structure l.n 
particular - that's appropriate to the content that 
they have" (Fodor, 1987, p. 137). 
This symmetry also accounts for the success of explanations 
of behaviour in terms of the intentions of an agent (in 
other words, folk psychological explanations). Cognitive 
states consist of propositional attitudes identified Vl.a 
their relationship to statements . l.n the language of 
thought. 
Fodor stresses that the constituent symbols of the language 
of thought must be explicitly represented, even if the 
computational processes that make use of them are not. In 
Fodor's opinion, we can account for our ability to generate 
an infinite variety of inner mental states in exactly the 
same way as we explain our ability to utter an infinite 
number of different sentences; that is to say, in terms of 
the number of potential combinations of meaningful symbols 
that may be created through the use of diverse 
computational rules which operate upon their syntax. In 
the case of overt languages, of course, these computational 
rules are known collectively as a grammar. 
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One consequence of Fodorean theory is that it results in 
methodological sOlipsism (Fodor, 1980, p. 65). Although 
Fodor is adamant that mental representations do have 
semantic content and that it is in principle possible for 
us to construct a naturalistic account of how each mental 
representation acquires its meaning, he 1S equally 
convinced that the naturalistic account will in practice 
remain forever unknown to us. since mental processes are 
computational, they only have access to the formal, 
syntactic properties of the symbols or representations that 
constitute the language of thought. No account is taken of 
the semantic content of these representations. study of 
these processes could therefore never yield any information 
about the meaning of these states. 
These features of the computational processes within the 
mind/brain force us not only to query the accuracy with 
which our mental states represent the world outside the 
mind/brain, but also to consider the more radical question 
of whether they can represent anything at all. These 
doubts correspond exactly to the weak and strong versions 
of the traditional veil-of-perception issue identified in 
Chapter 1 (subsection 1.2.4). If we have no testable 
explanation of how our representations come to have the 
semantic content that Fodor assures us they do, how can we 
ever trust them? Our concerns are compounded by Fodor's 
unfortunate comment that his theory 
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"is, in fact, a Good Old Theory - one to which both 
Locke and Descartes would certainly have 
subscribed" (Fodor, 1981, p. 26). 
Fodor goes on to draw an explicit comparison (ibid, p. 26) 
between the mental representations or symbols involved ln 
his inner language of thought and the "ideas" postulated ln 
seventeenth century philosophy. This is disturbing, since 
such "ideas" were an essential component of the theories of 
Locke - one of the philosophers most frequently alleged to 
have fallen into the trap of the veil-of-perception (see 
also my comments on Locke in Chapter 1, subsection 1.2.5).2 
As late as Fodor (1986), we find casual comments from Fodor 
about these difficulties. He writes 
"there is a worry about how symbols(/beliefs) can be 
false. These are hard problems; but at least they're 
the right problems" (Fodor, 1986, p. 21). 
However, Fodor does not appear altogether happy with this 
state of affairs, and in Fodor (1987) he attempts to put 
forward a naturalistic account of mental representations 
which retains the language of thought as an integral 
feature. His success in avoiding the difficulties 
associated with the impossibility of naturalism will be 
assessed in sUbsection 4.4.3, below. 
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4.2 Fodor's use of the bootstrap strategy 
4.2.1 Fodor's support for the bootstrap strategy as a 
device for the development of psychological theories 
Fodor is well aware that the bootstrap strategy has been 
used for a long time by psychologists with the express 
intent of deriving from one set of data both general and 
specific conclusions about the way that the mind works. He 
comments in the Preface of Fodor (1976) that 
n[w]hat speculative psychologists did was this: They 
thought about such data as were available about mental 
processes, and they thought about such first-order 
psychological theories as had been proposed to account 
for the data. They then tried to elucidate the 
general conception of the mind that was implicit in 
the data and the theories" (Fodor, 1976, p. vii). 
Fodor then goes on to associate himself with this 
methodology by declaring that 
n[t]his book, in any event, is unabashedly an essay ln 
speculative psychology" (ibid, p. viii). 
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Nor is Fodor unaware of the implications of the bootstrap 
strategy: namely, that empirical work must go hand in hand 
with theorizing. He argues that 
"One wants to say: 'If our psychology is, 1n general, 
right then the nature of the mind must be, roughly, 
this ... ' and then f ill in the blank. Given the 
speculative elucidation, the experimentalist can work 
the other way around: 'if the nature of the mind 1S 
roughly ... , then our psychology ought henceforth to 
look like this: ... ', where this blank is filled by new 
first-order theories. We ascend, in science, by 
tugging one another's bootstraps" (ibid, p. ix). 
Indeed, Fodor's overt response to the possibility that 
fundamental mistakes in our theories may be found as a 
result of the use of the bootstrap strategy is a good one. 
He argues (ibid, p. ix) that this possibility should be 
recognised as a real one, but should not prevent us from 
carrying out the work that will demonstrate these errors. 
However, when faced with evidence which tells against his 
own theory, Fodor's actual reaction is very different. He 
is reluctant to admit that either his specific or general 
theories of the mind/brain may be wrong3 • 
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The bootstrap line of argument within Fodor's 
Representational Theory of Mind 
There is a clear bootstrapping argument wi thin Fodor's 
theory. His general hypothesis Hl within his 
representational theory of mind, RTM, is that cogni ti ve 
processes are computational4 . This hypothesis is thought" 
by Fodor to derive support from a variety of sources which 
together constitute a body of evidence that I shall term El . 
Firstly, Fodor claims that all hitherto plausible specific 
theories of cognitive processes within the mind/brain have 
been based upon the notion of computation. He writes that 
"[t]he only psychological models of cognitive 
processes that seem even remotely plausible represent 
such processes as computational .... Remotely plausible 
theories are better than no theories at all" (ibid, p. 
27) • 
Theories that do not make use of the computational 
hypothesis have, Fodor's opinion, all been 
unsatisfactory. He regards behaviourism, for example, as 
incapable of providing us with a satisfactory explanation 
of human action, because it does not allow for the 
possibility that an agent has chosen to act to bring about 
one particular event rather than another. The behaviourist 
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ascribes causal powers only to actual events, and not to 
ones that are merely possible. Fodor writes that 
"the behaviorist requires us to view considered 
behaviors as responses to actual inputs, when what we 
want to do is view them as responses to possible 
outcomes. 
It is, conversely, one of the great advantages of 
computational theories of action that they allow us to 
acknowledge what everybody knows: that deciding what 
to do often involves considering what might turn out 
to be the case" (ibid, p. 33). 
In Fodor (1986b), Fodor is still insistent that our ability 
to predict and explain human behaviour would not exist were 
it not for computational systems within the mind/brain. 
This is because such explanations and predictions are based 
upon propositional attitude psychology. Moreover, 
"one can say in a phrase what it is that computational 
psychology has been proving so successful at: viz. the 
vindication of generalizations about propositional 
attitudes" (Fodor, 1986b, p. 3).5 
The very existence of such a successful method of 
explaining and predicting human behaviour, and the failure 
of psychologists and philosophers to provide an acceptable 
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non-computational theory of cognitive processes together 
constitute two of Fodor's main sources of evidence (E l ) for 
the general hypothesis (HI) concerning the computational 
nature of mind/brain processes. 
In the light of his general position that any satisfactory 
theory of the mind/brain must make reference to' 
computational processes, Fodor goes on to develop his 
specific hypothesis (H2) about the way that our mind/brain 
actually realizes these processes. H2 consists in Fodor's 
language of thought hypothesis and is arrived at by the 
following argument. 
If we accept Fodor's general hypothesis HI' and the evidence 
he cites in its favour, E l , 
computational. However, 
then cognitive processes are 
it is impossible for any 
computation to take place if there are no representations 
or symbols within the mind/brain over which such 
computational processes can be defined. It is the syntax 
of these representations that facilitates their 
computational manipulation. Fodor comments that 
"certain kinds of very central patterns of 
psychological explanation presuppose the availability, 
to the behaving organism, of some sort of 
representational system ..... For, deciding is a 
computational process; the act the agent performs is 
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of 
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over 
No 
representations, no computations" (Fodor, 1976, p. 
31) . 
This representational 
constitutes a language 
system, in 
of thought. 
Fodor's opinion, 
Like a natural 
language, our internal representational system must be able 
to deal with hypothetical situations and to create a 
potentially infinite variety of scenarios from a large, but 
finite number of constituent symbols. What better way to 
describe the representational system within the mind/brain 
than as a language of thought? Fodor sums up his argument 
graphically as follows: 
"OK, so here's the argument: Linguistic capacities are 
systematic, and that's because sentences have 
constituent structure. But cognitive capacities are 
systematic too, and that must be because thoughts have 
constituent structure. But if thoughts have 
constituent structure, then LOT [the Language of 
Thought thesis] is true" (Fodor, 1987, pp. 150-51). 
Fodor believes that our undisputed ability to learn 
concepts furnishes us with yet another source of evidence 
in support of the view that the mind/brain operates in a 
computational fashion. In his opinion, we owe our ability 
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to learn overt languages, including our native language, to 
the existence of the language of thought or Menta lese. 
This is because the learning of a concept 1n an overt 
language such as English consists in the formulation and 
testing of hypotheses. If we do not yet know a concept in 
English, then it has to be introduced into our vocabulary 
via a Mentalese equivalent. Fodor comments that 
"there is only one kind of theory that has ever been 
proposed for concept learning ... and this theory is 
incoherent unless there 1S a language of thought" 
(Fodor, 1976, p. 36). 
The hypothesis and confirmation theory of concept learning 
constitutes part of the body of evidence (E l ). As the 
previous quotation illustrates, Fodor combines this 
evidence with the general computational hypothesis (HI) to 
form an argument in support of the language of thought 
hypothesis (H2 ). He writes that 
"the analysis of concept learning is like the analysis 
of considered choice; we cannot begin to make sense of 
the phenomena unless we are willing to view them as 
computational and we cannot begin to make sense of the 
view that they are computational unless we are willing 
to assume a representational system of considerable 
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power in which the computations are carried out" 
(ibid, p. 36). 
Here, Fodor makes an explicit link between the general 
hypothesis (HI) and the specific language of thought 
hypothesis (H2 ) via the evidence provided by his view of 
concept learning. concept learning is only explicable by 
reference to computation, but the language of thought 
hypothesis is needed to account for the representational 
complexity demanded by the computational processes 
involved. This is, of course, wholly in keeping with the 
traditional use of the bootstrap strategy to formulate a 
general hypothesis and a more specific hypothesis on the 
basis of just one set of data. (See also my earlier 
comments in sUbsection 4.2.1, and the discussion in Chapter 
2.) If independent evidence could be adduced in support of 
the language of thought hypothesis, further confirmation 
would also be lent to the more general hypothesis 
concerning the fundamentally computational character of the 
mind/brain and the bootstrap argument would be complete. 
Fodor's views about how we learn concepts commit him to two 
further claims about the nature of the language of thought. 
Firstly, it 1S innate. Secondly, S1nce animals, and 
children who have not yet learned to speak are capable of 
acquiring concepts, a language of thought must be 
167 
4.2.2 
attributed to them too, Slnce such computational processes 
require representations, and 
"the representational systems of preverbal and 
infrahuman . organlsms surely cannot be natural 
languages. So either we abandon such preverbal and 
infrahuman psychology as we have so far pieced 
together, or we admit that some thinking, at least, 
isn't done in English" (ibid, p. 56). 
Fodor cites a mixture of reasons why we should be convinced 
of the truth of hypothesis H2 • This pot-pourri of 
reflections and supposed experimental support for the 
language of thought hypothesis constitutes E2 , the second 
body of evidence at work within Fodor's bootstrapping line 
of argument. The main thrust of this stage in Fodor I s 
reasoning is an argument by analogy which is intended to 
demonstrate that the language of thought hypothesis must be 
correct because our inner representational system has so 
many similarities with natural languages. For example, 
Fodor writes that 
U[t]he general idea is that facts about natural 
languages will constrain our theories of 
communication, and theories of communication will in 
turn constrain our theories about internal 
representations messages are most plausibly 
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construed as formulae in the language of thought" 
(Fodor, 1976, p. 109). 
Fodor's basic idea is that, for a speaker and a listener to 
understand each other, there must be some correspondence 
between the mental states of one and the mental states of 
the other. When two people communicate, a process of 
coding and decoding messages IS taking place. Fodor 
believes that this process is only possible if each 
participant in the communication process IS able to 
construct representations of these messages which stand In 
systematic relation to the structure of the sentences which 
make up the messages. If no such representations exist, 
then there is nothing for our cognitive processes to 
manipulate in the course of interpreting the information 
carried by the messages. 
Moreover, this representational medium must also be able to 
convey information from the senses In such a form that it 
can both be communicated to others and be used to confirn 
remarks uttered either by oneself or by others (ibid, pp. 
111-112) . Fodor suggests that 
n[a]n obvious way to achieve this would be to 
translate all perceptual inputs into a common code and 
then define the confirmation relation for formulae in 
that code" (ibid, p. 112). 
169 
This common code is the language of thought. 
explains that 
4.2.2 
Fodor 
It if the kind of theory of communication I have been 
sketching is right, messages must be formulated in the 
language of thought; ie, they must be formulae in 
whatever representational system provides the domains' 
for such cognitive operations as apply (inter alia) to 
linguistically carried information" (ibid, p. 115). 
Fodor is anxious to argue that his specific language of 
thought hypothesis (H2 ) will, when combined with E2 (the 
body of evidence and arguments which supports H2 ), yield 
further confirmation of his general hypothesis (H1 ) that 
, 
cognitive processes are computational. This would complete 
the bootstrapping cycle. In Fodor (1987), this move is 
made very clearly in two slightly different ways. 
Firstly, Fodor simply states what a representational system 
like a language of thought actually makes possible. He 
argues that 
n[ilf you think of a mental process - extensionally, 
as it were - as a sequence of menta 1 states each 
specified with reference to its intentional content, 
then mental representations provide a mechanism for 
the construction of these sequences; they allow you to 
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get, ln a mechanical way, from one such state to the 
next by performing operations on the representations" 
(Fodor, 1987, p. 145). 
Secondly, Fodor looks at the problem from the other side 
and considers the consequences of rejecting the language of 
thought hypothesis. His conclusion is radical. 
"As things stand now, the cost of not having a 
Language of Thought is not having a theory of 
A 
thinking" (ibid, p. 147). 
These passages provide a lucid illustration of the Fodorean 
stance. The language of thought hypothesis is not merely 
regarded as a consequence of the hypothesis that the 
mind/brain operates in a computational manner - it is also 
a prerequisite of computation6 • Acceptance of the general 
hypothesis HI (on the basis of evidence EI ) entails 
acceptance of the language of thought hypothesis H2 , and 
this more specif ic hypothesis, combined with supporting 
evidence E2 , makes it possible to claim that computational 
processes occur within the mind/brain. 
4.3 Fodor's attitude to realism 
It is one of the supreme ironies of Fodor's work th~t he 
repeatedly declares his respect for the view th~t all 
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hypotheses should be supported by satisfactory evidence, 
and yet fails to respond to criticisms of his theory in the 
same spirit. His apparently open mind about the ultimate 
plausibility of his language of thought hypothesis 1S 
revealed in this comment concerning a comparison of the 
language of thought with natural languages. Fodor clai~s 
that it is merely 
"a suggestion that I regard as entirely speculative 
but very interesting to speculate about .... " (Fodor: 
1976, p. 156) 
He continues 
"It is pertinent to finish by emphasizing that these 
views may very well all be wrong ... The thesis I care 
most about is that claims .. about the character of 
internal representations are empirical in the sense 
that empirical data would tend toward their 
confirmation or disconfirmation" (ibid, p. 156). 
Fodor is concerned to emphasize that he 1S not simply 
concerned to make sweeping statements to the effect that 
the language of thought hypothesis 1S correct and 
supportable by empirical evidence. Indeed, he sees his 
work as part of a larger, active research progra~~e. He 
admits that 
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"i t is not enough to argue that the notion of an 
internal language is conceptually coherent, that it 15 
demanded by such cognitive models as sensible people 
now endorse, and that, in principle, claims about the 
structure of that language connect with empirical 
issues in psychology and linguistics. What now needs 
to be shown is that some progress can in fact be made" 
in the assessment of such claims" (ibid, p. 122). 
Unfortunately, Fodor does not always show himself to be so 
willing in practice to consider questions of evidence and 
to provide detailed arguments in support of his theory. 
This becomes apparent in Fodor's (1976) discussion of the 
linguistic evidence which he takes to favour the language 
of thought hypothesis. Fodor asserts that he wishes only 
"to try to convince the reader that the internal 
language hypothesis is not, in the pejorative sense of 
the term, 'metaphysical': that there are factual 
considerations which constrain theories about the 
internal code. I shall therefore be content if it is 
accepted that the kinds of arguments I will rehearse 
are pertinent to the conf irmation of such theor ies 
(ibid, p. 99). 
Fodor's reluctance to claim any decisive authority for the 
specific evidence that he goes on to cite would be 
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commendable if it were combined with a genuine willingness 
to give due consideration to arguments and evidence brought 
forward against his theory of the nature of the mind/brain. 
However, he displays a tendency in all his work on the 
language of thought hypothesis to reject any arguments or 
data that conflict with his own views (see subsection 4.4.3 
below for some examples of this Fodorean tendency). Fodor' 
fails to acknowledge criticisms of his theory with the 
result that he creates the impression of systematically 
rendering it immune to tests or refutation. His insistence 
that he adopts the approach of a scientific realist to the 
issue of representation within the mind/brain is therefore 
misplaced. This point will be emphasised at length in 
sUbsection 4.4.4. 
4.4 Church land • s criticisms of the language of thought 
hypothesis 
4.4.1 Introduction 
This part of my argument has two key objectives. Firstly, 
I shall demonstrate that the arguments of Patricia smith 
Churchland against the language of thought hypothesis may 
be developed into the accusation that Fodor's 
representational theory of mind falls into the traps 
revealed in the earlier discussion (Chapter 1, sUbsection 
1.2.4) of the traditional veil-of-perception issue. 
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consequently, Fodor is a metaphysical realist and not the 
scientific realist he aspires to be. 
Secondly, my use of Patricia Smith Churchland's arguments 
to criticize Fodor is intended to show that she is not 
unaware of the issues of testability that relate to the 
question of scientific realism. 7 The contrast between her" 
ability to isolate Fodor's failure to adhere to the rigid 
standards of testability required and her own neglect of 
these standards will become apparent in the course of the 
remainder of this chapter and Chapter 6 (subsections 6.2 -
6.2.5) . 
Churchland does not object to Fodor's use of the bootstrap 
strategy wi thin his theory of the mind to work from a 
general computational hypothesis towards a language of 
thought hypothesis which, if correct, would yield further 
confirmation of the computational hypothesis. There is 
absolutely nothing wrong, in her view, with working from a 
position that may ultimately turn out to be wrong, 
provided that independent evidence can then be produced in 
support of any conclusions drawn8 • 
But this is precisely where Fodor fails. It will be argued 
that Church land is correct to castigate Fodor on the 
grounds that he is not entitled to draw the conclusions 
that he does solely on the basis of the hypotheses and 
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sources of evidence cited in the course of his bootstrap 
argument. This means that Fodor's use of the bootstrap 
strategy does not prevent his argument from suffering from 
the difficulties associated with the traditional veil-of-
perception issue and with the failures of metaphysical 
realism. This line of argument will be developed in detail 
in sUbsection 4.4.4. 
For the sake of clarity, my initial discussion of 
Churchland's criticisms of the Fodorean bootstrap strategy 
will be divided into two halves. The first half 
(subsection 4.4.2) will deal with her criticisms of Fodor's 
use of the general computational hypothesis (H l ) and the 
supporting body of evidence (El ) to infer the more specific 
hypothesis (H2 ) of the language of thought per see 
The second half (subsection 4.4.3) of the discussion 
examines Churchland's analysis of the remaining portion of 
Fodor' s theory, including the implications of H2 itself, the 
strength of the evidence contained in E2 , and Fodor's 
resulting claim that a combination of the two provide 
further confirmation of the truth of hypothesis Hl with 
respect to his overall representational theory of the mind, 
RTM. 
In ° lOt wloll be demonstrated that subsectlon 4.4.4 
Churchland's criticisms of Fodor's theory can be 
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reformulated to demonstrate Fodor's failure to avoid the 
difficulties that were associated with the traditional 
veil-of-perception issue in Chapter 1, sUbsection 1.2.4 and 
subsequently identified as characteristic of metaphysical 
realism in Chapter 2, sUbsection 2.2.1. 
4.4.2 Churchland's criticisms of Fodor's inference to Hi 
from H1 and E1 
It was noted above (subsection 4.2.1) that a sizeable 
proportion of Fodor's evidence (E l ) in favour of his general 
computational hypothesis (H l ) consists in the claim that 
such a hypothesis is needed in order to account for the 
success of common sense propositional attitude psychology. 
It is for this reason that Fodor comments that 
"at the heart of the picture, the fundamental 
explicandum, is the organism and its propositional 
attitudes: what it believes, what it learns, what it 
wants and fears, what it perceives to be the case. 
Cognitive psychologists accept, that 1S, what the 
behaviorists were most determined to reject: the 
facticity of ascriptions of propositional attitudes to 
organisms and the consequent necessity of explaining 
how organisms come to have the attitudes to 
propositions that they do" (Fodor, 1976, p. 198). 
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Since Fodor believes that having a propositional attitude 
is quite simply being in a specific relation to an internal 
representation, then a systematic way of manipulating such 
representations is required to account for the 
systematicity of human behaviour. Hence, Fodor 
claims that 
"only symbols have syntax, and our best available 
theory of mental processes indeed, the only 
available theory of mental processes that isn't known 
to be false - needs the picture of the mind as a 
syntax-driven machine" 
italics) . 
(Fodor, 1985a, p.94, his 
This argument is thought by Fodor to establish the point 
that only a computational theory can perform the task of 
accounting for our systematic behaviour and thought 
patterns. However, although Churchland is prepared to 
accept both the general point that our cognitive processes 
are computational, and that there is a superficial 
regularity in our behaviour, she denies that these two 
facts taken together constitute adequate grounds for the 
inference that Fodor then makes to the existence of a 
specific, sentential language of thought (H2). Churchland 
objects to the use of the sentential paradigm as a model 
for all internal representation, and argues that Fodor has 
been seduced into ignoring the possibility that other, non-
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linguistic forms of representation may exist within the 
mind/brain. 
In Churchland' s opinion, Fodor has overlooked valuable 
neuroscientific evidence and adopted an excessively top-
down a priori stance upon what is really a wholly empirical 
issue. In an article written with her husband, Paul M.· 
Churchland, Patricia smith Church land notes that 
n[t]he bulk of cognition may take place in other sub-
systems, and follow principles inapplicable in the 
linguistic domain. What those other representational 
systems are, and how they are knit together to form 
human cognition, these are empirical questions, 
begging empirical answers" (Churchland & Churchland, 
1983, p.16). 
Churchland's criticism of Fodor raises the possibility that 
Fodor may be confusing two different issues. The first of 
these is the undeniable fact that our descriptions of the 
internal representations of the mind/brain must, for the 
present, be couched in sentences, for we have no other 
means available to us. Whether these representations 
themselves take a sentential form is a second, wholly 
separate question. Churchland herself distinguishes 
clearly between these two very different points. On the 
first point, she remarks that, for example, 
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"wi thin the conf ines of that very theoretical 
framework [of folk psychology] we are bound to 
describe the eliminativist9 as believing there are no 
beliefs; however, this is not because folk psychology 
is bound to be true, but only because we are confined 
within the framework the eliminativist wishes to 
criticize and no alternative framework 1S 
available ..... It would be foolish to suppose folk 
psychology must be true because at this stage of 
science to criticize it implies using it. All this 
shows is that folk psychology is the only theory 
available now" (P.S. Churchland, 1986a, p. 397). 
However, this stance is by no means incompatible with the 
view expressed below about the nature of representations 
within the mind/brain. Churchland claims that 
" [t] here is no doubt that some of the inforrnation-
bearing states of the central nervous system are not 
a species of sentential attitude; that is, they are 
not describable in terms of the person's being in a 
certain functional state whose structure and elements 
are isomorphic to the structure and elements of 
sentences" (P.S. Churchland, 1980a, p. 1~7, 
italics) . 
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Churchland's point 1.S lent additional support 1n Clark 
(1989) . Clark, unlike Churchland, 1.S not an eliminative 
materialist, and so does not share her view that folk 
psychological explanations of human behaviour should be 
rejected just as soon as we have found an alternative 
theory of mind to work with. However, Clark does share 
Churchland's conviction that Fodor's conclusions about the 
form of internal representations within the mind/brain are 
unwarranted10 • 
Clark's reasoning begins from slightly different prem1ses 
from those employed by Church land. He argues along the 
following lines. Fodor is wrong to claim that the 
systematicity of our thoughts is a contingent, empirical 
fact (Clark, 1988, p. 146). Rather, it is the very ability 
to use and understand concepts in a systematic fashion that 
allows us to ascribe thoughts to a person. Systematicity 
is therefore a conceptual fact which helps us to explain 
the undoubtedly empirical fact that we behave 1n a 
comprehensible manner (most of the time) .11 
Clark states his case thus: 
n[w]hat stands in need of empirical explanation 1S not 
the systematicity of thoughts but the systematicity 01 
the behaviour, which grounds thought ascription. such 
systematicity indeed suggests recurrent and 
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recombinable elements. But there is no reason to 
suppose these to have to have a conceptual-level 
semantics" (Clark, 1989, p. 149) .12 
Fodor's failure to distinguish the conceptual from the 
empirical arguments within his body of evidence (E1 ) has 
resulted in his making an unwarranted inference about the" 
nature of the representations within the mind/brain. 
Although thought is systematic in the way that Fodor 
describes, this fact is not explained by hypothesising the 
existence of a language of thought modelled upon a 
sentential paradigm. Such a hypothesis could only explain 
empirical facts, not conceptual ones of this kind. Indeed, 
this part of Fodor's argument exhibits one of the common 
faults in bootstrapping identified by Achinstein (1983) and 
discussed in Chapter 2 (above, SUbsections 2.4.1, 2.4.2), 
namely that of using evidence which is compatible with the 
hypotheses contained within a theory, but which is not 
actually explained by these hypotheses. Consequently, the 
first half of the Fodorean bootstrap argument is already 
upon shaky ground. 
One of the key problems with the Fodorean hypothesis of the 
language of thought is that Fodor attempts all too 
frequently to support it via the same evidential paths that 
he uses to support his general computational hypothesis1J • 
For example, Fodor argues that our ability to acquire 
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concepts is dependent upon the computational processes 
within the mind/brain. As we noted in subsection 4.2.2 
(above) Fodor writes that 
"the analysis of concept learning is like the analysis 
of considered choice; we cannot begin to make sense of 
the phenomena unless we are willing to view them as' 
computational" (Fodor, 1976, p. 36). 
Once more, Fodor attempts to justify his language of 
thought hypothesis by relying upon the line of argument 
that computation can only take place if a structured 
representational system exists within the mind/brain. 
Moreover, he has again employed the implicit assumption 
that this representational system must follow the 
sentential paradigm. The onus will clearly be upon Fodor 
to provide evidence in support of this model of the 
mind/brain in the second part of the bootstrap strategy14. 
See below (subsection 4.4.3) for an evaluation of Fodor's 
success in this task. 
The flaws in Fodor's methodology might perhaps be mitigated 
if he could provide even one satisfactory source of 
evidence in support of his hypotheses. However, the 
Fodorean account of concept-learning is itself extremely 
problematic. It therefore rightly attracts much of 
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Churchland's critical attention, particularly p S 1n .. 
Churchland (1978) and P.S. Churchland (1980a). 
It was recorded in sUbsection 4.2.2 that Fodor regards the 
learning of concepts in one's native language as a matter 
of formulating hypotheses and testing them. In other 
words, he believes that we learn our native language in 
exactly the same way as we later learn a foreign language. 
For example, when we learn German, we do so by forming 
biconditional hypotheses which match English predicates 
with predicates 1n German. For instance, we might 
formulate the hypothesis: 
~Vater(x)~ is true (in German) iff father(x) 1S true 
(in English) 15. 
That is to say, our comprehension of the German word 
"Vater" is dependent upon the realization that its usage 
corresponds exactly to that of the English word "father". 
Similarly, Fodor argues, we learn English by matching 
predicates in the inner language of thought (or Mentalese) 
with English predicates. For example: 
~Father(x)~ is true (in English) iff F(x) 
where "F" is a predicate of the language of thought. 
This account of language learning therefore postul~tes ~n 
complete inner language of thought which predates O'--1r-
ability to express ourselves in our native language. :\5 
Churchland remarks 
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"the sum and substance of language learning thus turns 
out to be translation" (P.S. Churchland, 1978, p. 150, 
her italics). 
Churchland is quick to give Fodor credit for his insistence 
that his hypothesis of the langauge of thought 1S not 
intended as an instrumentalist view of the mind/brain. 
That is to say, Fodor does not claim simply that concept-
learning is better understood if we think of the activities 
of the mind/brain as if they operated upon sentential 
representations. Rather, as Churchland acknowledges, 
"[t]he idea is that insofar as we take the organism to 
be going through a series of psychological states, 
sententially characterized, we mean that the structure 
and elements of his physical states stand 1n the 
relevant relations to the structure and elements of 
sentences" (P.S. Churchland, 1980a, p. 161). 
However, Churchland makes it abundantly clear that Fodor 
must then live with the consequences of championing a 
realist hypothesis about sentential representations within 
the mind/brain. Many of these consequences will be 
discussed in sUbsection 4.4.3 (see also note 8 above). 
However two points must be made at once. 
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Firstly, I noted Fodor's belief (subsection 4.2.2) that we 
are often justified in attributing concepts to non-verbal 
animals and to children who have not yet learned to speak. 
Moreover, Fodor recognises that there are strong 
evolutionary arguments in favour of psychological theories 
that treat animals and humans in much the same way. For 
example, he comments that 
"there are homogeneities between the mental capacities 
of infraverbal organisms and those of fluent human 
beings which, so far as anybody knows, are 
inexplicable except on the assumption that infraverbal 
psychology • 1S relevantly homogeneous wi th our 
psychology" (Fodor, 1976, p. 57). 
Fodor therefore believes that his language of thought 
hypothesis applies with the same force to animals and to 
preverbal children as it does to adult linguistic human 
beings. He holds that they too have sentential 
representations in their heads. 
Here, Fodor is guilty once more of making unwarranted 
inferences from what may be valid premises. He ignores the 
possibility that the situation may be empirically 
underdetermined (see Chapter 2 , subsect ion 2. 2 .2) with 
respect to his own hypothesis and rival, non-sentential 
views of representation within the mind/brain. For 
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example, Patricia smith Churchland often shares Fodor I s 
premises, but would not infer the same conclusions from 
them. She is prepared to recognized that processes within 
the mind/brain may be computational, and like Fodor, she 
argues (P.S. Churchland, 1980a, p. 160) that it is likely 
that the representational systems of man bear a strong 
resemblance to those of creatures lower down the 
evolutionary scale. However, Churchland disagrees with 
Fodor's conclusion that animals have concepts because they 
too have a sentential representational system. On the 
contrary, Church land takes these very same evolutionary 
considerations to suggest that language is not a basic 
representational format in either animals or human beings. 
Fodor completely overlooks this possibility, thereby 
creating the impression that his inference is, at worst, 
wrong or, at best, not well supported by the available 
evidence. 16 
I now turn to the second problem inherent in the positing 
of sentential representations within the mind/brain. In 
Chapter 1, it was remarked that, for a theory or a 
hypothesis to provide a satisfactory explanation of an 
event or a situation, it must furnish us with new 
information about what is happening. Explanations cannot 
be informative if the explanans is merely couched in the 
same vocabulary as the explanandum. This renders doubtful 
their claim to be considered as explanations. Yet, it may 
187 
4.4.2 
be argued that the Fodorean account of concept-learning 
itself fails to be explanatory because of this very 
failing. 
Dennett (1981, p. 560) terms this kind of breakdown in 
explanation the virtus dormitiva, following Moliere's 
example (cited in 1.2.2). Dennett comments that 
"there can be no doubt that convicting a theory of 
relying on a virtus dormitiva is fatal to that theory, 
but getting the conviction is not always a simple 
matter" (Dennett, 1981, p. 57). 
However, Fodor makes it remarkably easy to gain such a 
conviction. Churchland (1978, p. 153) provides us with the 
initial stages of the case for the prosecution in a shrewd 
comparison of the Fodorean account of concept-learning with 
primitive theories of the growth of the foetus in the womb. 
Such theories failed to provide an adequate explanation of 
foetal development because they simply assumed that it 
proceeded along the same lines as postnatal growth, despite 
the absence of any supporting evidence for this view. 
Indeed, Churchland argues that 
"prima :facie, whatever was going on in utero had to be 
radically different" (P.S. Churchland, 1978, p.15l, 
her italics). 
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She goes on to ask 
"whether the model of translation as poorly fits the 
learning of the mother tongue" (ibid, p.1S1). 
Although Churchland makes an explicit and valid comparison 
between ancient theories of foetal development and Fodor's 
account of concept-learning, this is not in itself enough 
to establish that the Fodorean explanation falls foul of 
the virtus dormitiva objection. All that Churchland has 
established so far is that it is not good practice for 
philosophers or scientists to assume l.n the absence of 
independent evidence that unobservable processes are 
modelled upon observable processes. If we are to succeed 
in applying the virtus dormitiva objection as formulated by 
Dennett to Fodor's account of concept-learning, we require 
the additional premise that our ability to learn the 
concepts of our native language is both explained by and 
caused by our possession of a second language (the language 
of thought) within the mind/brain. However, this premise 
can easily be found within Fodor's own writings. For 
example, Fodor comments that 
"one cannot learn a first language unless one already 
has a language" (Fodor, 1976, p. 64). 
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This shows that Fodor is indeed attempting to account for 
our ability to learn our native language by postulating the 
existence of an inner mental language containing 
equivalents of all the English concepts that we will ever 
need. His hypothesis amounts to a causal explanation of 
our ability to perform linguistic feats which is expressed 
entirely in terms of other inner linguistic feats.' 
Consequently, Fodor's language of thought hypothesis has 
exactly the same explanatory status as a virtus dormitiva. 
Mentalese, like the hidden structure of consciousness so 
vaunted by McGinn (see Chapter 3), is simply one of those 
"expressly occult 
little demons or 
qualities 
goblins 
or faculties 
capable of 
. . like 
producing 
unceremoniously that which is demanded, just as if 
watches marked the hours by a certain horodeictic 
faculty without having need of wheels, or as if mills 
crushed grains by a fractive faculty without needing 
anything resembling millstones" (Dennett, 1981, p. 
56) .17 
It has been emphasized repeatedly in the course of this 
chapter that Fodor regards his account of concept-learning 
as a central feature of his body of evidence (E 1 ) in support 
of a computational system within the mind/brain which 
requires sentential representations in order to operate. 
If Churchland's objections to this evidence can be 
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developed along the lines that I have suggested, then 
further doubt must be cast upon the hypothesis of a 
language of thought18 • A related criticism of Fodor is 
made by Colin McGinn who comments that 
"[t]he suggestion is that outer speech has meaning by 
being connected with propositional attitudes, so we 
cannot hope to explain what it is to have a 
propositional attitude by claiming that attitudes 
consist in inner speech... And if the inner saying 
theory can no longer be regarded as explanatory, the 
motivation lapses for insisting that we recognise the 
existence of a language of thought" (McGinn, 1982, p. 
70) • 
Thus far we have established that there are grounds for 
doubting that Fodor is entitled to claim that his general 
computational hypothesis (H l ), combined with the evidence 
he cites in its favour (E l ), yield support for his specific 
hypothesis of the language of thought (H2). This claim has 
been criticised upon two grounds. First, that even if the 
evidence and the initial hypothesis are sound, they do not 
in themselves warrant Fodor's inference that there is a 
sentential language of thought within the mind/brain. 
Second, there are good reasons for believing that at least 
some of the evidence thought by Fodor to support his 
hypotheses is fundamentally flawed, in particular his 
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account of concept-learning19 • In subsection 4.4.4 these 
difficulties in Fodor's theory will be evaluated in the 
light of the issues of realism, explanation and the veil-
of-perception (see Section A), which must act as 
constraints upon the nature of any satisfactory theory of 
the mind/brain. 
Moreover, I hope to have shown that Patricia Smith 
Churchland has been aware of all the major failings of the 
Fodorean argument isolated thus far. It will be seen in 
sUbsection 4.4.3 that she has identified still further 
flaws in the second half of Fodor's bootstrap argument. As 
noted earlier (subsection 4.4.1), Churchland's awareness of 
the difficulties inherent 1n the relationship between 
evidence and hypothesis within the Fodorean bootstrap 
strategy, and indeed, within the philosophy of psychology 
in general, contrasts sharply with her own failure to deal 
with these difficulties when evincing her own theory of the 
mind/brain. 
I now turn to a critical examination of the second part of 
the Fodorean bootstrapping argument. 
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4.4.3 Churchland's criticisms of Fodor's inference to B 
1 
from B2 and B2 
It was mentioned in the previous subsection of this chapter 
that Fodor's account of concept-learning commits him to the 
view that the language of thought must be innate. If we 
learn the concepts of our native language through a process' 
of translation from their Mentalese equivalents, then the 
question arises as to how we learned the concepts in 
Mentalese. Fodor cannot claim that these were learned in 
the same way as the concepts of our native languages 
without creating an infinite regress. Instead, he argues 
that the language of thought is innate. 
The evidence that Fodor cites in the second part of his 
bootstrap argument (see sUbsection 4.2.2) is 
predominantly concerned to establish that, in many 
respects, the language of thought resembles overt 
languages. Fodor is clearly hoping to avoid objections to 
his hypothesis based upon the accusation that he is unable 
to characterize this inner language, and that therefore it 
cannot possibly be hypothesized. 
Once more, Fodor's hypothesis of the language of thought 
may be criticised along lines suggested by Churchland I s 
(1978) comparison of Mentalese with primitive theories of 
foetal development. Fodor is taking an unnecessar i ly 
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narrow view of the possible nature of representations 
within the mind/brain, which is similar to 
"the narrowness •.. in slavishly modelling growth in 
utero on growth ex utero" (P.S. Churchland, 1978, 
p.15l). 
Churchland's opinion, shared by many commentators on 
Fodor's theory, is that the body of evidence E2 is 
inadequate to the tasks that it is intended to perform, 
namely, supporting hypothesis H2 and combining with it to 
provide further confirmation of the truth of the general 
computational hypothesis HI relative to Fodor's entire 
representational theory of mind. 
For example, Churchland (P.S. Churchland 1978, 1980a, 
1980b) emphasizes the sheer number of concepts contained 
within our native languages and the way in which language 
has evolved over the centuries in synchrony with the 
increases in our knowledge of the world. We now describe 
the world in an infinitely more sophisticated fashion than 
our ancestors did. In so doing, we have developed new 
concepts and discarded those that no longer reflect the way 
that we think about the world. The term "phlogiston", for 
example, no longer has any application20 • In a nutshell, 
Churchland's position is that the capacity of our native 
languages to keep pace with our theories about the world 
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can only be accounted for by their flexibility. By 
contrast, the language of thought cannot, ex hypothesi, 
exhibit the same flexibility since it is innate and 
therefore fixed. such a fundamental difference between our 
overt linguistic systems and the inner one postulated by 
Fodor can only cast grave doubts upon the validity of 
Fodor's argument by analogy which forms such a large part 
of his body of evidence (E2 ) in support of his language of 
thought hypothesis. Churchland writes that 
"what is so implausible about Mentalese is that it is 
surpassingly rich, and that it has this richness 
independently of any learning processes ... The richness 
together with the innateness constitute a rigidity, a 
resistance to modification, an imperviousness to 
learning from one's mistakes that 1S wholly 
uncharacteristic of the language of communication" 
(P.S. Churchland, 1978, pp. 151-152). 
We can extend Churchland's argument to see how Fodor is 
caught between the horns of a dilemma. The first horn 
takes the following form: if the language of thought is to 
be rendered capable of formulating hypotheses containing 
new concepts so that English equivalents can be learned ln 
the way Fodor describes, then Fodor is forced to give up 
the view that Mentalese is innate21 . This would enable 
him to counter the criticism expressed by Churchl~nd ~hat 
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"we may be innately disposed to represent space 
Euclideanly, or to represent the sky as a vault, or to 
represent dolphins and whales as fish, and so on. But 
even if we are, I think it is fair to say that we have 
shown some alacrity and aptitude for reform" (P.s. 
Churchland, 1978, p. 153). 
However, such a manoeuvre would remove the final obstacle 
to the criticism that Fodor's account of concept-learning 
suffers from an infinite regress. Fodor is only able to 
counter this objection by insisting that all concept-using 
creatures are born with a complete language of thought (see 
above, sUbsection 4.2.2). If this criticism were allowed 
to go through, then the Fodorean account of concept-
learning would be even less satisfactory than it appears in 
the light of the arguments already evinced in sUbsection 
4.4.2. 
We now come to the second horn of the dilemma in which 
Fodor finds himself. Fodor can opt to accept that there is 
a yawning gap between the apparent rigidity of mentalese 
and the flexibility of our overt linguistic expression. 
However, this gap simply underlines the unlikelihood that 
our inner thought processes can be modelled along the lines 
of public language statements. Fodor's attempt to provide 
evidence for his language of thought hypothesis by using an 
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blow by this admission. 
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severe 
Moreover, given that our native languages seem capable of 
representing our beliefs and judgements about the world in 
a satisfactory manner, the language of thought, by 
implication, could not achieve this. Yet, as Churchland 
rightly points out, 
"for any Weltanschauung, for any structure allegedly 
exploitable to represent how the world is, it is 
pertinent to inquire whether it might not be in 
certain ways inaccurate, or unfaithful to the facts -
whether how it represents the world might not be at 
odds with how the world actually is" (P.S. Church land , 
1978, p. 152, her italics). 
If the language of thought is not capable of representing 
, 
the world faithfully and of thereby providing us with a 
suitable supply of concepts with which we can describe it, 
then it is not doing the job for which it was deemed 
necessary in the first place. This greatly weakens the 
case in support of the hypothesis. 
Church land is not the only commentator to have noticed this 
fundamental flaw in the Fodorean enterprise of 
characterising the processes and representations within the 
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mind/brain. For example, samet argues that Fodor's theory 
opens up 
"the possibility that although the world that triggers 
our concepts might vary indefinitely, we remain 
trapped within the range of our innate endowment. We 
have only a limited spectrum of conceptual responses; 
we are not indefinitely flexible; we do not 
necessarily have the resources to accurately represent 
the variety that's out there in the world" (Samet, 
1986, p. 592)22. 
It was noted above (subsection 4.3) that Fodor displays a 
singularly cavalier attitude towards criticisms of his 
theory. This is perhaps even more irritating and saddening 
than the flaws in his argument, as his spurious defences of 
his hypotheses create the impression that he is 
systematically trying to place them beyond the reach of 
criticism and possible refutation. It need hardly be said 
that this is scarcely the stance that one would expect of 
a committed scientific realist. 
A graphic illustration of Fodor's style of response to 
criticism of his language of thought hypothesis is 
contained in Fodor (1980). Here, Fodor is actually 
responding to points raised by Cohen in the peer 
commentaries section of the same paper, but it is easy to 
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imagine that he might counter Churchland's line of attack 
with the same words. He writes that 
"[t]he system of mental representations will have to 
be precisely as rich as it has to be to explain the 
data, and not one whit less so. I'm very much afraid 
that 'put up or shut up' is the only form of serious' 
argument in this area" (Fodor, 1980, p. 100). 
Fodor's response to Cohen' s reasoning is most worrying. 
This statement in support of his hypothesis hardly amounts 
to a well-constructed argument in favour of his theory! 
Faced with the accusation that it is implausible to 
postulate a wholly innate, yet very rich and flexible 
language of thought, it is simply not enough to claim that 
this is the only possible explanation of the data 
available. Indeed, Fodor is once more dangerously close to 
the objection that his argument is circular. If the 
richness of the language of thought is the only possible 
way to explain the data, and yet the only evidence for the 
richness of the language of thought is this very same data, 
then the circle is complete. 
Fodor requires independently obtained evidence to explain 
how the language of thought can be so rich but, as we have 
seen, he has been completely unable to reconcile the 
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abundance of concepts contained within Mentalese with its 
status as an innate representational system. 
It is clear that Fodor's comparison of the language of 
thought with overt languages has utterly failed to yield 
the unequivocal sup~ort for his sentential.hypothesis that 
he anticipated. The relationship between the body of" 
evidence E2 and hypothesis H2 within the bootstrap argument 
therefore breaks down. 
Moreover, the plausibility of the intended comparison is 
decreased still further by Fodor I s insistence (see, for 
example, Fodor 1980) that the syntactic relations between 
the representations of the language of thought allow 
computational processes to operate within the mind/brain, 
but cannot account for how the representations have 
meaning. This is the formality condition of computational 
accounts of the mind/brain, which precludes such accounts 
from ever yielding an explanation of how the inner language 
can accurately represent the world. Yet, as we have just 
seen (see also sUbsection 4.2.2), it is paramount that the 
language of thought should be able to do so, if it is to 
account for our ability to learn concepts and apply them 
correctly within the world. 
Fodor argues (Fodor, 1980) that only a naturalistic 
psychology can provide a theory of how the language of 
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thought can represent the external world. However, such a 
theory would require a wholly physical vocabulary to 
characterise nomological relations between an organism ~nd 
its environment. As a consequence of this, Fodor concludes 
(Fodor, 1980, pp. 70-71) that such a naturalistic 
psychology will not .be possible until all nonpsychological, 
physical sciences have been completed and can yield such a 
vocabulary. That is to say that, in practice, naturalistic 
psychology is impossible. Nonetheless, Fodor claims that 
these conclusions should not lead us into fears of 
solipsism. He comments that 
II [m]ethodological solipsism isn't, of" course, 
solipsism tout court. Heaven only knows what 
relation between me and Robin Roberts makes it 
possible for me to think of him (refer to him, etc.), 
and I've been doubting the practical possibility of a 
science whose generalizations that relation 
instantiates. But I don't doubt that there is such a 
relation or that I do sometimes think of him. still 
more: I have reasons not to doubt it; precisely the 
sorts of reasons I'd supply if I were asked to justify 
my knowledge claims about his pitching record . . . 
nothing in the preceding tends to impugn these truths" 
(Fodor, 1980, p. 71). 
201 
4.4.3 
Fodor's views about the formality condition are shared by 
other philosophers and psychologists of widely differing 
persuasions, including Paul and Patricia Churchland23 • 
Nonetheless, his claim that a naturalistic psychology is 
(in practice, at least) impossible is disastrous for his 
language of thought hypothesis which was postulated in the 
first instance to explain how we are able to learn concepts 
which accurately reflect the world. If no account of how 
this is actually done is possible, then the case for the 
language of thought is once more greatly weakened24 • How 
can we ever be sure that the language of thought even 
contains any references to an external world whatsoever? 
The traditional veil-of-perception issue recurs before our 
very eyes! The point is made graphically clear in this 
lengthy quotation from Harman's response to Fodor (printed 
in the peer commentaries to Fodor 1980). Harman writes 
that 
"[w]hat leads us to attribute mental representations 
to a creature in the first place is that the creature 
is aided in achieving its presumed goals by being able 
to detect, corne to know about, certain features of its 
situation. We study its capacity for mental 
representation first by investigating what features it 
can detect and what it cannot detect; then we study 
what sort of mistakes it can make that would lead it 
to act inappropriately. At that point we may be able 
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to form hypotheses about the content of some of its 
mental representations, perhaps even hypotheses about 
the form or syntax of these representations. But 
there is no way we could ever come to these hypotheses 
without considering how the creature's mental states 
are connected with things in the outside world" 
(Harman, in Fodor, 1980, p. 81, my italics). 
It appears that Fodor has recognised that his language of 
thought hypothesis is in difficulties if no naturalistic 
psychology is possible, for his (1987) ~contains an attempt 
to construct just such a psychology. He comments that 
n(w]e really do need to know at least roughly what [a 
naturalist psychology] might be like, on pain of 
having the metaphysical worry that excepting 
psychophysical concepts[25] - we have no idea at all 
what a naturalized semantics would be like ,for the 
nonlogical vocabulary of Mentalese" (Fodor, 1987, p. 
118). 
Fodor believes that some concepts, which he terms 
"psychophysical", will automatically occur to us in the 
presence of the right kind of causal conditions. "Red" is 
one such concept. Fodor writes that 
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"there are circumstances such that red instantiations 
control 'red' tokenings whenever those circumstances 
obtain; and it's plausible that 'red' expresses the 
property red in virtue of the fact that red 
instantiations cause 
circumstances; and 
nonsemantically, 
'red' tokenings in those 
the circumstances 
nonteleologically, 
nonintentionally specifiable" (ibid, p. 112). 
are 
and" 
Fodor claims that a naturalistic semantics can also be 
given for other more complex concepts, including new 
scientific ones such as "proton" (which, it will be 
recalled, have already caused major difficulties for the 
language of thought hypothesis). Crudely speaking, his 
theory amounts to the view that a proton will activate the 
concept "proton" in the mind/brain by creating effects that 
are describable in terms of psychophysical concepts. For 
example, the presence of protons in the environment may 
turn a photographic plate red (Fodor, 1987, p. 120). Fodor 
readily admits that the concept of "proton" will only be 
activated in the mind/brain of someone who knows that 
protons have this effect upon photographic plates, but 
argues that this does not affect the possibility of a 
naturalistic semantics. Fodor asserts that . 
"[fJor purposes of semantic naturalization, it's the 
existence of a reliable mind/world correlation that 
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counts, not the mechanism by which that correlation is 
e:t:tected" (ibid, p. 122, his italics). 
Several points need to be made at this juncture. The first 
is that Fodor's naturalistic account of semantics seems to 
have the same explanatory status as a deus ex machina. 
Fodor needs some kind of causal relation between mental 
representations and the world to get his theory out of a 
tight spot so, 10 and behold, he postulates that one 
exists, even though we cannot actually know its exact 
nature. Clearly, the criticisms I levelled at McGinn's 
hypothesis of the hidden structure of consciousness in 
Chapter 3 (see especially subsection 3.2.4) and at the 
language of thought as an explanation of concept-learning 
in sUbsection 4.4.2 are equally applicable to this part of 
Fodor's argument. Fodor's failure to find a solution to 
the problem of how we are to account for the meaning of our 
mental concepts is far more extreme than any of his caveats 
in Fodor (1987) imply (see for example, p.11S). Fodor's 
actual progress from his (1980) stance is minimal. 
The explicit aim of Fodor's (1987) treatment of this issue 
is to disprove the sceptic's claim that it is impossible 
even in principle to construct a naturalized semantics. He 
is not trying to provide a cast-iron argument that such a 
semantics actually exists. Fodor's limited objectives may 
partially explain his failure to shed very much light upon 
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the problem for practical purposes26 • This brings me to 
my second point. Fodor allows that a proton will only 
trigger the Mentalese concept "proton" wi thin the 
mind/brains of those who have theoretical knowledge about 
protons and their effects upon the environment. However, 
Fodor has still not provided us with a satisfactory account 
of how we could ever acquire an understanding of modern 
concepts like "proton" given that the language of thought 
is innate. (See my earlier criticisms in this subsection). 
It is therefore unclear how any of us could ever know that 
the appropriate circumstances for a tokening of the 
Mentalese concept "proton" were being instantiated. 
Finally, Fodor does not seem to have realized that the 
relationship between the existence of a satisfactory 
naturalized semantics and the fate of Mentalese is not 
symmetrical. I have argued that the absence of a 
satisfactory naturalistic psychology is bad from Fodor's 
point of view since it deprives Fodor of yet another source 
of evidence that some system exists within the mind/brain 
which does the job of representing the world that the 
language of thought was hypothesised to do. However, even 
if a naturalistic psychology of how our mental 
representations are causally related to the world does 
ultimately prove to be attainable, this would not 
necessarily vindicate a sentential representational system. 
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For example, P.M. Churchland and P.S. Churchland's (1983a) 
argues that 
"if we want to know how cognitive creatures hook up to 
the world they inhabit, neuroscience holds out the 
best hope for an enlightening account" (p. 17). 
Before I turn to a consideration of how the arguments 
against Fodor put forward in this SUbsection and the 
previous one demonstrate that his representational theory 
of mind does indeed suffer from the problems of explanation 
and metaphysical realism delineated by the traditional form 
of the veil-of-perception issue, one final remark needs to 
be made with respect to the second half of Fodor's 
bootstrap strategy. 
Fodor hopes to derive further support for his computational 
view of the mind from the success of his language of 
thought hypothesis. More specifically, it is the 
systematic relations between the representations within the 
language of thought which he thinks provide the support he 
requires to complete the bootstrap argument. Fodor 
declares that 
"arguments that suggest that mental states have 
constituent structure ipso facto favor Turing/Von 
Neumann architectures, which can compute in a language 
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whose formulas have transportable parts" (Fodor, 1987, 
p. 139). 
Clearly, the problems outlined above with regard to the 
viability of Mentalese make it difficult for Fodor to 
continue to assert that he can obtain support for his 
computational hypothesis within his theory of mind from the· 
more specific hypothesis relating to the existence of the 
language of thought. This is not to say that mental 
processes are not computational, but that the demise of the 
language of thought hypothesis renders it perfectly 
possible that other, rival computational hypotheses may be 
equally viable. Perhaps images are manipulated, rather 
than languages with a constituent structure, or perhaps as 
Clark (1989) suggests, computation may take place along 
connectionist lines - a possibility acknowledged, but not 
taken seriously enough by Fodor (Clark, 1989, p. 150). In 
any event, Fodor fails to provide us with sufficient 
independently obtained evidence for his claim that the 
language of thought hypothesis (H2 ) should increase our 
confidence in the truth of the more general computational 
hypothesis (HI)' and the bootstrap argument breaks down once 
more. 
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4.4.4 Fodor unmasked - the metaphysics behind Mentalese 
It will be recalled that one of the key problems isolated 
in Fodor's development of the representational theory of 
mind was the precise way in which the language of thought 
could really be said to represent the world and to yield 
adequate concepts for us to describe this world subsection 
4.4.3). The root of this difficulty lies in the innateness 
of the language of thought, although Fodor's claim that a 
naturalistic psychology is not currently possible may be 
regarded as a contr ibutory factor. Nonetheless, it is 
worth repeating Churchland's remark that 
"for any Weltanschauung, for any structure allegedly 
exploitable to represent how the world is, it is 
pertinent to inquire whether it might not be in 
certain ways inaccurate, or unfaithful to the facts -
whether how it represents the world might not be at 
odds with how the world actually is" (P.S. Churchland, 
1978, p. 152, her italics). 
This quotation could easily be adapted to question the 
accuracy of Fodor's view of the representational system of 
the mind/brain, by simply replacing the word "world" with 
the words "mind/brain". We have already noted in the 
Introduction to Section B (subsection B2) that those who 
choose to investigate the workings of the mind/brain should 
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be no less constrained by the need to provide satisfactory 
evidence in support of their theories. We may therefore 
ask whether Fodor's representational theory of mind is an 
accurate account of what is really going on inside our 
mind/brains. 
In section A, it was argued that the problems of-
explanation associated with metaphysical realism are 
exemplified by those theories that exhibit the same kind of 
semantic inconsistency as that identified within the 
traditional veil-of-perception issue. It is now time to 
see in what way the arguments put forward against Fodor in 
the previous two sUbsections (many of which were influenced 
by Churchland) can be construed as an attack upon a 
metaphysical realist whose theories suffer from a 
veil-of-perception type of defect. This subsection will 
indicate not only that Fodor's bootstrap strategy has 
failed, but also that it has failed because Fodor adopts a 
metaphysical realist's attitude towards the relationship 
between the bodies of evidence and the hypotheses within 
his theory, rather than that of a scientific realist. In 
the next subsection, I shall attempt to suggest reasons why 
this might be so. 
It is easy to reconstruct Patricia Smith Churchland's 
arguments against Fodorean Mentalese as a renewed attack 
upon the metaphysical realism raised by the 
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veil-of-perception issue. To see this, we have only to 
compare the following outline of Fodor's views with the 
central features of the traditional representational 
theories of perception I highlighted earlier (subsection 
1.2.4). Fodor takes the following statements to be true: 
I) there is an inner language of thought over and 
above any overt linguistic skills in human mind/brains 
and those of many dumb animals 
II) this inner language of thought stands in relation 
to our overt mother tongue as cause does to effect, 
since we can only learn a language like English by 
matching its concepts with those of the inner language 
III) we are only ever directly aware of our acquired 
linguistic capacities; the existence of mentalese is 
recognised only because these acquired linguistic 
capacities reflect it, and because the success of our 
commonsense computational and psychological 
explanations and our abilities to learn concepts 
cannot be otherwise accounted for 
IV) yet we nevertheless have an accurate idea of what 
this inner language of thought must be like, since our 
overt linguistic capacities are both caused by and 
exact reflections of our mentalese faculties. 
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All of the claims made in these four statements occur at 
some point within the Fodorean bootstrap argument. 
However, it will be instructive to clarify the precise 
relationship between statements I-IV above and the 
individual hypotheses and bodies of evidence that together 
constitute Fodor's Representational Theory of Mind. 
statements I and II represent a summary of the specific 
language of thought hypothesis H2 , together with Fodor's 
main reason for postulating it, namely that it accounts for 
how men and animals have concepts. (Compare Fodor's 
comment, also quoted above, sUbsection 4.2.2, that "there 
is only one kind of theory that has ever been proposed for 
concept learning ... and this theory is incoherent unless 
there is a language of thought" (Fodor, 1976, p. 36). 
statement III acknowledges that it is not possible for us 
to have direct knowledge of the inner language of thought, 
but reiterates Fodor's two main sources of evidence for the 
claim made in statements I and II that such a language of 
thought exists. These are the success of our commonsense 
psychological explanations yielded by computational 
processes (a combination of hypothesis Hl and evidence El 
within the bootstrap strategy, see also SUbsection 4.2.2, 
above) and the argument from analogy with overt languages 
(the body of evidence E2 , see SUbsection 4.2.3). Finally, 
statement IV embodies a claim fundamental to Fodor's 
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bootstrap strategy, namely, that that these sources of 
evidence provide us with adequate indirect knowledge of the 
nature of the language of thought. 
These four statements, like their counterparts in my 
reconstruction of the traditional formulation of the veil-
of-perception issue (Chapter 1, sUbsection 1.2.4) form a" 
semantically inconsistent tetrad. The semantic 
inconsistencies between the statements can be seen easily 
if the arguments against the Fodorean representational 
theory of mind put forward in sUbsections 4.4.2 and 4.4.3 
are considered. 
There are two levels of semantic inconsistency within the 
Fodorean tetrad, just as there were within the traditional 
veil-of-perception issue. Both of these levels are 
revealed by the arguments evinced in the previous two 
sUbsections (many of which, it will be recalled, have been 
developed from lines of attack suggested by Churchland). 
The first inconsistency is revealed by a critical 
examination of the evidence cited by Fodor in statement III 
in support of his claim that the language of thought exists 
(statements I and II). Fodor readily admits that we can 
only have direct awareness of our overt languages, and the 
other evidence cited in statement III in support of his 
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language of thought hypothesis was shown to be inadequate 
in sUbsections 4.4.2 and 4.4.3 above. 
In sUbsection 4.4.2, it was argued that our success 1n 
explaining the systematicity of human behaviour does not 
depend upon the existence of a sentential representational 
system within the mind/brain, that the Fodorean account of-
concept-learning is itself not well supported by sufficient 
evidence, and that evolutionary considerations do not 
necessarily suggest that all creatures with an apparent 
ability to reason or to exhibit behaviour appropriate to a 
given situation have a sentential language of thought. 
In sUbsection 4.4.3, it was concluded that Fodor's other 
body of evidence in support of the language of thought 
hypothesis, an argument from analogy with overt languages, 
fails because of the incongruities implicit in the Fodorean 
view that an innate language of thought can contain all the 
concepts of our overt, flexible languages and thereby 
represent the environment with any degree of accuracy. 
This means that the criteria evinced for the existence of 
the language of thought statet1ent III are 
unsatisfactory, so that this statement, when fully 
evaluated, is incompatible with statements I and II. This 
semantic inconsistency constitutes the strong or 
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ontological 27 version of the veil-of-perception issue as 
it occurs within Fodor's representational theory of mind. 
Secondly, even if we permit Fodor to postulate the 
existence of some kind of language of thought within the 
mind/brain, the con~iderations put forward in subsections 
4.4.2 and 4.4.3 indicate that Fodor is still not entitled 
to make the further assertion that it resembles our overt 
languages. The breakdown of the argument from analogy 
discussed in sUbsection 4.4.3 alone renders such an 
assertion dubious. Moreover, sUbsection 4.4.2 contains 
more than one illustration of Fodor's habit of drawing 
unwarranted conclusions from premises that may, in fact, 
themselves be valid. Indeed, it was remarked that Fodor 
sometimes makes inferences which are consonant with the 
evidence he is discussing, but which do not actually 
explain this evidence. Thus Fodor's failure to provide 
satisfactory evidence which tells in favour of his own view 
of the representational system within the mind/brain and 
against rival theories renders him open to the weaker, 
epistemological version of the veil-of-perception issue 
(see Chapter 1, subsection 1.2.4). 
point clearly. She comments that 
Churchland sees this 
"(t]he onus of proof rests on the sententialist to 
provide evidence for taking various neural structures 
to process information in accordance with his favoured 
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model of information process;ng" (P S Ch hl d ~ .. urc an, 
1980a, p.165). 
We can see that the hypothesis of the language of thought 
put forward in statements I and II and claim IV, that the 
nature of this representational system can be readily 
inferred from the sources of evidence mentioned in 
statement III cannot be upheld in the light of the 
criticisms of Fodor's theory in the previous two 
sUbsections. Additional evidence would be needed for the 
language of thought hypothesis to withstand these 
criticisms, but this evidence is not forthcoming. 
The conclusion that Fodor's representational theory of mind 
suffers from the difficulties associated with metaphysical 
realism discussed in Chapter 2, sUbsection 2.1 (despite 
Fodor's protestations to the contrary noted in sUbsections 
4.1, 4.3) follows easily from the reconstruction of his 
argument on the veil-of-perception model. 
The arguments evinced in this chapter demonstrate clearly 
that Fodor is attempting to assert the existence of a 
language of thought within the mind/brain to explain our 
systematic thought and behaviour, and our ability to learn 
concepts in the absence of any independently obtained 
evidence in support of this assertion. 
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This pattern of explanation is identical to that employed 
by metaphysical realists (see also Chapter 2, subsection 
2.2.1). The metaphysical realist takes it to be a 
prerequisite of scientific activity that the world exists 
more or less as we perceive it. Fodor takes the existence 
of a language of thought to be a prerequisite of our 
undisputed linguistic ability. Metaphysical realists' 
presuppose a correspondence theory of truth, so that the 
truth of our perceptions is determined by their accuracy in 
representing the world. Similarly, Fodor thinks that our 
mental representations provide an accurate reflection of 
the external world. 28 
Indeed Fodor's only real argument for the existence of the 
language of thought is based upon its ability to explain 
our linguistic capacities and systematic thought, but this 
line of argument clearly begs the very point at issue. 
Moreover, Fodor systematically disregards sources of 
possible empirical evidence against his views and 
persistently ignores all criticism of his arguments, 
thereby rendering his theory increasingly untestable and 
immune to refutation (see above, subsections 4.3 and 4.4.3 
for details of Fodor's evasive tactics). 
The moment that Fodor adopts an approach that is genuinely 
congruent with scientific realism and allows evidence which 
contradicts his hypothesis to be brought forward, his 
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theory is likely to be refuted or, at the very least, 
unsatisfactory to the same degree as other theories which 
provide an equally satisfactory explanation of the 
observable facts. 
4.5 Fodor, the bootstrap strategy, and the problem of 
empirical underdetermination 
4.5.1 Introduction 
It was argued in Chapter 1 (subsection 1. 2. 5) that the 
problems of explanation epitomized by the traditional veil-
of-perception issue arise from the lack of a suitable 
methodology from making justifiable and testable inferences 
from experience to unobservable systems. Fodor needs just 
such a methodology to permit him to make inferences about 
the nature of representational systems within the 
mind/brain from the overt sources of evidence readily 
available to him. Like Glymour (see Chapter 1, sUbsection 
1.2.5, also Chapter 2, subsections 2.3, 2.3.1), Fodor turns 
to bootstrapping as a way of providing well-supported 
explanations of observable facts in terms of entities or 
processes that cannot be directly experienced (see also 
sUbsection 4.2.1). 
However, the use of the bootstrap strategy is patently not 
in itself a sufficient guarantee of a well-confirmed 
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theory. If it were, then Fodor would not be in the 
difficulties that he is. 
4.5.2 Empirical underdetermination in Fodor's 
representational theory of mind 
In sUbsection 4.4.2, it was noted that Fodor has a marked 
tendency to dismiss the possibility that his specif ic 
conclusions may be drawn from premises that actually lend 
equal support to rival hypotheses. Indeed, there is a high 
degree of empirical underdetermination in this area of 
study (see also Chapter 2, sUbsections 2.2.2, 2.4). 
One example of empirical underdetermination is to be found 
in the possible consequences of evolutionary factors for 
the question of representation within the mind/brain (see 
above, sUbsection 4.4.2). Churchland and Fodor agree that 
the available evidence suggests that the representational 
systems within the human mind/brain may, in many respects, 
resemble those found in other species (particularly, other 
primates such as chimpanzees). Yet, as we saw in 
sUbsection 4.4.2, Churchland regards this as a reason for 
rejecting the sentential paradigm as a basic form of 
representation in either animals or in human beings, 
whereas Fodor confronts the issue by ascribing a language 
of thought to any animal he deems capable of entertaining 
concepts. Similarly, I have argued (following Clark, 1989) 
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that the undisputed systematicity of human behaviour does 
not necessarily requ1re a sentential system of 
representation within the mind/brain. Clark suggests that 
other forms of representation such as those contained 1n a 
connectionist network may be able to account for our 
behaviour in an equally convincing manner. 
Glymour (1980) has suggested that the bootstrap strategy is 
capable of circumventing such problems of empirical 
underdetermination, since it is unlikely that two theories 
produced by this line of argument will be equally 
acceptable when are examined 1n the light of a welter of 
abstract criteria. (See Chapter 2, sUbsection 2.4). When 
faced with two theories which apparently yield equally 
plausible explanations of a body of data, we should follow 
a policy of endorsing the theory that best conforms with 
general methodological criteria such as: prefer theories 
containing confirmed hypotheses rather than ones containing 
disconf irmed hypotheses, prefer theor ies that prov ide a 
uniform explanation of phenomena and that have been tested 
against a wide variety of evidence. However, Glymour's 
criteria have been shown by both Achinstein (1983) and 
Nordby (1989) to be vulnerable to criticism and abuse. 
These 1ssues were discussed 1n Chapter 2 (subsections 
2.4.1, 2.5.1). 
their relevance 
methodology. 
The next two subsections will demonstrate 
to the Fodorean use of the bootstrap 
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4.5.3 Achinstein's criticisms of the bootstrap strategy as 
they apply to Fodor's representational theory of mind 
I remarked in Chapter 2 (subsection 2.4.1) that Achinstein 
attributes much of the initial plausibility of the 
Glymourian bootstrap methodology to the fact that the 
evidence used does fit with the hypotheses of the theory, 
although it can only support them relative to that theory. 
In fact, Achinstein argues, this methodology presupposes 
the truth of the theory and therefore begs the very point 
at issue. Once more, a supposedly scientific methodology 
falls into the difficulties associated with metaphysical 
realism. 29 
This flaw is clearly also visible in the Fodorean bootstrap 
strategy and was demonstrated in sUbsection 4.4.4 of mind 
to be the root of the veil-of-perception problems with 
which his theory is afflicted. Fodor's evidence in support 
of his language of thought hypothesis 1S only acceptable 
given the framework of his overall theory. Indeed, it was 
argued in sUbsections 4.4.2 and 4.4.3 that evidence which 
conflicts with the very foundations of this theory has been 
systematically ignored , despite Fodor's assert ions (see 
above, subsection 4.3) that his hypotheses are empirica~ 
and may be either con firmed or d i scon firmed by a wide 
variety of evidence. 
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This illustrates the point made in Chapter 2 (subsection 
2.4.3) that it is often possible to find examples of 
philosophers and psychologists making use of criteria which 
implicitly favour their own theories whilst claiming to use 
the abstract methodological criteria for selecting the best 
theory suggested by Glymour. 
4.5.4 Bootstrappinq in Fodor: the Nordby paradigm 
These problems should make us question the appropriateness 
of general methodological criteria for the evaluation of 
bootstrapping arguments in the philosophy of mind. 
Furthermore, we must ask whether other criteria are 
actually being employed instead. 
It was explained in Chapter 2, sUbsection 2.5.1 that Nordby 
(1989) extends the application of the bootstrap methodology 
to cover the deliberations of detectives, who may employ it 
to account for existing evidence and to predict what other 
evidence would be forthcoming if a crime is viewed as a 
token of a particular crime type. However, Nordby rejects 
Glymour's abstract criteria for choosing between crime type 
models in cases of empirical underdetermination as 
unhelpful in the absence of wider theories which prescribe 
strategies for deciding between competing models or for 
weighting evidence that originates from a diverse number of 
sources (eg: forensic, eye-witness accounts, expert 
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witnesses, etc). It is worth repeating Nordby's comments 
that 
"[a]pplying Glymour's formal criteria for theory 
choice does not provide firm grounds for crime 
model choice. . Ultimately the choice depends on 
deciding that certain lore, or natural or social 
sciences apply, and that is not a decision based 
on formal grounds" (Nordby, 1989, p. 385) 
and that 
"[t]he issue instead remains which science (s), or 
other components composing the models, should apply to 
the problem" (ibid, pp. 382-3). 
Subsection 2.5.2 of chapter 2 contends that the distinction 
made by Nordby between bootstrapping in the philosophy of 
mind and bootstrapping in detective work may not be as 
pronounced as he suggests. In the study of the mind/brain, 
just as in detective work, relevant information come 
increasingly from a wide variety of different fields, each 
wi th their own standards of evidence. co-evolutionary 
philosophers must therefore develop a strategy for 
evaluating this information and for determining the 
relative importance of each field and its criteria for 
reliable evidence. No such strategy has been established 
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as yet, so like Nordby's detective, the philosopher of the 
mind/brain bootstraps while barefoot. 
Fodor rejects a fully co-evolutionary approach to the study 
of central information processing in his (1976), although 
he does accept that there is some link between his 
sentential representations and their neurological-
implementation. 30 At the time when The Language of 
Thought was written, philosophers took relatively little 
interest in neurophysiological studies, but Fodor, 
disturbingly, has made no attempt to revise his theory or 
to consider the neurophysiological evidence brought forward 
against his theory in more recent times, even in Fodor 
He continues to rely on the conceptual 
arguments that he evinces against the possibility of 
reduction in Fodor (1976). 
In the absence of any overarching theory of what 
constitutes relevant and sound evidence, Fodor finds 
himself beset by exactly the same difficulties as his more 
committed co-evolutionary counterparts. We are frequently 
given the impression that many of the gaps in his evidence 
for the hypotheses that constitute the representational 
theory of mind arise because Fodor must make decisions 
about what kind of evidence is needed to support his theory 
in the absence of any tangible guidelines. Consequently, 
fl't with his he champions evidence that appears to 
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hypotheses (at least superficially), dismisses criticisms 
of this evidence summarily, and neglects less favourable 
information. This approach was illustrated in subsections 
4.4.2 and 4.4.3. Fodor's representational theory of mind 
is therefore open to the line of criticism developed in 
Chapter 2, sUbsection 2.6. There, I argued that the lack 
of any overarching theory of how disparate sources of-
information relevant to the study of the mind/brain should 
be synthesised renders the philosopher liable to judge the 
available evidence in the light of his own preferred 
explanations. Not only may his interpretation of the 
relative importance of evidence from different sources be 
coloured by this form of bias; he may also simply not see 
some facts as relevant evidence at all. 
4.6 Conclusions 
Firstly, it has been demonstrated that Fodor's use of the 
bootstrapping argument in the construction of his 
representational theory of mind has not resulted in a well-
confirmed, scientific theory. Indeed, I have shown in 
sUbsection 4.4.4 that the problems isolated in subsections 
4.4.2 and 4.4.3 render Fodor open to the same difficulties 
regarding explanation and the nature of evidence as those 
that have been associated with the traditional veil-of-
perception issue. As a result, Fodor's claim to have 
produced a testable and explanatory theory of mind is 
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untenable. He is shown to be a closet metaphysical 
realist who does not remain true to the tenets of 
scientific realism that he professes to uphold. 
Moreover, I have shown in subsection 4.5.2 that 
Achinstein's criticisms of the Glymourian bootstrap 
strategy are pertinent to the version employed by 
philosophers of mind. I also suggested in sUbsection 4.5.3 
that Fodor's diff icul ties in evaluating evidence may be 
exacerbated by the absence of any guiding theory relating 
to the combination of data from a variety of sources. To 
this extent, Fodor, like Nordby I s detective, bootstraps 
while barefoot. 
Secondly, it has been emphasised that the criticisms of the 
Fodorean enterprise urged in sUbsections 4.4.2 and 4.4.3 
follow readily from the remarks made by Patricia Smith 
Churchland in her discussions of Fodor I s theory. This 
demonstrates that she is aware of how the abstract issues 
of scientific realism, explanation and the need for 
testable sources of evidence should be incorporated into 
specific theories of the mind/brain. In Chapter 6, it will 
be argued that Churchland's understanding of these 
questions as they pertain to the theories of others is in 
stark contrast to her treatment of them wi thin her own 
attempts to construct a coherent account of the mysteries 
of the mind/brain. 
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I now turn to a discussion of the lssue of modularity 
within the mind/brain. This will not only evaluate Fodor's 
attempt to grapple once more with the issues of realisn, 
explanation and evidence, but will also demonstrate that 
the image of the veil-of-perception does not disappear if 
we cease to regard man as a united entity which confronts 
the rest of the world. Rather, the issue simply relocates 
at the junction between perception and cognition. 
1. Much of this chapter is based upon the contents of a paper 
entitled "Realism and Represention in the Philosophy of Mind 
which I read at King's College, London, in November 1990. I am 
indebted to Professor David Papineau and his department for some 
helpful comments. 
2. Yet Fodor explicitly dissociates his own theory of the mind 
from those theories which have traditionally been associated with 
the difficulties of the veil-of-perception issue. He even uses 
Platonic imagery in his denial of such views (cf. Chapter 1, 
subsection 1.2.3): witness his comment that "It 1S easy to 
picture the mind as somehow caged in a shadow show of 
representations unable, in the nature of the thing, to get in 
contact with the world outside. And it's easy to go from there 
to an indefinite yearning for epistemic immediacy; a yearning 
which is none the less impassioned for all that it is largely 
incoherent •.. It is therefore pertinent to insist that this 
picture isn't the one that I have been developing, nor is it 
implied by anything that I have had to say" (Fodor, 1976, t;>. 
204). However, this disclaimer by Fodor does not preve~t hlS 
theory from encountering the difficulties of .the ve~l-of­
perception issue if he draws conclusions to Wh1Ch he 1S not 
entitled solely dn the basis of the flawed evidence cited in his 
premises. 
3. See also below, subsections 4.3 and 4.3.3. 
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4. Although Fodor tends to refer simply to computation he 
really means classical computation (ie: non-connectio~ist 
computation). For example, Clark comments that Fodor's "claim 
is that •• operations, resources, etc. are fundamentally 
classical; they consist of structure-sensitive processes defined 
over internal, classical, conceptual-level representations" 
(Clark, 1989, p. 150). 
5. Fodor thus differs from other philosophers of psychology such 
as stich, who are prepared to espouse a computational view of the 
mind/brain, but who believe that such a view dispenses with the 
need to talk in terms of propositional attitudes (Fodor, 1986b, 
p. 3). 
6. The potential for circularity in this argument will be 
explored in sub-section 4.4.2. 
7. Of course, Fodor's theory has been criticized at length by 
other philosophers and scientists. However, since Churchland's 
attitude towards the issues of realism and the veil-of-perception 
forms one of the key themes of this thesis, I have chosen to 
concentrate upon her arguments against Fodor. Criticisms of 
Fodor by others are included only in support of specific points 
made by Churchland in order to demonstrate that her arguments do 
not result solely from her own very individual views upon the 
nature of the mind/brain. 
8. Indeed, it will be seen in Chapter 6 that Patricia smith 
Churchland employs the bootstrap strategy herself. We shall 
regard this as an implicit endorsement of the methodology for the 
study of the mind/brain! 
9. See Chapter 6, sUbsection 6.2.1 for further details of the 
eliminativist position. 
10. It is ironic that Clark agrees with Churchland that Fodor's 
sentential hypothesis about the nature of representation within 
the mind/brain is incorrect, for he also holds that the failure 
of this very hypothesis will provide further grist to the mill 
of Churchland' s eliminative materialism. This reinforces my view 
that Churchland's criticisms of Fodor do not arise solely from 
her own preconceptions about the mind, but are rather genuine 
criticisms of poor arguments and faulty evidence. 
11. This blurring of the distinction between conceptual and 
empirical facts makes Fodor's argument seem more scientific than 
it really is. Cohen makes a similar comment in the peer 
commentaries of Fodor (1980). He argues that U[w]hat Fodor calls 
'the representational theory' and 'the computational theory' are 
not scientific theories at all, but bits of conceptual 
analysis ..... A scientific theory would reveal causes, effects 
or explanatory principles, and would have experimentally testable 
consequences" (Cohen in Fodor, 1980, p. 75). 
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12. rux:ther ramifications of this point will be mentioned in the 
discuss10n of the success of the second half of the Fodorean 
boOtstrap argument (sub-section 4.4.3). 
13. Thi~ is the source of the potential circularity noted above 
(subsect10n 4.2.2). Al though .th.e ~ootstrap strategy is meant to 
permit the used of the same 1n1t1al body of evidence to frame 
both a specific and a general hypothesis, Fodor must include 
additional sources of strong independent evidence in E2 , which is suppos.ed ~o support th7 language of thought hypothes is. 
However, 1t w1ll be argued 1n sub-section 4.4.3 that this body 
of evidence is equally unsatisfactory. 
14. It will be seen in the next part of this discussion that it 
is a necessary consequence of the Fodorean account of concept-
learning that the language of thought is innate. However an 
examination of Churchland's views concerning the plausibility of 
an innate sentential system will be deferred until sUbsection 
4.4.3. 
15. This hypothesis has been constructed using the same notation 
as Fodor uses in Fodor (1976). 
16. Once again, the line of argument put forward by Churchland 
is supported by the work of Clark. Clark argues (1989, pp. 69-
72) that organisms do not necessarily employ systems that provide 
the neatest solutions to the tasks that they have to perform. 
Rather, the systems utilized frequently take the form of a 
"kludge", which Clark defines as "a solution dictated by 
available materials and short term expediency" (Clark, 1989, p. 
71). Thus, if we were designing a creature from scratch, it 
miqht be apposite to give it sentential representations so that 
it could have concepts, but it is very unlikely that this will 
happen in nature. For further relevant discussion, see Chapter 
6, sUbsection 6.1.3. 
17. It has already been noted Chapter 1, sUbsection 1.2.2) that 
explanations have been criticised for displaying a virtus 
dormitiva since the time of Moliere. This quotation, which 
encapsulates the problem perfectly, is taken from the Preface to 
Leibniz's New Essays on the Understanding, (1704). 
18. The philosopher who tries to construct his argument using 
a bootstrap strategy but fails to support it with adequate 
sources of evidence will discover that the strategy has a sting 
in its tail. Good evidence may be combined with an intial 
hypothesis to yield further hypotheses which, when coupled with 
aound evidence from an independent source, ,will in~rease support 
for the first hypothesis. However, poor eV1dence wlll cast doubt 
Upon any conclusions drawn from it in such a way that the entire 
theory may ultimately fall. This is a necessary consequence of 
the need to construct bootstrap arguments so th~t they avo~d the 
charge of vicious circularity. Vicious circularl ty oc~urs l~ ar:'Y 
evidence whatsoever would confirm the hypotheses contalned wlthln 
the theory. See also my discussion of Hunt (1990) in ,Chapter 2 
for further explanation of how circularity can be avolded. 
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19. Indeed, other commentators have cast doubt upon H Fodor's 
general computational hypothesis. For example, Wasow a~gu' es that 
, d· · " ld h b . Fodor s 1SCUSS1on wou ave enef~tted from more careful 
attention to the distinction between the use of computational 
aodels and the need for computational models. The fact that a 
certain phenomenon has been described in terms of computational 
.odels gives us Ii ttle reason to accept the consequences of 
attributing psychological reality to such descriptions" (Wasow 
1978, p. 163). For further development of this point, see als~ 
Clark, 1989, pp. 152-154. 
20. It has, however, acquired a whole new lease of life from 
being used so frequently as an example of a superceded concept. 
See for instance P.M. Church land , 1989, p. 14. 
21. It may seem initially that Fodor's (1987) attempt to provide 
a naturalistic account of the meaning of concepts within the 
language of thought resolves the problem of how we acquire new 
concepts without relinquishing the innate status of Mentalese 
. .. ' although th~s 1S not the ma~n purpose of this work. However, a 
careful consideration of the arguments readily yields the 
conclusion that this move is equally unsuccessful. A more 
detailed evaluation of the arguments is provided later in this 
sUbsection. 
22. For other criticisms along these lines, see the peer 
commentaries by Cohen and Hayes following Fodor (1980). 
23. I do not propose to discuss the question of the formality 
condition at length, since it lies outside the scope of this 
chapter. It is raised merely to demonstrate that, if Fodor is 
correct to assert that naturalistic psychology is in practice 
impossible, then this closes off yet another potential source of 
evidence in support of his language of thought hypothesis, or at 
least, in support of the view that some inner representational 
system exists within the mind/brain. 
24. Not all philosophers and psychologists share Fodor's 
pessimism about the possibility of a naturalistic psychology. 
It is surprising that Fodor does not consider the use of the 
bootstrap strategy to construct such a theory. This is, in 
effect, the route suggested by Davis in the peer commentaries of 
Fodor (1980). Davis asks (Fodor, 1980, p. 77) "why can't 
naturalistic psychology get started with what we have? If it 
turns out that [for example] salt really isn't NaC~, then when 
we find that out, we will revise what has to be rev1sed". 
25. See the next paragraph for an explanation of this term. 
26. This remark in no way precludes the .crit~cis~ tha~ i~ is 
deceptively easy to assert that someth1~g ~s ~n pr~nc~ple 
Possible in the very trivial sense that 1t 1S not logically 
impossible but that it is much harder to put any flesh on this 
argument i~ the absence of any practical details. 
27. See Chapter 1, subsection 1.2.4 for my use of this term. 
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28. Fodor tries to defend his claim that he adopts an attitude 
consonant with scientific realism on the grounds that whilst he 
holds a correspondence theory of truth, this is not inco~patible 
with a coherence theory of evidence. He comments that he sees 
"nothing compelling in the inference from 'truth is a matter of 
the correspondence of a belief with the way the world is' to 
'ascertaining truth is a matter of "directly comparing" a belief 
with the way the world is.' Perhaps we ascertain the truth of 
our beliefs by comparing them with one another, appealing to 
inferences to the best explanation whenever we need to do so" 
(Fodor, 1980, p. 68). However, this statement does not render 
the charge of metaphysical realism against Fodor invalid since 
. , 
he plainly v10lates all commonsense standards of coherent 
evidence. It is scarcely coherent to claim that, for example, 
the language of thought accurately reflects the state of the 
world and yields the flexibility of our overt languages whilst 
at the same time maintaining that it is innate (see also 
sUbsection 4.4.3)! 
29. In sUbsection 2.4.1 I suggested that Achinstein's view that 
the existence of evidence which supports a hypothesis relative 
to a theory says nothing about the truth of that theory may 
result in instrumentalism. However, Fodor is not an 
instrumentalist with respect to sentential representations, since 
he believes that they literally exist in the mind/brains of 
concept-users. Yet the evidence he provides in support of this 
realist hypothesis is, as I have stressed repeatedly in the 
course of this chapter, unsatisfactory. 
30. For example, Fodor comments that "I think that it is very 
likely that all of the organismic causes of behavior are 
physiological" (Fodor, 1976, p. 9). 
31. This reticence may be partly explained by the view he 
expresses in Fodor (1983) concerning the difficulties of 
investigating the central processes within the mind/brain. (See 
also Chapter 5, below). However, the bold claims that he ma~es 
for the existence of a language of thought contrast sharply w1th 
this caution. Nonetheless, I think that I am justified in 
ascribing to Fodor at least a modicum of acceptance of the 
relevance of neurophysiological dat~ for ,the, stud~ of the 
mind/brain, since he considers these Issues 1n h1S sem1nal work 
on the modularity of mind (Fodor, 1983). 
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Chapter 5 - Modularity and Metaphysics l 
5.1 - Introduction 
So far, I have examined two theories of the mind/brain in 
the light of the issues of realism and evidence raised in 
the course of Section A. Both McGinn I s theory of the 
hidden structure of consciousness and Fodor's· 
Representational Theory of Mind are based upon conceptual 
analysis, even though they contain some evidence from 
psychology and from neurophysiology.2 It was clear that, 
although both McGinn and Fodor rely implicitly upon a 
bootstrapping argument to support a general and a specific 
hypothesis about the mind/brain on the basis of just one 
body of initial evidence, neither of them avoided the traps 
created by the use of untestable hypotheses and 
unsatisfactory evidence. Both theories therefore suffered 
from the metaphysical difficulties associated with the 
traditional veil-of-perception issue. 
I now turn to a discussion of the more modern co-
evolutionary theories of the mind/brain to see whether 
their more overtly empirical hypotheses avoid these 
difficulties. I begin in this chapter with the modular 
theories of mind. 
There are two main reasons for reviewing the modularist 
debate. Firstly, such theories call into question the very 
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image which has traditionally been at the root of the veil-
of-perception issue, namely the image of man as a united 
being which confronts the rest of the world. However, it 
will become clear in the course of this chapter that this 
by no means obviates the difficulties raised by the veil-
of-perception issue. They are simply relocated in the 
question of the relationship between the structures within' 
the mind/brain, modular and otherwise. 
Secondly, it is possible to isolate a bootstrapping 
strategy within the co-evolutionary lines of argument 
employed by at least two of the modularists, Jerry Fodor 
and Howard Gardner. Their arguments will be discussed in 
detail in the course of this chapter. Moreover, most of 
the arguments put forward by the modularists rely heavily 
upon the possibility of support in the form of 
scientifically testable evidence. However, this does not 
mean that these theorists are any more successful in 
negotiating the pitfalls of scientific realism than either 
McGinn or the early Fodor. The citation of scientifically 
obtained evidence does not necessarily entail the correct 
and objective interpretation of this evidence. 
These considerations uphold my hypothesis (outlined in 
Chapter 2, sUbsection 2.5.2) that it is not always possible 
for philosophers of mind employing the bootstrap strategy 
to determine by means of Glymourian abstract criteria which 
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of two theories is actually the correct one when the 
theories are underdetermined by the evidence. This 
difficulty is explained by the novel and complex 
multidisciplinary character of the modular approach to the 
mind/brain issue. As yet philosophers have no over-arching 
theory to assist them in the selection and evaluation of 
evidence. Philosophers in innovative areas are faced with-
the evaluation of evidence from a variety of disciplines 
and the weight accorded to each source of evidence will 
depend upon the precise model of explanation that they have 
in mind. An incorrect decision may lead to the prosecution 
of the wrong theory, unsatisfactory testing of the evidence 
and the systematic acceptance of a false metaphysics. All 
these problems may be very difficult to correct or revise 
at a later stage. 
The remainder of this chapter is given over to an 
elaboration and justification of these arguments. 
5.2 What are modular theories of the mind? 
Modular theories of the mind developed from a belief that 
traditional psychology is making a fundamental mistake in 
regarding the mind as nothing other than a set of 
"horizontal" central executive processes which operate 
across all content domains, no matter how diverse these 
might be. Modularists all share the view that there are at 
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least some autonomous content-specific production systems 
or modules, but the details of their individual theories 
vary considerably. 
Fodor (1983, 1985) describes a module as an informationally 
encapsulated inference-making computational system within 
the brain. This means that it does not have access to all· 
the information contained within the rest of the brain, but 
only to the information within its own "database" together 
with information about the external stimulation that it is 
receiving at anyone time. 
Modules have their own particular function of providing our 
central cogni ti ve processes with information about the 
world by making inferences from the way in which our 
sensory apparatus is affected by outside stimuli. (Fodor 
sometimes refers to them as input analyzers.) 
Consequently, they form part of our perceptual system, 
whilst our cognitive abilities are general and nonmodular. 
Our linguistic abilities are also based upon a modular 
structure, since they, like perception, have the function 
of providing us with information about the world beyond our 
senses. 
Since modules are computationally autonomous (or 
"bullheaded" as Fodor likes to call them), they can only 
react in one way. Moreover, since they are informationally 
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encapsulated in the way just described, they are unable to 
take account of the background beliefs and knowledge 
possessed by the brain as a whole, because they have no 
access to them. Fodor argues that this explains why we 
continue to be subject to optical illusions even when we 
know that appearance is not reflecting reality. Our visual 
modules can only respond to the stimuli that come to them 
from the eyes and receive no information from our memory, 
or our knowledge of the rules of geometry, for example. 
Visual modules transform the stimuli that we receive from 
our senses so that our cogni ti ve capacities receive the 
information in a format that they can understand. There is 
therefore a division between the perceptual and the 
cognitive capacities within the brain which causes us to 
rethink the traditional image of the human brain as one 
entity which confronts the rest of the world. Just as 
microscopes enhance the presentation of information about 
the world so that we can understand it better, the visual 
input analyzers within the brain are performing a similar 
function which differs only in temporal location within the 
visual process. We may come to regard our perceptua I 
capacities as an extension of the visual aids we use that 
are situated outside the brain, so that our concept of self 
is restricted in application to the cognitive capacities. 
However, the traditional veil-of-perception issue may 
simply be relocated in the question of the reliability of 
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the information presented to us by our visual input 
analyzers. We have already seen that Fodor attributes the 
existence of optical illusions to the mandatory operation 
of the modules. The possibility of other incorrect 
information reaching the cognitive processes via the 
modules cannot be overlooked. It may not always be so easy 
for the cognitive processes to spot the errors. 
Informational encapsulation and computational autonomy have 
a further consequence. Since modules are unable to 
consider the relevance of background facts to their 
operation, they react very quickly (as do reflexes, which 
are also informationally encapsulated). Fodor regards this 
speed as vital for our survival and that the advantages of 
informational encapsulation more than outweigh the 
disadvantages caused by the occasional misidentification of 
objects that might perhaps be prevented if modules had 
access to more background information. As Fodor writes 
"we want the perceptual identification of 
panthers to be very fast and to err, if at all, 
on the side of false positives" (1983, p. 70). 
Modular systems frequently exhibit other properties. These 
include domain or content specificity. In other words, 
different modules deal with different perceptual stimuli, 
such as speech, other noise, colour, and shape. This is 
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what is meant by a vertical theory of perception. A 
horizontal theory would operate from the assumption that 
all perceptions could be processed by the same system, 
irrespective of their content. 
Finally, Fodor holds that modules are frequently associated 
with specific neuroanatomical architecture or even specific' 
locations within the brain. 
Although modules provide us with an interpretation of the 
information yielded by incoming sensory stimuli about the 
world and therefore seem to be intelligent, Fodor believes 
that they are really dumb mechanisms since their operation 
is mandatory and restricted by their informational 
encapsulation. By contrast, Fodor thinks that our real 
intelligence inheres in our general cognitive processes, 
which he thinks are unencapsulated and slow, but which are 
not modular and function across all domains, irrespective 
of their content. 
If Fodor's theory seems less precise in its delineation of 
the characteristics of such central processes, this is no 
accident. Fodor believes that we can know very little 
about our cognitive processes precisely because they are 
not modular. He writes that 
238 
"[t]he condition for successful science 
. . . is 
that nature should have joints to carve it at: 
relatively simple subsystems which can be 
artificially isolated and which behave, in 
isolation, in something like the way that they 
behave in situ. Modules satisfy this condition; 
... If, as I have supposed, the central cognitive 
processes are nonmodular, that is very bad news 
for cognitive science" (Fodor, 1983, p. 128). 
5.2 
So, Fodorean modules are very small information processors 
within the mind/brain and are delineated by reference to 
their function of interpreting information from the senses 
about the externa I wor ld. By contrast, Howard Gardner 
holds that the mind is divided up into only seven modules 
or "intelligences", which are classified by their content. 
These seven intelligences are the linguistic, the logical-
mathematical, the spatial, the musical, the bodily-
kinaesthetic, the interpersonal and the intrapersonal. 
Gardner regards his theory as an alternative to the 
traditional Piagetian view of intelligence as a general 
capacity which operates equally successfully in any context 
and which develops at a constant rate in each child and in 
all domains. In Gardner's opinion, the modular theory of 
intelligence provides a better explanation of why an 
individual may perform well in some tasks and very badly in 
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others. 
Moreover, Gardner tries to adopt a more open attitude to 
the influence of different cultures upon the manifestation 
of intelligent behaviour. Traditional intelligence tests 
have, in his view, placed undue emphasis upon the logical 
and mathematical abilities prized in Western culture. If" 
this bias is removed, he argues, then we may learn to 
acknowledge that tasks important in other societies such as 
navigation by the stars also require intelligence. 
There are some similarities between Fodor's modules and 
Gardner's intelligences. Both are essentially 
computational mechanisms within the brain which are 
accessed by certain kinds of informational input. Gardner 
believes that at birth we have only the cores of what will 
ultimately become our fully developed intelligences. These 
cores are similar to Fodor's own modules, but also include 
primitive motor skills. Thus Gardner writes that 
" [0] ne might go so far as to def ine a human 
intelligence as a neural 
computational system which 
programmed to be activated or 
mechanism or 
is genetically 
"triggered" by 
certain kinds of internally or externally 
presented information. Examples would include 
sensitivity to pitch relations as one core of 
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musical intelligence, or the ability to imitate 
movement by others as one core of bodily 
intelligence" (Gardner, 1985, pp. 63-4). 
5.2 
However, whereas Fodorean modules will always remain 
autonomous, Gardner believes that the cores of his 
intelligences are not informationally encapsulated, but' 
rather will begin to interact as they develop against a 
particular cultural background. He comments that 
"[ i] n the normal course of events, the 
intelligences actually interact with, and build 
upon, one another from the beginning of life" 
(Gardner, 1985, p. 280). 
Nonetheless, the intelligences may still develop at 
different rates and, in cases of brain damage, it is 
possible that some intelligences will be impaired or even 
destroyed whilst others continue to function as before. 
Indeed, it is only in such cases, or in autistic people, 
that we see the isolated core mechanisms of the 
intelligences exposed. Once more doubt is cast upon the 
accuracy of the view of a united self which inspired the 
traditional formulation of the veil-of-perception issue. 
On Gardner's theory, there is a live possibility that a 
person might react in vastly different ways to diverse 
stimuli from the external world depending upon which 
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intelligence is activated. Moreover, autistic people, 
prodigies and those who have suffered brain damage are 
living examples of the fact that cross-fertilization of 
skills and learning abilities between the different spheres 
of intelligence may be impossible. Despite his theory that 
intelligences do interact in the normal course of events 
" , 
Gardner does not think that such interaction will result in" 
the formulation of any general, non-modular cognitive 
processes. 
5.3 Modular theories and the use of the bootstrap strategy 
It has already been noted in Chapter 2 (section 2.5.1) that 
Glymour takes his bootstrap strategy to be most useful in 
the development of new theor ies . The attempt to understand 
the mind/brain in terms of a partially or wholly modular 
structure, and to support this with findings from 
neuropsychological studies, whilst not entirely new3 , is 
certainly an area in which very little interest had been 
shown. Shallice, for example, comments that 
"(f]or 100 years, it has been well known that the 
study of the cognitive problems of patients 
suffering from neurological diseases can produce 
strikingly counterintuitive 
observations .... However, in general, 
neuropsychology has had little impact on the 
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study of normal function" (Shallice, 1988, p.3). 
This seems to be the ideal situation in which to employ the 
bootstrap strategy, and it is indeed possible to find 
evidence of the strategy within the writing of both Fodor 
and Gardner. Both use the strategy to bootstrap from a 
general hypothesis about the mind/brain to a more specific 
modular hypothesis which, with the right kind of evidential 
support, is intended to lend further confirmation to the 
original hypothesis. 
Fodor begins the main thrust of his argument with the 
postulation of a 
"trichotomous functional 
psychological processes; a 
taxonomy 
taxonomy 
of 
which 
distinguishes transducers, input systems, and 
central processors, with the flow of input 
information becoming accessible to these 
mechanisms in about that order" (Fodor, 1983, pp. 
41-2). 
It is a more elaborate form of this claim that may be said 
to constitute hypothesis Hl within Fodorean modularity 
theory (T). Hl is the general hypothesis that linguistic 
and perceptual systems have a functional similarity which 
is not shared by the central cognitive systems. Fodor's 
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reason or evidence El for this hypothesis 1S that 
"both serve to get information about the world 
into a format appropriate for access by such 
central processes as mediate the fixation of 
belief" (ibid, p. 46) 
5.3 
This leads to Fodor's specific modular hypothesis H2 , which 
states that the functional class constituted by perceptual 
and linguistic systems also constitutes a natural kind, 
known as modules. The essential, defining feature of these 
modules is that they are informationally encapsulated in 
the sense explained above (subsection 5.2). 
However, Fodor takes it that these modules share other 
features of psychological interest. The evidence that he 
cites in support of this claim constitutes evidence E2 • 
This evidence is in two parts. Firstly, Fodor attempts to 
show that we have some knowledge of the features of modules 
and secondly, he argues that we have no knowledge of our 
cognitive processes. 
evidence which not 
Both of these points are, he holds, 
only supports H2 , but which also 
strengthens our belief in H1 • 
It seems that Fodor is well aware that he is making full 
use of a bootstrapping methodology in the face of uncertain 
evidence. He comments that 
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"I'll be trying to say what you might expect the 
data to look like if the modularity story is true 
of input systems; and I'll claim that, insofar as 
any facts are known, they seem to be generally 
compatible with such expectations" (ibid, p. 46). 
5.3 
Moreover, Fodor is also aware of the need for El and E2 to 
be independent from each other so that the bootstrap 
argument is not circular. He writes that 
" l' f we undertake t b' ld h 1 o U1 a psyc 0 ogy that 
acknowledges this functional class as a natural 
kind, we discover that the processes we have 
grouped together do indeed have many interesting 
properties in common - properties the possession 
of which is not entailed by their functional 
homogeneity (ibid, p. 46). 
The individual sections of the Fodorean bootstrapping line 
of argument will be evaluated in the next few sUbsections. 
However, Fodor is not the only one to employ a 
bootstrapping strategy. It is possible to detect a similar 
line of argument in Gardner (1985). 
It was noted in the previous subsection (5.2) that Gardner 
regards his modular theory of intelligences as a 
significant advance upon the traditional theories which 
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treat intelligence as one general capacity. Let us call 
Gardner's initial claim or hypothesis C14 • C1 makes the 
general claim that traditional theories of intelligence as 
one unified capacity across all manner of contents and 
activities are unable to explain many aspects of human 
behaviour. Gardner writes that 
"current methods of assessing the intellect are 
not sufficiently well honed to allow assessment 
of an individual's potentials or achievements in 
navigating by the stars, mastering a foreign 
tongue, or composing with a computer ....... Only 
if we expand and reformulate our view of what· 
counts as human intellect will we be able to 
devise more appropriate ways of assessing it and 
more effective ways of educating it" (Gardner, 
1985, p.4). 
Gardner derives much of his evidence for this hypothesis 
from the existence of many feats from different cultures 
which would often be overlooked by the Western world with 
its emphasis upon pencil and paper tests. Moreover, there 
are people within our own culture whose abilities force us 
to question the idea that intelligence is one capacity that 
functions equally well in all domains. There are prodigies 
who are gifted in, for example, music from a very early 
age, but who are of otherwise average ability. Equally, 
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autistic children sometimes have one remarkable talent 
which may far exceed the abilities of most people in that 
domain, whereas their performance of other tasks is well 
below average. It is cases like these which cast doubt 
upon the notion of a unified intelligence. 
Gardner's body of evidence D1 • 
They form 
Gardner's conclusion is that these facts would be better 
explained by the specific hypothesis of multiple 
intelligences or modules within the mind/brain. So, 
hypothesis C2 is constituted by the 
"conviction that there exist at least some 
intelligences, that these are relatively 
independent of one another, and that they can be 
fashioned and combined in a multiplicity of 
adaptive ways by individuals and cultures" (ibid, 
p. 8) • 
D2 , the body of evidence cited in support of C2 is, alas, 
not wholly independent of D1 , since further reference is 
made by Gardner to the existence of idiots savants and to 
prodigies. However, Gardner also alludes to 
neuropsychological evidence relating to subjects who have 
SUffered brain damage and consequently lost some of their 
intellectual skills, whilst others have remained intact. 
This both supports C2 since it provides evidence that 
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intelligences are localized within the brain, and it also 
strengthens belief in Cl , namely, that such selective 
impairment cannot easily be explained by traditional 
theories of intelligence. 
Gardner, like Fodor, does seem aware that he is using a 
bootstrap strategy. He writes that 
"[m]y review of earlier studies of intelligence 
and cognition has suggested the existence of a 
number of different intellectual strengths, or 
competences. . . .. The review of recent work in 
neurobiology has again suggested the presence of 
areas in the brain that correspond, at least 
roughly, to certain forms of cognition; and these 
same studies imply a neural organization that 
proves hospitable to the notion of different 
modes of information processing" (ibid, p. 59). 
It is worth noting at this stage that Gardner regards his 
theory of modular intelligence as an instrumentalist one. 
It is useful to refer to the intelligences as if they 
really existed when we are trying to formulate an 
innovative theory of the mind/brain, yet 
"[t]hese intelligences are fictions .... for 
discussing processes and abilities that (like all of 
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life) are continuous with one another; Nature brooks 
no sharp discontinuities of the sort proposed here. 
Our intelligences are being separately def ined and 
described strictly in order to illuminate scientific 
issues and to tackle pressing practical problems .... 
they exist not as physically verifiable entities but 
only as potentially useful scientific constructs" 
(ibid, pp. 69 - 70). 
However, Gardner's instrumentalism does not free him from 
the obligations of examining all the evidence available to 
him to ensure that he is not guilty of dismissing rival 
theories (instrumentalist or realist) without giving them 
due consideration, or of rendering his own theory immune 
from any refutation. 5 Gardner is prepared, at least 
nominally, to acknowledge this point. In the course of a 
discussion of the kinds of evidence that might refute his 
theory he comments 
"[a]fter all, if M. I. [multiple intelligence] theory 
can explain (or explain away) all potentially 
disconfirming evidence, it is not a valid theory in 
the scientific sense of that term" (ibid, p. 298). 
However, it remains an open question whether Gardner does 
indeed give due weight to all possible interpretations of 
the evidence for and against modular theories. I shall 
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argue in sUbsections 5.4 - 5.4.5 of this chapter that 
Gardner overlooks the fact that there are strong reasons 
for declaring that there is empirical underdetermination of 
the evidence between his theory and rival views. 
5.4 Modules: intelligent giants or ignorant dwarves? 
Gardner versus Fodor 
5.4.1 Central cognitive processes: the status of the myth 
Howard Gardner makes this comment upon Fodor's stance with 
respect to central cognitive systems: 
"Fodor ultimately reaches a conclusion that, though 
pessimistic from a scientific point of view, aligns 
his position somewhat closer to my own. Fodor 
concludes that scientific investigation should be able 
to illuminate the modules, because they are relatively 
distinct and so can be subject to controlled 
experiment, but that the central processor is probably 
immune to study because its lines of information are 
at once unlimited and totally interconnected. As a 
practical matter, then, the science of cognition 
reduces to the study of the individual matters. Even 
if the central-processing view is valid, says Fodor, 
we will not be able to incorporate it meaningfully 
into our science of cognition" (Gardner, 1985, p. 
284) • 
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This lengthy quotation is important, for it indicates that 
Gardner blurs a fundamental distinction between his own 
view and that of Fodor. The Gardnerian position is that a 
modular theory may yield a complete explanation of our 
mental activities, in which case we will be able to 
dispense with the entire concept of central cognitive 
processes. By contrast, Fodor thinks that the concept of-
a central processor has a meaningful place in our science 
of cognition, but that the very nature of this concept 
presents us with the empirical fact that we will be able to 
discover very little about how it is actually instantiated 
within the mind/brain or about its functional mechanisms. 
In discussing Fodor, Gardner fails to distinguish between 
the conceptual and the empirical. This raises the question 
of whether he treats all Fodor's statements with the same 
cavalier approach. 
Two other points should be made at this juncture. The 
first is that Gardner's theory postulates a small number of 
large modules which perform the functions traditionally 
attributed to central cognitive processes. By contrast, 
Fodorean modules are plentiful, but minute, and perform a 
wholly different function from central cognitive 
capacities. Consequently, -Fodorean modular theory would 
have a much larger explanatory gap to fill if it did not 
postulate the existence of central cognitive processes 
within the mind/brain. 
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Secondly, it is questionable how Fodor can justify his 
insistence upon the existence of central cognitive 
processes in the face of his assertions that we will never 
be able to discover a great deal about their nature. 6 This 
casts doubt upon the scientific status of the concept of a 
central cognitive process within his theory, but this does 
not exonerate Gardner's misunderstanding of the position 
that Fodor wishes to adopt. 
5.4.2 Empirical underdetermination and the criteria for 
modularity 
Fodor's criteria for modularity are, quite correctly, 
criticized by Gardner as "idiosyncratic" (see Gardner, 
quoted in Fodor, 1985, p. 13), because they are a mixture 
of the logical (for example, modules are domain-specific) 
and the empirical (for example, modules react speedily). 
Gardner argues that his own criteria are far more testable 
and therefore acceptable, since they are all based upon the 
evaluation of wholly empirical evidence from eight 
different sources. Yet although Gardner does not include 
any logical definitions among his criteria for a modular 
intelligence, his interpretation of the empirical evidence 
shows a distinct tendency to ignore the fact that in some 
cases the evidence is equivocal between his own view and 
that of Fodor. In other words, in cases where the choice 
of theory is grossly underdetermined by the ev idence, 
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Gardner finds in favour of his own a priori belief that he 
is probably right and Fodor is probably wrong. 
For example, one source of Gardner's body of evidence 02 is 
the potential isolation of an intelligence by brain damage. 
Gardner cites (Gardner, 1985) numerous examples of how 
particular lesions in the brain may affect one particular 
capacity such as language or music and yet leave others 
such as logical and mathematical reasoning or spatial 
awareness completely unimpaired. Moreover, very localized 
brain damage may destroy just one part of an intelligence 
leaving the rest of it totally intact. This leads Gardner 
to conclude that each of his intelligences is autonomous in 
that it has a distinct neurophysiological basis, and he 
takes further proof of this to be the fact that autistic 
children may have one ability or intelligence that 
functions normally or even extraordinarily well, although 
they perform badly in other spheres. Equally a child 
prodigy may have one very great talent without being gifted 
in any other fashion. 
We have already noted that Gardner's bootstrap argument is 
weakened by the citation of the existence of autistic 
children and prodigies as evidence both for the inadequacy 
of traditional theories of intelligence eel) and for the 
existence of autonomous intelligences (C2 ), so that the two 
hypotheses are not supported by wholly independent sources 
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(It would of course be permissible for 
Gardner to claim that the evidence produced from studies of 
brain damage supports his initial hypothesis that 
traditional theories of intelligence are inadequate and 
hence explains why autistic children do not fit well into 
such theories - this is precisely the way in which the 
bootstrap strategy is supposed to work.) 
However, Gardner is faced with a second difficulty. His 
interpretation of the evidence from studies of autistic 
children is not the only one possible. For example, in the 
case of the autistic artist, Nadia, Gardner writes that: 
"her drawings stand as an eloquent demonstration of 
the dissociability of spatial intelligence from other 
intellectual strengths and of its potential for a 
singularly high degree of development" (Gardner, 1985, 
p. 190). 
However, Gardner fails to specify precisely what it is 
about Nadia's performance that is intelligent. Nadia I s 
remarkable ability could equally well be explained by 
Fodorean modular theory. If Nadia's visual input analyzers 
are more finely tuned than those of many people then they 
may yield a better representation of the world. She may 
then be able to reproduce this representation using her 
motor skills, which Gardner acknowledges may be among the 
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core "dumb mechanisms" of a spatial intelligence. He 
writes that 
"central to spatial intelligence are the capacities to 
perceive the visual world accurately, to perform 
transformations and modifications upon one's original 
perceptions, and to be able to re-create aspects of 
one's visual experience, even in the absence of 
relevant physical stimuli" (Gardner, 1985, p. 173). 
Nadia is unable to classify or organise even the content of 
her drawings. Gardner comments that 
"[S]he lacked the conceptual knowledge requisite to 
her drawing skills. She could not perform sorting 
tasks where she had to put together items of the same 
category. Moreover, in her own drawings, she would 
show little regard to the particular object being 
depicted. Sometimes she would cease to draw an object 
right in the middle of its contour or continue to draw 
right off the page, as if slavishly transcribing a 
form that she had committed to memory" (Gardner, 1985, 
p. 190). 
Hence we have no reason to believe that Nadia has higher-
level skills in the spatial sphere any more than she has 
them in any other sphere of intelligence. Gardner 
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overlooks the fact that there is no more reason to read the 
evidence as support for his theory than there is to regard 
it as support for the Fodorean modularity theory. On the 
Fodorean view, Nadia's visual input analyzers are highly 
developed, but her general cognitive organizational 
processes are not, so that she remains unable to utilize 
the information received from these input analyzers in a" 
more productive fashion. This may explain the difference 
between the limited development of the autistic child and 
the performance of the genius who is ordinary in every 
other way - the general processes of the latter are more 
able to cope with the output of the highly efficient core 
mechanisms. This indicates that the data relating to 
autism results in empirical underdetermination between 
Gardner's hypothesis (C2 ) relative to his modular theory of 
mind and the account provided in Fodor's theory, T. 
There is a further diff icul ty with Gardner's use of the 
prodigy and the autistic child as illustrations of the 
autonomy of his intelligences. No account has been taken 
of the role played by motivation in the development of the 
intelligence. Does the child composer show a marked 
musical ability because he is interested in the subject or 
is he interested in the subject because he has the ability 
in the first place? One would imagine that the truth 
probably lies somewhere between these two extremes. 
However, Gardner does recognize that there is a gap in his 
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theory at this point. 
Nor does the neurophysiological evidence cited by Gardner 
support his theory unequivocally. For example, Gardner 
admits that it is very rare to find a person whose 
linguistic abilities have been impaired whilst the 
remainder of their intellectual capacities remain intact." 
This casts doubt upon the identification of language as an 
autonomous intelligence. However, Gardner glosses over 
this possible objection to his hypothesis by claiming that 
language satisfies enough of the other criteria for a 
separate intelligence for it to be classified as such.' 
This is an example of the advantage that Gardner has by not 
attempting to formulate an algorithm for the classification 
of intelligences - he can happily shift his criteria enough 
to allow him to neglect systematically those sources of 
empirical evidence that contradict his desired result. 
Given this method, he has no need of the a priori criteria 
for modules for which he criticises Fodor. If an candidate 
intelligence is excluded by one criterion, but readily 
included by other criteria, then Gardner can include 
precisely those intelligences in his list that best suit 
his theory just as easily as if he had postulated their 
existence on a priori grounds. Neither methodology pays 
much attention to the important question of systematic 
testability. 
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It should be said in Gardner's defence that his discussion 
of the problems encountered in the identification of 
intelligences does at least indicate that he is not wholly 
unaware of the SUbjectivity of his approach. However, he 
maintains that his method is scientific by dint of the very 
fact that he makes public the sources of his evidence so 
that readers may judge for themselves whether he is right 
or wrong (ibid, p. 62). It is my belief that, although 
Gardner should be praised for citing his evidence, this 
does not, and should not, remove the onus upon him to 
discuss rival interpretations of the evidence within his 
text, thereby achieving a more balanced outlook and 
illustrating the relative confirmation of his theory. 
Gardner's failure to do so weakens the strength of his 
bootstrap argument. 
5.4.3 Memory and modularity: is Gardner's theory remotely 
tenable? 
It has already been noted that Gardner pays insufficient 
attention to the relationship between motivation and 
intelligence. He also neglects to investigate the question 
of meaning with respect to memory in sufficient depth. 
Gardner comments (ibid, p. 195) that a chess master will 
remember the layout of pieces on a board after just a few 
seconds of exposure to it, provided that the pieces are 
arranged in a meaningful fashion. If they are placed 
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indiscriminately on the board, then he will recall their 
positions no more accurately than a mere novice. Gardner 
concludes from this that the memory of the chess master is 
influenced by the meaningful configuration of the pieces 
upon the board, which his highly developed spatial 
intelligence allows him to see instantly. In other words, 
his spatial memory derives its excellence from his spatial 
intelligence, whilst his memory in other domains, such as 
foreign languages, may be appalling. 
This view is obviously problematic. Firstly, if Gardner's 
claim that the chess master can remember the layout on the 
board because his spatial intelligence tells him that it 
has meaning, what are we to say of an architect to whom the 
strategies of chess mean nothing, but who has an excellent 
memory for the details of structural plans? Does he have 
the same spatial intelligence as the chess master or a 
different one? Just how specialized can an intelligence 
be? 
Here Gardner appears to be faced with a dilemma. His first 
option is to admit that the architect and the chess master 
have different spatial intelligences, in which case he is 
paving the way for a flood of candidate intelligences, not 
only within the spatial domain, but in all the other 
spheres that he mentions too. I can play polo very well, 
but I am a terrible swimmer. Do I have the same bodily-
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kinaesthetic intelligence as Duncan Goodhew or a completely 
different one? I am an accomplished journalist and 
novelist, but cannot master a word of French. Do I have 
the same linguistic intelligence as Sartre or a different 
one? The list is endless. Fodor is making a similar point 
when he declares that 
"I don I t think that there are specialized modular 
cognitive systems corresponding to most of the things 
that we know how to do" (Fodor, 1985, p. 36). 
However, the other horn of the dilemma is no more 
attractive for Gardner. If he claims that the architect 
and the chess master have the same spatial intelligence, 
then his attempt to explain their abilities by reference to 
spatial intelligence is bound to fail, since we have just 
seen that there is no reason why the architect should have 
any memory for what to him is a meaningless arrangement of 
chess pieces upon a board. 
Either way, Gardner is forced to relinquish his modular 
argument. If there are many different intelligences, then 
the spatial intelligence of the chess master bears little 
resemblance to that of the architect and so the general 
notion of spatial intelligence does not explain a great 
deal. In fact, the modular theory risks becoming trivially 
true, if Gardner is reduced to claiming that the chess 
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master's ability to understand and remember the arrangement 
of chessmen on a board is explained by his superior 
understanding of and memory for the spatial arrangement of 
chessmen. On the other hand, if there is only one form of 
spatial intelligence, then Gardner's theory still loses 
much of its explanatory force, since it is impossible to 
explain why the architect remembers building plans well but" 
chess arrangements badly by reference to a superior spatial 
intelligence. 
Moreover, any attempt to rescue Gardner by reducing his 
argument to the claim that our memories function better 
with increased understanding of what it is that we are 
trying to remember will also fail, since even if this is 
correct, it does not in itself imply that our memory is not 
a horizontal cognitive process. Once more, Gardner is 
faced with the problem that Fodorean modular theory is 
equally capable of explaining the facts available. Our 
memory may utilise information from Fodorean input 
analyzers in different ways in different contexts and may 
yet be a general process. Fodor highlights a comparable 
mistake made by Gall who inferred that, as Fodor puts it 
"the same faculty cannot be both weak and strong, so 
if it sometimes happens that mathematical memory is 
weak and musical memory robust, then the memory that 
mediates mathematics cannot be the same as the memory 
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that mediates music" (Fodor, 1983, p. 17). 
However, Fodor continues 
"All that can be inferred, strictly speaking, is that 
mathematical memory + musical memory; which, though 
patently true, is quite compatible with mathematical 
memory and musical memory being exercises of the self-
same faculty with respect to mathematics in the one 
case and music in the other" (ibid, p. 17). 
Hence not only does Gardner's evidence relating to memory 
function (again, part of 02) fail to provide unequivocal 
confirmation of C2 ; it is equally unable to lend further 
support to Gardner's general hypothesis (e l ) that a general 
factor of intelligence does not adequately account for our 
abilities. Once more, the bootstrap strategy has not been 
supported by strong enough unequivocal evidence. 
5.4.4 A modular account of general processes 
There is one final criticism of Gardner that must be made 
before this section is concluded. This concerns Gardner's 
attempt to 9 i ve a satisfactory modular account of those 
processes which we usually regard as general, such as 
common sense, originality, wisdom and the ability to use 
metaphor (Gardner, 1985, chapter 11). 
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These processes are interpreted by Gardner as amalgams of 
talents from more than one sphere of intelligence - perhaps 
only two or three, as in common sense, which Gardner 
declares not to be very general at all upon closer 
examination, since it is made up of interpersonal, bodily 
and spatial intelligence (Gardner, 1985, p. 289). Others 
such as metaphor and originality develop in one domain and' 
then spread into others, whilst still others such as wisdom 
are amalgams of these amalgams. Wisdom, says Gardner, is 
a term applied to those who have 
"considerable common sense and originality in one or 
more domains, coupled with a seasoned metaphorizing or 
analogising capacity" (Gardner, 1985, p. 295). 
On Gardner's account then, the wise person must be very 
gifted in many spheres! Of course, Gardner's modules are 
not informationally encapsulated like Fodor's and on his 
view, frequently work together, but the force of his claim 
that modular intelligences exist must be weakened if so-
called general processes must be explained in terms of 
ability in so many of these domains, unless the bulk of the 
population is to be regarded as lacking in common sense and 
wisdom! This impression is reinforced by factors such as 
Gardner's discussion of originality in which he seems to be 
referring to the standards that we would normally expect 
only of an expert (ibid, pp. 289 - 91). 
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It is clear that the empirical evidence which he cites in 
support of his theory does not justify the strong claim he 
makes (Gardner in Fodor, 1985, p. 13) that his brand of 
modularity theory has no need of central cognitive 
processes, so that he is 
"more Fodorean than Fodor". 
Gardner's account of general processes is unconvincing. 
This is of course more grist to Fodor's mill, since the 
Fodorean claim is that we know little about such processes 
precisely because they do not have a modular structure. 
Indeed, Gardner's evidence that general processes are 
modular does rather more to refute C1 ' his general modular 
hypothesis, than it does to support his theory. 
5.4.5 Summary of the Gardner versus Fodor debate 
It is not possible to decide which of the two theories is 
correct purely on the evidence cited by Gardner, and so we 
are left with the difficulty of how to decide between his 
bootstrap argument and that of Fodor (see above, sub-
section 3.3.2.). We have already noted that some of the 
evidence (01 ) used by Gardner to argue that the traditional 
notion of a general intelligence factor is incorrect (el ) 
is also employed in support of his specific hypothesis (e2 ) 
that intelligence is modular. This means that we may be 
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able to prefer the Fodorean model on one of the abstract 
qrounds suggested by Glymour, that is, that we should 
prefer a theory in which each hypothesis is supported by 
independent sources of evidence. However, we have not yet 
examined the pitfalls of the Fodorean argument, and 
therefore it is as yet unclear whether the Fodorean theory 
will satisfy abstract criteria any better than Gardner's 
theory8. We must therefore reserve judgement about whether 
it is possible to employ Glymourian abstract criteria to 
decide between the two theories. 
It is important to see that much of the preceding 
discussion of the Gardnerian position has been concerned 
not with showing that Gardner's theory is incorrect 
(although, inevitably, doubt has been cast upon some 
aspects of his view), but rather with a demonstration that 
the evidence cited by Gardner in favour of his theory does 
not support him in the unequivocal fashion that he often 
implies that it does. It has been argued that much of this 
evidence would be equally consistent with a Fodorean 
account of the mind/brain. Indeed, Gardner's abject 
failure to account for many everyday capacities such as 
common sense and wisdom may lead us to maintain that the 
only tenable version of his theory would be one in which 
the cores of each intelligence (Gardner's dumb mechanisms) 
are modular, but higher level processing is performed in a 
general, nonmodular fashion. If this is the case, then the 
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Gardnerian theory would collapse into the Fodorean 
position, and his own bootstrap strategy will fall. 
Even if some form of Gardner I s theory may be maintained 
which is distinct from the Fodorean view, then it is not 
wholly clear as yet how we may decide between them. How 
much weight should we attach to empirical evidence? Does 
our lack of knowledge of central cognitive processes mean 
that they do not exist or that we just do not know very 
much about them? How important are Fodor I s functional 
criteria for modularity? This is a new area of multi-
disciplinary study, in which both Fodor and Gardner are 
employing the bootstrap strategy to confirm their own model 
of mind/brain organization. There are few guidelines or 
precedents about what might constitute an acceptable 
strategy for evaluating evidence from a variety of sources. 
As a result, the preference of one model over another may 
well be based upon a decision as to what evidence IS 
relevant and what kinds of tests it should be subjected to. 
We have already seen that Gardner allows his own view of 
intelligence to influence his interpretation of the 
evidence, and it will be demonstrated later that Fodor is 
no less guilty of this. 
The modularist is in a position akin to that of Nordby's 
detective (Nordby, 1989) (see Chapter 2, subsections 2.5.1, 
2.5.2). His choice of model may lead to, rather than arise 
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from, his interpretation of the evidence. Moreover, as the 
arguments of this chapter illustrate, the provisional 
nature of his conclusions is frequently forgotten in the 
course of discussions of important and contentious points. 
Neglect of alternative interpretations of the evidence is 
all too often a recurrent feature of the modularist debate. 
As we have seen in the case of Gardner, this neglect of the 
issue of empirical underdetermination results in the making 
of unwarranted assumptions. Although Gardner 1S an 
instrumentalist about his modules, his theory exhibits the 
same failure to ground his hypotheses upon unequivocal 
sources of evidence as we noted in realist theories. 
Gardner is aware of some of the difficulties involved in 
the scientific pursuit of a theory of the mind/brain. (See 
earlier, subsection 5.4.2). A further example occurs in 
his discussion of the statistical analysis of intelligence 
testing. He comments that 
n[w]hen it comes to the interpretation of intelligence 
testing, we are faced with an issue of taste or 
preference rather than one on which scientific closure 
is likely to be reached" (Gardner, 1985, p, 17). 
It is unfortunate that Gardner does not adopt this attitude 
when he considers the evidence that he cites in favour of 
his theory. 
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5.5 Shanon versus Fodor - further failures to evaluate the 
evidence 
5.5.1 Introduction 
Benny Shanon suggests (Shanon, 1988) that there is evidence 
in support of other modular divisions within the mind/brain 
than those postulated by Fodor. Whilst I agree with this 
claim, I believe that Shanon, like Gardner, makes the 
fundamental error of failing to evaluate the evidence in a 
non-biased fashion. Whilst there may be good arguments 
that can be evinced against Fodor's view (see sUbsection 
5.6 below), Shanon's arguments do not number amongst them. 
I shall sUbstantiate this claim in the course of the 
following four sUbsections. The discussion will have the 
following structure. 
Shanon suggests that the Fodorean notion of modular i ty 
(Fodor [1983]) as "structural and fixed" should be replaced 
by 
"one which is dynamic, (and) context-dependent" 
(Shanon [1988], p.331). 
I propose to comment briefly upon the major points of 
Shanon's attack on Fodor in subsections 5.5.2 and 5.5.3, 
which will deal with the structure of the modules and 
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methodological arguments respectively. It is in these two 
sections that Shanon's failure to evaluate the evidence for 
the Fodorean view is most clearly displayed. In subsection 
5.5.4, I argue that, whilst Shanon claims victory on both 
counts, such a victory is at best Pyrrhic: Shanon' s 
revision of the modularity thesis deprives it of its 
capacity to account for the discrepancy between our 
knowledge of input systems and our comparative ignorance of 
cognitive organisation within the brain. If Fodor is wrong 
about this division, then better arguments are needed to 
show it. Consequently, Shanon's modular theory of mind is 
less explanatory than that of Fodor. In section 5.5.5 I 
shall make the further claim that this attempt to revise 
Fodorean modularity lends unintentional support to Fodor's 
despondency about our chances of providing a scientific 
account of the central cognitive processes. So, Shanon's 
whole attempt to provide a scientific account of cognition 
by revising the definition of modularity fails, because it 
cannot withstand the methodological criticisms he levels at 
Fodor. This means that even if it can be shown by other 
arquments that the Fodorean theory of modularity does not 
meet the requirements of science, Shanon' s replacement 
theory will not fare any better. 
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5.5.2 Remodelling modularity 
Shanon begins his paper with an attempt to summarize 
Fodor's theory of the modules. He agrees with Gardner's 
criticism (cited above, sUbsection 5.4.2) that Fodor's 
descriptions of the modular properties of input analyzers 
are derived not merely from functional considerations, but" 
also based upon procedural and neurophysiological features. 
Of prime importance to Fodor are the functional 
characteristics of domain specificity (described in Fodor 
1983 as "Gall's idea that there are distinct psychological 
mechanisms - vertical faculties - corresponding to distinct 
stimulus domains", p.48) and informational encapsulation 
(defined by Fodor 1983, p.69 as "the claim that the data 
that can bear on the confirmation of perceptual hypotheses 
includes, in the general case, considerably less than the 
organism may know"). However, Shanon, like Gardner, points 
out that Fodor employs many empirical considerations to 
enlarge upon these defining attributes of his mental 
modules. He writes that 
" [e]vidently, such a characterization of the 
modularity of mind is not one that could have 
been suggested on mere a priori grounds" (1988, 
p.334) • 
F d '(1985 3) l'mpll' es that, whereas informational o or s , p. 
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encapsulation is crucial to the concept of modular systems, 
it is a contingent fact that such systems also tend to have 
other psychological features in common. Shan on attempts to 
maintain the Fodorean insistence upon the criteria of 
informational encapsulation and domain specificity in his 
revised account of modularity. Indeed, there is little or 
no disagreement between Fodor and Shanon as to what is' 
logically possible. Their conflict centres around the 
contingent, but actual nature of modularity. Both do rely 
heavily upon empirical evidence in formulating their 
hypotheses. 
However, Shanon commits a serious methodological error in 
declaring (1988, p.334) that a concrete discussion of the 
empirical evidence cited by Fodor lies beyond the scope of 
his paper. There are three main ways in which Shanon's 
neglect of Fodor's use of empirical evidence and 
willingness to allow for future empirical developments has 
unfortunate consequences for his arguments. 
Firstly, the gap between the views of Fodor and Shanon is 
thereby made to appear wider than it really is. Shanon has 
a tendency to misinterpret Fodor's stance upon potential 
instantiations of modularity. For example, Shanon writes 
that the direction of information flow concentrated upon in 
Fodor 1983 runs from the external world to the internal 
cognitive faculties of man. He goes on 
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"there is, however, the converse course: the one 
that proceeds from within to without. This 
course presents itself in motor performance and 
in the production of language, as well as in 
processes of recollection, retrieval and 
problem-solving" (Shanon, 1988, p.334). 
5.5.2 
This implies that Shanon takes Fodor to be restricting the 
application of the term modular to input analyzers only. 
We will consider the arguments with respect to 
problem-solving and memory in sUbsection 5.5.4. Suffice it 
to say for the moment that Fodor explicitly allows that his 
tripartite division of the mind into transducers (which 
present information from the outside world as raw material 
for the modules), input analyzers (or modules) and central 
processes may not cover all the workings of the mind/brain. 
Indeed, he writes that 
"it is left wide open that there may be modular 
systems that do not subserve any of these 
functions. Among the obvious candidates would be 
systems involved in the motor integration of such 
behaviours as speech and locomotion" (Fodor, 
1983, p.42).9 
Secondly, it is disconcerting that Shanon ignores Fodor's 
empirical considerations with regard to modular systems 
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when his argument against Fodor in section 3 is concerned 
with precisely the fact that Fodor does not adduce such 
considerations when discussing the nature of our central 
cognitive processes. 
Thirdly, Shanon's own modular hypothesis rests heavily upon 
empirical evidence gleaned from various psychological' 
experiments. As will be argued in SUbsection 5.5. below, 
Shanon makes the same mistake as Howard Gardner in assuming 
that the empirical evidence he discusses may be interpreted 
unequivocally in favour of his theory. It is therefore 
regrettable that he does not examine Fodor's evidence more 
thoroughly, since there is ample scope for criticism (as 
demonstrated in the peer commentaries of Fodor (1985) 10. 
Shanon's failure to do so, coupled with the problems 
entailed by his own views make the Fodorean account seem 
more satisfactory than it really is. 
Shanon agrees with Fodor that at least some of the central 
cognitive processes must be nonmodular, but he claims 
that, whilst all central cognitive processes may in 
principle operate in a nonmodular fashion, exhibiting the 
characteristics of isotropy (the property a system has when 
it can look at anything it knows) and Quineanity (a term 
applied to systems within which any given hypothesis is 
sensitive to properties of the entire system) ascribed to 
them by Fodor, in practice they may display instances of 
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modulari ty. Modules occurring wi thin the central processes 
exist only temporarily, and are not associated with any 
fixed neural architecture. Nevertheless, Shanon claims 
that during their ephemeral existence they manifest the 
functional features of domain-specificity and informational 
encapsulation of the Fodorean modules (Shanon (1988), 
p.347). 
The advantage of viewing the mind/brain in such a modular 
light is, in Shanon's view, that we will be able to study 
the patterns of encapsulation within the mind/brain and 
perceive important psychological generalizations that the 
stricter, Fodorean definition of the module overlooks. If 
Shanon is correct, then his arguments would cast serious 
doubt upon Fodor's bootstrap argument, since his specific 
hypothesis H2 regarding the modular structure of input 
analyzers and the non-modular structure of the central 
cognitive processes could no longer derive support from the 
body of empirical evidence E2 . Consequently, no further 
confirmation of the general Fodorean hypothesis (H 1 ) that 
our central cognitive processes are functionally distinct 
from linguistic and perceptual processes would be 
available. However, Shanon' s views will be disputed in 
sUbsections 5.5.4 and 5.5.5 of this chapter. 
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Methodoloqy under the microscope - Shanon on Podor 
Shanon makes two major criticisms of the Fodorean 
methodology, which are closely linked to one another. The 
first is that Fodor's criteria for the modularity of input 
analyzers are very strict, whereas his reasons for holding 
the central cognitive processes to be nonmodular are less· 
stringent. Shanon writes that 
"in other words, for Fodor a few examples that an 
input system is not encapsulated are not 
sufficient for characterizing it as non-modular, 
whereas any instance of even potential 
nonencapsulation is sufficient for the 
characterization of the central processes as 
non-modular" (Shanon (1988), p.33S). 
He accuses Fodor of interpreting crucial empirical evidence 
relevant to such issues as what constitutes an individual 
system, the nature of representational output, etc. in the 
light of his own theories about the make-up and functional 
divisions of the mind/brain. ll If Shanon' s allegations 
are correct, this would clearly be problematic for the 
Fodorean bootstrapping argument, since his evidence E2 for 
the specific modular hypothesis of the mind he puts forward 
in H2 would not necessarily uphold H2 when examined 
objectively, and this would have repercussions for Fodor's 
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more general claim (H1 > that the perceptual and linguistic 
systems within the mind/brain are functionally distinct 
from the central cognitive processes. 
It may be said in Fodor's defence that he does acknowledge 
the problem of analyzing empirical evidence and 
observations without any prejudice. 
this point (Shanon, 1988, p. 336). 
writes that 
Shanon, too, notes' 
For example, Fodor 
"I claim only that, contrary to the textbook 
story, the empirical evidence for the continuity 
of perception with cognition is not overwhelming 
when contemplated with a jaundiced eye" (Fodor, 
1985, p. 5). 
Fodor's failure to review evidence impartially will be 
further discussed in subsection 5.6 below. However, it 
will be seen in sUbsection 5.5.4 that Shanon has equally 
scant regard for the need for strong evidence to support 
his hypotheses. Whilst this does not obviate his criticism 
of Fodor, it does cast doubt upon the question of whether 
he fully understands the relationship between evidence and 
hypothesis. 
Shanon's comments concerning the impossibility of Fodor's 
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arriving at his modular conception of mind on purely a 
priori grounds implies that he regards Fodor's 
supplementation of his functional definitions with 
empirical data as responsible for his rigidity with respect 
to the modularity of the input systems. This point is 
similar to that made in a more critical fashion by Howard 
Gardner (noted above, sUbsection 5.4.2). The criticism is' 
not wholly unwarranted, but as I shall argue in subsection 
5.5.4, it is one which might well be applied to Shanon too. 
The second criticism of Fodor's methodology made by Shanon 
is that Fodor operates from a mixture of two perspectives 
throughout his (1983). The first is psychological and, as 
mentioned above, concentrates upon the actual mechanisms of 
the input analyzers as well as citing their functional 
characteristics, whilst the second is philosophical and 
discusses the central cogni ti ve processes in terms of 
isotropy and Quineanity. Shanon writes that 
"the considerations of principle Fodor employs in 
The Modularity of Mind are philosophical to an 
extent that takes them outside the scope of 
psychology proper. The philosopher's 
perspective of principle is atemporal; the 
psychologist, by contrast, cannot avoid the 
consideration of the actual, and for him there is 
nothing more essential than time. Just as the 
277 
atemporal study of language is linguistics but 
not psycholinguistics, the atemporal study of 
mind is epistemology but not psychology. Surely, 
the study of scientific discovery need not be the 
paradigm for the study of standard, everyday 
human reasonin9" (Shanon (1988), p.336). 
5.5.3 
Shanon is, however, putting the cart before the horse here. 
Fodor is taking a philosophical stance because, in his 
view, there is a lack of current empirically based 
scientific evidence about the way that the central 
cognitive processes function, hence he is forced to retreat 
to a more theoretical and philosophical stance. 
how he describes his task (Fodor (1983), p.104): 
Here is 
liThe fact is that there is practically no direct 
evidence, pro or con, on the question whether 
central systems are modular .... When you run out 
of direct evidence, you might just as well try 
arguing from analogies, and that is what I 
propose to do". 
Furthermore, although the approach shifts from a 
psychological to a philosophical one, the points made with 
respect to the central processes are exactly the opposite 
of those made about the peripheral modules in the light of 
psychological considerations. Isotropy and Quineanity are 
278 
5.5.3 
the exact reverse sides of the coins of informational 
encapsulation and domain specificity respectively. 
However, it should be noted that the Fodorean attempt to 
combine a philosophical study of the mind/brain with 
considerations taken from psychology and neurology is 
partially responsible for the difficulties he has in using' 
the bootstrap strategy. 
more detail below. 
This point will be discussed in 
Shanon's point against Fodor has a sequel, namely, that 
Fodor's strict definition of modularity forces him to 
overlook the possibility that there are some psychological 
groupings even amongst the central processes which exhibit 
the functional characteristics of domain specificity and 
informational encapsulation so vaunted by Fodor in his 
discussion of the peripheral modules. study of these 
groupings, in Shanon's view, can be useful to scientific 
study of the mind/brain. Shanon's argument amounts to the 
accusation that Fodor's definition of modularity governs 
his interpretation of the evidence, so that his evidence E2 
in favour of his own version of the modularity thesis (H2 ) 
is only obtained by judicious selection of examples of 
modules that support his hypothesis and systematic omission 
of those that do not. 
However ub ctl' on 5 5 4 (below) argues that Shanon' s , s se . . 
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methodology in defining these groups is faulty, since he 
in effect, a helps himself indiscriminately to what is, 
totally mixed bag of psychological phenomena. In doing so, 
he displays the same disregard for any distinction between 
functional and empirical criteria as Fodor. His argument 
therefore provides further support for Fodor's opinion that 
we will not be able to hav~ any satisfactory study of the' 
central processes which will incorporate both 
neurophysiological and psychological considerations. 
5.5.4 Blurring the focus: Shanon's modules 
Shanon is aware that there are differences between his 
various modular groupings, and that they do not exhibit all 
the secondary qualities of the Fodorean modules (as 
described in sUbsection 5.5.2 above). However, I think 
that the dichotomies between them are far wider than Shanon 
admits, since they do not even all exhibit domain 
specificity or informational encapsulation in the same way. 
Shanon is therefore as guilty as Fodor of interpreting his 
criteria for modularity so that they pick out only those 
putative examples that support his own view. 
We shall begin by considering the way in which Shanon 
claims that we develop isolated habits, beliefs or skills. 
This category includes examples of isolated fields of 
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competence like the ones exhibited by chess masters and 
idiots savants. Shanon also argues (Shanon, 1988, p. 342) 
that modularity is demonstrated when we perform a task 
satisfactorily in one context, yet fail to carry out an 
essentially identical task in a different situation. 
Moreover, he notes that (ibid, p. 341), our memories may 
function better in some contexts than they do in others.· 
However, it is clear that the level of modularity under 
consideration here is by no means as fine-grained as that 
described by Fodor (cf. note 1 above). The difficulties 
inherent in these examples of modularity have already been 
deal t with at length in the course of my discussion of 
Howard Gardner (above, sUbsections 5.4.2 and 5.4.3). 
However, not all of Shanon' s modules bear such a strong 
resemblance to those cited by Gardner nor can they be so 
easily reinterpreted in line with Fodorean theory. For 
example, Shanon claims that information may be sheltered 
locally through prejudices, which arise through the sheer 
impossibility of checking our beliefs against all other 
beliefs and knowledge represented in our mind/brains. 
Nevertheless, it does not follow that prejudices are 
therefore either domain-specific or informationally 
encapsulated in any interesting or even remotely Fodorean 
sense. For a start, our inability to check one set of 
beliefs against all our other background beliefs is, in 
Fodor's opinion, an example of epistemic boundedness, which 
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occurs when 
"our cognitive organization imposes epistemically 
significant constraints on the beliefs that we 
can entertain" (Fodor, 1983, p.120). 
5.5.4 
However, Fodor regards the idea that our mind/brains are" 
simply not equal to such a task because of lack of memory 
or computational power as uninteresting, because it is 
equally valid irrespective of our stance upon the question 
of modularity. 
Secondly, the functional definition of domain-specificity 
implies that it operates in a vertical direction, whereas 
it seems that prejudices may appear irrespective of the 
content or function of our beliefs. 
This point about informational encapsulation and prejudices 
also applies to Shanon's claim that the ad hoc sheltering 
of information during thought experiments or during the 
consideration of specific problems constitutes a form of 
modularity. Whilst Fodorean modules are only concerned 
with one particular function and operate in a bullheaded 
and mandatory fashion, this cannot be sa id to apply to 
Shanon's modules. Consider his analogy of the ad hoc 
sheltering of information with the use of specific tools on 
a workbench for repairing an object. Shanon writes that 
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"it is well to concentrate all required materials 
and tools on a workbench, and to separate them 
from other items so as to be able to direct one's 
resources. Experiencing a state of affairs as 
quite real and at the same time maintaining the 
knowledge that it is, in fact, not real is a 
fundamental ability of human intelligence" 
(Shanon (1988), p.345). 
5.5.4 
The analogy serves only to highlight just how different 
Shanon's view is from the Fodorean notion of informational 
encapsulation and domain-specificity that he claims to 
follow so faithfully in broadening his criteria for 
modularity. In considering our problems we may well revise 
our beliefs in the light of new knowledge, hypotheses will 
become prejudices etc. The point is that they may be 
interchangeable, just as we may replace workbench tools in 
different places, or hunt for another if we find our 
current selection to be inadequate. The fact that we will 
not always succeed because, in the case of beliefs, the 
holistic system is too vast, or in the case of the 
workbench, our tools are in someone else's garage, does not 
make for informational or tool encapsulation in any 
interesting sense. Rather such faculties as thought 
experiments and treatment of prejudice appear to be 
horizontal and unencapsulated processes. (Remember that 
Fodorean domain specificity is vertically defined.) 
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Compare this with Fodor's description of the horizontal 
faculty of memory according to Plato (Fodor, 1983, p.12). 
Socrates says that we should think of a man 
"hunting once more for any piece of knowledge 
that he wants, ,catching, holding it, and letting 
it go again" (ibid, p. 12). 
5.5.5 Shanon, Fodor and the prospects for science 
I do not wish to deny that the psychological groupings 
described by Shanon exist within the mind/brain. Indeed, 
Shanon, like Fodor, combines empirical evidence 
(particularly in his slightly more plausible example of 
dreaming, which displays a neurophysiological basis) with 
his supposedly functional ascriptions of domain specificity 
and informational encapsulation. I simply wish to reject 
Shanon's conclusion that such groupings form a continuum in 
any important sense of modularity since many of them 
violate even those aspects of the Fodorean modular thesis 
that Shanon claims to endorse. If we were to follow 
Shanon's example, then literally any informational grouping 
would have to be modular. Clearly, this use of the term 
modularity is too broad. Shanon admits this problem, but 
does not deal with it adequately. 
The patterns of modularity which Shanon regards as so 
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important for scientific study are in fact so h t e erogenous 
that there is no advantage over simply studying the 
groupings in isolation. Shanon's multiplicity of modules 
does nothing to dispel Fodor's gloom in holding that 
"to the extent that the existence of 
forml function correspondence is a precondition 
for successful neuropsychological research, there 
is not much to be expected in the way of a 
neuropsychology 
p. 127) .12 
of thought" (Fodor (1983) , 
5.6 Some better criticisms of the Fodorean modular i ty 
thesis 
The failures of Shanon and Gardner to provide any telling 
arguments against the Fodorean modular i ty thesis do not 
entail that no such arguments are available. Indeed, much 
of the initial plausibility of the Fodorean view may be 
attributed to two major sources. Firstly, we have seen 
that both Shanon and Gardner omit any consideration of 
alternative interpretations of the evidence that they cite 
in support of their Vlews. It is easy to show that much of 
the evidence can be interpreted in a manner which supports 
the Fodorean theory equally well. Moreover, a close 
examination of Shanon' s arguments yields the conclus ion 
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that his claim to have demonstrated instances of modularity 
overlooked by Fodor which nevertheless satisfy the Fodorean 
criteria of informational encapsulation and domain 
specificity fails, because he has simply reinterpreted 
these criteria so that they will apply to his chosen 
examples. He is therefore arguing at cross-purposes with 
Fodor. 
The second reason for the apparent survival of the Fodorean 
thesis lies within Fodor's own writing. I t seems more 
acceptable than it really is because the range of evidence 
discussed is so limited. Fodor declares that a 
comprehensive view of all relevant evidence lies outside 
the scope of his work, and that any criticisms of his 
theory along these lines are therefore unwarranted. For 
example, he comments that 
"Modularity was not, however, an attempt to make 
the case for modularity; or to weigh the 
evidence; or to summarize the literature; or to 
dissect the alternatives ..... Modularity provides 
a sketch • • • • together with a smattering of 
supporting evidence and an occasional indication 
of how to get around some of the data that were 
alleged to support the earlier story. But, as 
Forster says, the evidence is appealed to 
'essentially for illustrative purposes'; so, for 
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that matter, are most of the arguments" (Fodor, 
1985, p. 33). 
However, it may be argued against Fodor that it is 
irresponsible to write an entire proposal for a radically 
different theory of. the mind/brain, whilst systematically 
ignoring so many important pieces of evidence which weaken' 
his theory, even if he admits to doing so. Only the most 
critical of readers are likely to heed his warnings about 
the provisional status of his theory.13 
Fodor creates the impression that his theory is more 
coherent than it rea 11 y is. This imba lance should and 
could have been redressed by a more thorough review both of 
the evidence that Fodor thinks does support his theory and 
that which might refute it. His critics have not 
misunderstood the purpose with which he writes. Rather, 
they are more aware than Fodor that even a tentative 
account of the mind/brain, particularly one with such 
extensive ramifications for the future direction of 
scientif ic research into this topic, should regard the 
evaluation of evidence as of paramount importance even at 
an early stage. 
The sources of evidence that are pertinent to the Fodorean 
modularity thesis which are neglected by Fodor have been 
well documented by other critics (Shallice, 1984, 1988; 
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Marshall, 1984; Putnam, 1984; Fodor, 1985), and a brief 
outline of them is all that is necessary here. 
Several of the peer commentaries in Fodor (1985) comment 
upon the sparsity of the evidence cited by Fodor or upon 
the way in which Fodor allows for reinterpretation of the 
evidence to suit his own theory to the extent that he runs 
the risk of rendering his theory unfalsifiable. For 
example, Robert J. sternberg writes that 
"[t]o some, Fodor's weighing of various sources 
of evidence might seem odd, if not downright 
bizarre" (Fodor, 1985, p. 33). 
Sternberg's view is that the division between modular 
processes and non-modular ones is not a purely functional 
one, which separates perception from cognition. Rather, 
automatic processes are modular and controlled ones are 
not. The chess expert's skills are modular, on Sternberg's 
account, not for the reasons cited by Shanon or by Gardner, 
but because they have become automatic, unlike the early 
chess moves of the novice. If sternberg is right, then his 
arguments cast doubt upon the strength of Fodor's evidence 
(E2 ) for his specific modular hypothesis H2 that modules 
actually form a natural kind. Moreover, although the 
functional division envisaged by Fodor between language and 
perception on the one hand and cognition on the other (the 
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general Fodorean hypothesis H1 ) is not directly affected by 
sternberg's remarks, it will gain little confirmation from 
H2 if E2 can be shown to be either incorrect or incomplete. 
It is clearly impossible to say whether or not Sternberg's 
arguments do weaken Fodor's case without a more thorough 
examination of the empirical evidence. Such an examination 
would be out of place here however, as it is not my aim to 
correct Fodor's omissions, but merely to demonstrate how 
easily his bootstrapping argument can be destroyed by the 
consideration of alternative interpretations of the 
evidence. As Sternberg himself comments 
"Fodor is a persuasive advocate of his position, 
but he does not seriously consider alternative 
hypotheses, or he dismisses them cavalierly" 
(ibid, p. 33). 
Some unsatisfactory arguments for central cognitive modules 
have already been noted in my discussion of Shanon in the 
preceding sUbsection (5.5.4). However, there are better 
arguments which cast doubt upon the validity of Fodor's 
inference from his general hypothesis that there are 
functional divisions within the mind/brain to the more 
specific view that his own particular modular hypothesis is 
the only viable one. Many of these arguments are linked to 
criticisms of Fodor's failure to provide a thorough survey 
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of the literature that is relevant to his hypothesis. For 
example, Marshall (1984) agrees with the importance ~f the 
modular concept and that it would be advantageous from an 
evolutionary point of view if input systems were to be 
modular. He writes that 
"it would certainly make biological sense to have 
a mechanism that restricted the access of input 
systems to central processes ... provided, of 
course, that loud noises and sudden movements 
could automatically overcome that inhibition" 
(Marshall, 1984, p. 220). 
However, he goes on to remark that Fodor's attempts to 
defend his theory against the potential counterexamples 
raised by the possibility that language modules may be 
influenced by context are impoverished by 
"the very narrow range of literature he 
considers" (ibid, p. 223). 
Putnam expands upon the difficulties associated with the 
modular nature of language by arguing that even if Fodor 
succeeds in escaping from the objection that word 
recognition is contextually facilitated, he will still be 
caught upon the opposing horn of the dilemma when required 
to account for how linguistic and visual modules can ever 
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acquire concepts when they are supposed to be 
informationally encapsulated. 14 Diff icul ties occur when 
Fodor attempts to explain how we can relate the output of 
our visual and linguistic modules to the information 
contained within our cognitive processes. How can we know 
that the modules are yielding reliable information? Even 
though they are informationally encapsulated this does not 
preclude the possibility of their being systematically 
wrong. We are forced to consider seriously the problems 
raised by the traditional veil-of-perception issue, namely, 
that we might genuinely be mistaken as to our perceptions 
and have no way of knowing it. Yet Fodor is attempting to 
put forward a scientif ic theory of the mind, and should 
surely pay more heed to such empirical questions. 
Shallice comments that 
" [e] legant and powerful theor ies based on sketchy 
data can potentially be dangerous as well as very 
valuable. Questions can receive a premature 
answer when what is most needed 1S that they 
merely be adequately stated" (Shallice, 198~, p. 
244) • 
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5.7 Fodor's modular theory and the veil-ot-perception 
issue 
Fodor's failure to present a critical account of this 
evidence means that fundamental flaws within his theory may 
remain undiscovered until we have progressed a long way 
down the wrong path or, worse still, that by eschewing the 
need for evidence, he is thereby rendering his theory 
immune from testability. Once more, the difficulties 
encountered by the metaphysical realist in supplying 
satisfactory support for his theory recur wi thin a more 
scientific approach to the mind/brain, despite the use of 
the bootstrap strategy. 
Fodor's theory contains a semantically inconsistent tetrad. 
Fodor takes the following four claims to be true: 
I modules exist within those parts of the 
mind/brain that are responsible for language and 
perception 
II these modules play a causal role in the 
process of conveying information from the 
environment to our central cognitive system 
III we know that these modules exist because of 
our capacities and abilities, but we are not 
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directly aware of their existence 
IV nonetheless, there is ample evidence of 
their nature from neuroscientific and 
psychological sources. 
The semantic inconsistency of these four statements is' 
clear. First, Fodor asserts the existence of the modules 
(as described in statements I and II) on the basis of our 
acknowledged capacities and abilities (statement III). 
Yet, as my consideration of Putnam in the previous 
sUbsection suggests, many of our linguistic and perceptual 
capacities are not well accounted for by Fodor's modular 
hypothesis. This indicates that we do not have unequivocal 
evidence for the existence of a modular system within the 
mind/brain. Fodor may be vulnerable to the strong or 
ontological version of the veil-of-perception problem. 
Indeed, since he systematically ignores sources of evidence 
that cast doubt upon his hypotheses (see previous 
subsection), then he may be guilty of rendering his modular 
theory of the mind untestable. 
Moreover, even if we grant that there is some kind of 
modular system within the mind/brain, we still cannot claim 
to know its nature on the basis of the neuroscientific and 
psychological evidence cited by Fodor (statement IV). As 
we have seen, there are strong suggestions that the 
293 
5.8 
evidence strongly underdetermines theory selection. Note, 
for example, Sternberg's arguments in favour of a 
modularity thesis that focuses upon the expert/novice shift 
rather than upon a functional division within the 
mind/brain. 15 Fodor's failure to discuss such potentially 
disconfirming sources of evidence renders him vulnerable to 
the weaker, epistemological version of the veil-of-
perception issue (as identified in Chapter 1, subsection 
1.2.4). 
5.8 Conclusion 
My contention is that Fodor bases his arguments on 
inadequate data so that his bootstrapping argument is not 
well confirmed, largely because there is insufficient 
consideration of the evidence in support of and against his 
specific modular hypothesis (H2). We have seen that there 
are many telling examples of specific disorders within the 
central cognitive systems, which cast doubt upon Fodor's 
denial that such systems are modular and that we will ever 
know a great deal about them (eg: Shallice, 1988, 
acalculia). I believe that Fodor's failure to consider the 
evidence is partly explained by the difficulties inherent 
in bootstrapping within a new field of science discussed in 
Chapter 2, sUbsections 2.5.1 - 2.6. 
Here, Nordby's conclusions concerning the difficulties 
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involved in assessing rival theories by reference to formal 
criteria or abstract criteria seem very relevant to the 
modular debate (see Chapter 2, subsections 2.5.1, 2 
.5.2, 
2.6). Fodor decides which evidence to include and which to 
exclude but, in the absences of any systematic theory, his 
decisions are less influenced by scientific considerations 
than by his own model of the mind/brain. As a result,' 
Fodor risks either refutation or rendering his theory 
untestable. His modular theory, like his Representational 
Theory of Mind, fails to overcome the difficulties of 
metaphysical realism. 
1. Much of this chapter has been published in two papers, 
Bennett (1988b) and Bennett (1990). 
2. See, for example, McGinn's discussion of blindsight in 
Chapter 3, sUbsection 3.2.5. 
3. Franz Gall's (1758-1828) phrenology was a forerunner of the 
current modularist attempt to reduce the role attributed to 
horizontal faculties of intelligence operating across all content 
domains and to isolate the existence of vertical faculties each 
of which would process information relating to one specific sense 
or subject, eg: music, or numbers. For a comparison of Fodor and 
Gall, see Gross (in Fodor, 1985). 
4. In what follows the letter C will be used to represent a 
hypothesis postulat~d by Gardner, his theory will be denoted M 
and the bodies of evidence in support of his hypotheses will be 
referred to as D and D. There is no significance attached to 
this change in ~y usua1 notation: it is purely introduced to 
aVoid confusion with the notation used to represent the 
bypotheses and evidence within Fodor's theory, which will be 
discussed in conjunction with the Gardnerian view. 
295 
5. However, to avoid confusion with those theories that ad t 
an attit~de of realism to~ards their post~lated ontology of ~~e 
.ind/bra1n, I shall refra1n from present1ng Gardner's argum t 
in the form of a semantically inconsistent tetrad. en 
6. This difficulty in Fodor's theory resembles those encountered 
in McGinn • ~ ~rgument~ for the existence of a deep hidden 
structure W1 th1n conSC10usness (see Chapter 3, subsection 3.2.4) . 
7. Gardner .ci t.:;s eig~t possible signs of an intelligence. These 
are: potent1al 1solat10n by brain damage; the existence of idiots 
savants, autistic people and prodigies; an identifiable core 
operation which is sensitive to certain inputs; a distinctive 
developmental history; a plausible evolutionary history· support 
from experimental psychological tests; support from pSY~hometric 
tests and susceptibility to encoding in a symbol system. 
S. For example, I shall be arguing below (sub-section 5.6) that 
it is only by virtue of jUdicious selection of his sources that 
Fodor creates the impression that his modular theory is well 
confirmed by a variety of evidence. A different bibliography 
might well secure a very different result. Consequently, Fodor's 
modular hypothesis like that of Gardner, may not be supported by 
independent evidence, and therefore the bootstrapping fails. 
9. It is also true that Fodor (1983) does not go on to develop 
this point further. However , explicit reference is made in Fodor 
(1985), p.4 to "the computational systems that deal with the 
perception/production of language" (emphasis mine) and to 
aphasias and agnosias, which may be located either in 
comprehension or in production. Shanon' s valuable comments 
concerning modularity in production in section 5 of his paper do 
not refute anything that Fodor has said, but rather flesh out a 
less adequate part of the Fodorean theory. Furthermore, many of 
the examples given there by Shanon, such as typing or playing a 
musical instrument, bear more of a striking resemblance to the 
modular intelligences described by Howard Gardner (1985) than 
they do to Fodorean input analyzers, since they involve a strong 
cultural influence upon a core processing mechanism. See also 
subsection 5.5.4, below. 
10. See also section 5.6 (below) for other criticisms of Fodor's 
theory. 
11. See also Achinstein's criticisms of the bootstrap argument 
in subsection 2.4.1 of Chapter 2, in which Achinstein claims that 
evidence can only support the constituent hypotheses of the 
bootstrap if we already accept the theory as true. 
12. Fodor does not always rule out the possibility o~ modular 
effects within the central cognitive processes wlt~ ,such 
aeverity. He writes that "one might consider the pOSSlbl~ity 
that Mother Nature, having tried peripheral m~dular mechan~sms 
and found them good then contrived via the nov1ce-expert shlft, 
to simulate some of the effects of modularity at the level of 
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central systems" (Fodor, 1985, p.39). However, I do not think 
~at this statement represents much of a concession by Fodor 
In the preceding paragraph, he is scathing about the limited 
sense in which the novice-expert shift might give rise to modular 
effects, since it is always open to us to exercise conscious 
control over tas~s usually co.nducted in an automatic, expert 
fashion. The nov1ce-expert Sh1ft thus falls foul of objections 
along the lines of those I levelled against Shanon's workbench 
theory in sUbsection 5.5.4 above. 
13. Compare Fodor's equally cavalier attitude towards criticisms 
of his Representational Theory of Mind, Chapter 4, subsection 
4.4.2. 
14. Analogous problems have been discussed with reference to 
Fodor I s theory of how overt languages can be learned and can 
develop from an innate and therefore rigid inner mental language 
in the previous chapter (subsections 4.4.2, 4.4.3). 
15. See also Shallice (1988, p. 273) for a suggestion that 
phenomena such as acalculia cast doubt upon Fodor's claim that 
the modular/non-modular distinction corresponds exactly with the 
boundary between the input systems and the central processing 
unit. 
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Chapter 6 ~M=e~t~a~p~h~y~s~i~c~a~l~~r~e~a~l~i~s~m~~ian __ ~c~o~-~e~v~o~l~u~tt!iQo~n~a~r~y 
theories of the mind/brain! 
6.0 Introduction 
In section A, I established that the difficulties of 
metaphysical realism can only be avoided by a bootstrappinq 
argument if there is a satisfactory relationship between 
the hypotheses contained within a theory and the evidence 
that is intended to support them (see Chapter 2, 
sUbsections 2.4, 2.4.1). It is not enough to cite evidence 
that is merely compatible with the hypotheses that we wish 
to confirm true relative to the overall theory; we must 
also ensure that this evidence is properly explained by the 
hypotheses under scrutiny. Moreover, we saw that 
circularity can only be avoided if the bodies of evidence 
used to support each hypothesis are arrived at by 
independent paths. 
I also argued in section A that philosophers and scientists 
who are breaking new ground in their attempts to formulate 
theories do not in fact make use of the formal criteria 
favoured by Glymour (1980) for deciding which theory is to 
be preferred in cases of empirical underdetermination. 
(See Chapter 2, sUbsections 2.4 - 2.5.2). Rather, they, 
like the detective discussed in Nordby (1989), "bootstrap 
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while barefoot". This means that, in the absence of any 
pre-existing overall guidelines concerning the relative 
importance of a variety of sources of evidence, they will 
make decisions about what counts as acceptable evidence in 
support of their hypotheses based upon their own 
preconceptions of what kind of theory they should be 
looking for. 
Thus far in section B, I have demonstrated that the issue 
of realism should be regarded as of the same importance in 
the study of the mind/brain as it is in other branches of 
philosophy and science (Introduction to section B, 
sUbsection B2). This is acknowledged on a superficial 
level by both of the philosophers whose arguments I have 
examined in detail in Chapters 3 - 5. McGinn and Fodor pay 
lip service to the ideals of scientific realism and urge 
the view that their own theories have been constructed 
using only evidence that is both testable and supportive of 
their hypotheses. However, I have contended that their use 
of the bootstrap strategy is flawed, since the bodies of 
evidence upon which they rely are clearly inadequate for 
the tasks that they are intended to perform. As a result, 
their theories may be reconstructed in the form of 
semantically inconsistent tetrads which correspond to that 
created by my reconstruction of the traditional veil-of-
perception issue in Chapter 1 (subsection 1.2.4). Semantic 
inconsistency is a key characteristic of metaphysical 
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realism (see Chapter 1, subsection 1.2.4, and Chapter 2, 
subsection 2.1). 
I have suggested that the elements of metaphysical realism 
within McGinn's theory of the structure of consciousness 
and in the Fodorean Representational Theory of Mind derive 
in the main from poor conceptual analysis. However, to the 
extent that they attempt to prop up their philosophical 
arguments with piecemeal evidence from neurophysiology and 
psychology, their efforts to construct a theory by 
bootstrapping also suffer from the complications inherent 
in the task of combining evidence from a variety of sources 
in the absence of any established criteria as to how this 
should be done. 
It might be imagined that the recent trend of investigating 
the workings of the mind/brain by means of a combination of 
philosophical argument and scientific activity comprising 
both computational and neurophysiological research (the so-
called co-evolutionary approach) would have resulted in the 
development of a bootstrapping methodology capable of 
avoiding these problems of evidence and realism. 
However, we have already seen in Chapter 5 that, although 
all the contributors to the modularity debate made 
reference to neurophysiological data to bolster their 
conceptual arguments, this did not help to resolve their 
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dispute since I was still able to argue that their theories 
were underdetermined with respect to this evidence (s ee, 
for example, Chapter 5, sUbsection 5.4, in which Fodor's 
theory is compared with that of Gardner). Of course, it is 
perfectly possible that the problems that I have isolated 
in the treatment of neurophysiological data by this 
particular group of theorists are simply a result of a poor' 
understanding on their part of what is required for 
evidence to support a theory. Others may have succeeded in 
producing a successful bootstrap methodology which is 
capable of the successful integration of philosophical 
arguments with information derived from neurological study 
of the mind/brain, and which may also allow for the 
incorporation of data obtained from additional scientific 
enterprises such as computational research and 
psychological experiments. 
This chapter has two main purposes. Firstly, I intend to 
establish that the failure to develop such a methodology is 
not confined to the modularity theorists, by examining the 
bootstrap arguments of two further leading exponents of the 
co-evolutionary approach, David Marr and Patricia Smith 
Churchland2 • 
Secondly, I shall argue that, although the treatment of the 
evidence by co-evolutionary theorists of the mind/brain is 
undoubtedly haphazard and frequently biased in favour of 
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their own preferred hypotheses, this situation is a natural 
consequence of the very novelty of the study of the 
mind/brain using a plethora of different disciplines, each 
with their own criteria for testability and satisfactory 
evidence. This means that the diff icul ties of 
bootstrapping whilst barefoot are as integral to the co-
evolutionary approach to the mind/brain problem as they are 
to the task of solving serial killings as described in 
Nordby (1989). 
The discussion of Churchland's work in the second half of 
this chapter will also sustain my subsidiary claim that 
Churchland is quick to notice the need for hypotheses to be 
supported by satisfactory evidence when she is criticising 
theories of the mind/brain put forward by others, but slow 
to realise the implications of these issues when developing 
her own bootstrap argument. This deficit in her method 
greatly weakens her assertion that her co-evolutionary 
approach to the mind/brain is better supported by the 
available evidence than the Fodorean sentential paradigm. 
This point will be discussed at length in the second half 
of this chapter. I begin with an examination of Marr' s 
theory of vision. Marr is important not only for his 
contribution to our understanding of the process of vision, 
but also for his methodological arguments detailing the 
need to view the mind/brain as an information processor. 
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6.1 Marr and metaphysical realism 
6.1.1 Marris theory in outline 
Marr conceives of vision in very much the same terNs as 
Aristotle did. He comments that 
"vision is the process of discovering from lmages 
what is present in the world, and where it is" 
(Marr, 1982a, p. 3, his italics). 
Marr proposes a bifurcated study of vision. We must, as 
the above quotation indicates, regard vision as a kind of 
information-processing, but it is also imperative to 
investigate the nature of the system of internal 
representations that is a prerequisite of any information-
processing3 • As we noted in the Introduction to Section B 
(subsection B3), each species will employ a different 
representational system capable of 
information most vital to its survival. 
emphasising the 
This might lead us to expect a heavy emphasis upon 
neurological details within Marris theory. Surprisingly, 
however, Marr warns against excessive preoccupation ~ith 
the investigation of neural activity on the grounds that 
303 
"neurophysiology and psychophysics have as their 
business to describe the behavior of cells or of 
subjects but not to explain such behavior" (ibid, 
p. 15). 
6. 1 . 1 
Although Marr concentrates upon vision in his own work, he 
regards his methodology as the correct approach for 
exploring any aspect of mind/brain function. The 
fundamental tenet of this methodology 1S that no 
explanation can ever be complete if it does not include a 
consideration of both what task is being carried out by a 
process or system and why it is being carried out (ibid, p. 
22) • Marr has christened this part of an explanation the 
computational theory4, but it is really the main hypothesis 
within a larger theory of how we should tackle the problems 
inherent in trying to understand the mind/brain, and 
specifically, the visual processs . 
Marr not only believes that this Computational level of 
explanation is an essential element of any investigation 
into the workings of the mind/brain, he also thinks that it 
must form our starting point. Any explanation that 
proceeds too hastily to draw conclusions from research into 
computer modelling of mind/brain processes or from 
neurophysiological data runs the risk of formulating 
misguided hypotheses. The reason for the Computational 
element within Marr's theory is that 
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U[t]here must exist an additional level of 
understanding at which the character of the 
information-processing tasks carried out during 
perception are analyzed and understood in a way 
that is independent of the particular mechanisms 
and structures that implement them ln our 
heads .... Such analysis does not usurp an 
understanding at the other levels - of neurons or 
of computer programs but it is a necessary 
complement to them, since without it there can be 
no real understanding of the function of all 
those neurons" (ibid, p. 19). 
6. 1. 1 
Once we have decided what information-processing process is 
being carried out, it is defined in abstract terms which 
indicate the precise manner in which one set of data is 
mapped onto another and the constraints within which this 
must be carried out (ibid, pp. 23-4)6. Only then may we 
proceed to an examination of the issues that relate to the 
second and third levels of explanation. 
Marr's second level of explanation requires the selection 
of appropriate representations for the input and output of 
our brain activity and of an algorithm for the 
transformation of the informational content of the input 
into the informational content of the output. These 
selections may well be interdependent according to Marr; 
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algorithms may only be practical glven certain 
representational schemata for input and output. Both 
choice of representation and choice of algorithm are, of 
course, dictated by the constraints delineated at the 
first, more abstract level of explanation. other 
considerations may influence the choice of algorithm too, 
such as efficiency. 
Finally, Marr incorporates neurophysiological information 
into the third level of explanation involved in a study of 
the mind/brain. Levels two and three are interdependent ln 
the sense that the choice of algorithm may be dictated in 
part by the nature of the physical instantiation of the 
information-processing system as revealed by 
neurophysiological research. 
This means that although Marr subscribes to a broadly co-
evolutionary approach for the exploration of the 
mind/brain, believing that 
"the real power of the approach lies in the 
integration of all three levels of attack" (ibid, 
p. 330), 
he does not share Churchland's enthusiasm for incorporating 
neurological information into a theory of mind/brain 
function from its inception 7 • Rather, Marr is a top-down 
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logical, 
digitalized information-processing. Indeed, he would agree 
with those whom Church land characterises as "purists of the 
top-down persuasion" that 
"the cardinal article of faith is that first you 
figure out what the mind-brain does, and 
secondarily you find out how it might implement 
the functions described" (1986a, p.419). 
I shall now give a very brief summary of the maln features 
of Marr's theory of vision. It should, of course, be borne 
in mind that the theory is actually far more complicated 
than it will appear in this description, but none of my 
remarks about the success of Marr's bootstrap strategy will 
hinge upon the details that have been omitted8 . 
The starting point of Marris explanation of VlSlon lS, as 
we would expect, a general Computational hypothesis which 
describes the key stages of visual information-processing 
in terms of the tasks that they perform. The first stage 
of vision is the creation of the primal sketch from the 
retinal image to reveal important features of the two-
dimensional image which, when combined according to 
particular rules, may indicate the positions of edges of 
objects in the external world. Secondly, the primal sketch 
lS transformed into a 2\ dimensional sketch, which, 
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although still viewer- rather than object-centred, yields 
further information about the position and direction of 
surfaces. Here, the constraints formulated at the 
Computational level are of paramount importance, since the 
information contained in primal sketches 1.S frequently 
compatible with more than one 2~-D sketch. If there were 
no constraints upon the possible interpretations of this 
information, then our visual system would not be able to 
cope with such instances of empirical underdetermination. 
Finally, it 1.S important f or the v 1. ewer to have 
representations of the world that may be used for purposes 
of object recognition. This results in a 3-D model 
representation with the task of describing 
"shapes and their spatial organization in an 
object-centered coordinate frame, using a modular 
hierarchical representation that includes 
volumetric primitives (i.e., primitives that 
represent the volume of space that a shape 
occupies) as well as surface primitives" (ibid, 
p. 37). 
. 
These abstract characterisations of the three maJor stages 
of visual processing constitute what Kitcher (1988, p. 5) 
terms Marr' s global computational hypothesis of vision. 
Marr also postulates several local Computational theories 
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about the visual process, each of which delineates the 
contribution of a particular subprocess towards one of the 
three stages outlined above (Kitcher, 1988, p. 8). A local 
Computational hypothesis will attempt to identify the 
constraints that must operate to avoid empirical 
underdetermination of the output of the given subprocess by 
the input, by first assuming values for inputs and outputs, 
and then providing a mathematical confirmation that unique 
outputs are indeed derived for each input and the 
constraints postulated. Only then can we tackle the 
questions of algorithms and suitable representations for 
neurophysiological instantiation. 
6.1.2 The bootstrap strategy within Marris theory 
It should be clear from the prev10us sUbsection that Marr 
is engaged in two main tasks. Firstly, he is concerned to 
develop a paradigm methodology for the investigation of all 
aspects of mind/brain function. Secondly, he argues for a 
specific theory of vision, which 1S derived from the 
rigorous application of the general methodological approach 
that he endorses. Marr sometimes runs these two strands of 
his work together in a rather confusing manner, but it 1S 
clear from much of the argument in the introductory chapter 
of Marr (1982a, see especially pp. 24-29) that Marr regards 
his discussion as relevant to the study of all information-
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processing devices. For example, Marr declares that there 
are 
"different levels at which an information-
processing device must be understood before one 
can be said to have understood it completely" 
(ibid, p. 24). 
Consequently, it is possible to discern more than one use 
of the bootstrap strategy within Marris writings. within 
Marris overall theory of information-processing within the 
mind/brain, T, Marris first hypothesis (Al) is the general 
Computational hypothesis that the best way to understand 
the processes and representations within the mind/brain 1S 
to use the three levels of explanation described 1n 
sUbsection 6.1.1 above, starting with an abstract, 
mathematically rigorous characterizations both of the task 
performed by the process or representation and of the 
constraints operating in the world outside the mind/brain 
which facilitate this performance. 
Marr is emphatic that this general methodological principle 
is the only possible way of obtaining an satisfactory 
explanation. He argues that prev10us attempts to 
understand the workings of the mind/brain have failed 
precisely because they did not incorporate such a rigorous, 
highly abstract description of what tasks are being carried 
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out. 
6. 1. 2 
No amount of computer modelling can adequately 
demonstrate that the same mechanism is actually employed by 
the mind/brain. Marr claims that 
"the critical point is that understanding 
computers is different from understanding 
computations. To understand a computer, one has 
to study that computer. To understand an 
information-processing task, one has to study 
that information-processing task. To understand 
fully a particular machine carrying out a 
particular information-processing task, one has 
to do both things. 
(ibid, p. 5). 
Neither alone will suffice" 
Nor can we really learn how a task 1S being carried out 
simply by isolating the neurons responsible (see above, 
sUbsection 6.1.1). Research projects on computer 
programming or on neuronal function cannot, either 
severally or together, yield all the information necessary 
for a full understanding of the processes and 
representations at work but, when guided by a Computational 
description of the tasks under scrutiny, they furnish the 
student with vital additional perspectives on the issues. 
We may term these considerations MarrIs body of evidence 8 1 , 
which he regards as support for his general hypothesis A1 • 
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In the light of these considerations, Marr argues that we 
should tackle the specific question of vision using the 
methodology outlined in hypothesis Al . Here we see that 
Marr, like Fodor and McGinn (see Chapter 3, sUbsection 
3.2.2, and Chapter 4, sUbsection 4.2.2) makes use of the 
bootstrap argument to infer a specific hypothesis which is 
founded upon the same evidence as the general hypothesis. 
Let us call the entire issue of vision Marr' s second 
hypothesis, A2 • 
It is here that the situation becomes complex. Marr relies 
upon evidence that his treatment of vision lS successful in 
order to provide further confirmation of his initial 
general methodological Computational hypothesis (A l ). Let 
us call this required body of evidence B2 • Clearly, B2 must 
contain strong indications that Marr' s handling of the 
question of vision is not only compatible with what we 
already know about vision, but is a better explanation of 
the phenomenon than any alternatives which do not make use 
of his Computational methodology. That is to say, as we 
would expect, we must seek the required evidence B2 by 
evaluating the hypothesis A2 . 
However, Marris account of vision lS constructed uSlng a 
second bootstrapping argument, very similar to the first. 
This is recognized by Kitcher who remarks that 
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.. [t]he global and local Computational theories 
constrain each other - here "constrain" in the 
sense of preventing a theory from being wild 
speculation. The global theory describes the 
large stages, the local theories explain how 
those l~e Computations are carried out, and the 
two levels must fit together. So the local 
computational theories are constrained from 
above, and they are constrained from below" 
(Kitcher, 1988, p. 21). 
6.1.2 
Kitcher thinks that the use of such a bootstrap strategy 
ensures that the overall theory of vision is testable. 
This view will be discussed below (subsection 6.1.3, part 
B) • 
Indeed, A2 is not only the second hypothesis of the 
bootstrap argument relative to Marris general theory, T, of 
information-processing within the mind/brain, but is also 
Marr's specific theory of vision. Relative to this theory 
then, Marr postulates further hypotheses. The first, VI' 
is the general Computational hypothesis that the entire 
question of vision must be approached uSing the three 
levels of explanation outlined in the previous subsection, 
beginning with an rlgorous abstract characterization in 
mathematical terms of the tasks performed by each of the 
three key stages within the visual process and the 
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constraints at work . ln the world outside the perceiver 
which make those tasks possible. Moreover, Marr holds that 
vision is modular, that is to say, it is made up of a 
number of subprocesses, each of which can be studied 
independently. 
We saw earlier that Marr holds that a comprehensive 
understanding of any information-processing device 
necessarily involves explanation at the three different 
levels described in the previous section. I commented that 
he arrived at this view as a result of his realization that 
explanations which failed to exploit the idea that the 
mind/brain is used for information processlng. Similarly, 
Marr chooses to defend V1 , his corresponding general 
hypothesis about how we should approach the study of 
vision, by reference to earlier accounts which have failed 
to understand that vision is simply a kind of information-
processing. For example, Marr comments that, prior to his 
treatment of the problem, nobody had succeeded ln 
understanding stereopsis because 
U[n]one of them formulated the computational 
problem precisely at the top level, and almost 
all the proposed networks actually computed the 
wrong thing ..... people became so entranced by the 
mechanisms for doing something that they 
erroneously thought they understood it well 
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enough to build machinery for it" (Marr, 1982a, 
p. 336). 
6. 1. 2 
Marr analyses Gibson's failure to provide a fully 
satisfactory account of the visual process in the same way. 
He comments that 
"although some aspects of [Gibson's] thinking 
were on the right lines, he did not understand 
properly what information processing was, which 
led him to seriously underestimate the complexity 
of the information-processing problems involved 
in vision and the consequent subtlety that 1S 
necessary in approaching them" (ibid, p. 29). 
Moreover, Marr is adamant that any satisfactory theory of 
vision must explain why our perceptions of the external 
world display an overwhelming tendency to be accurate. 
This is his justification for including the calculation of 
constraints upon the world as part of the explanatory 
device described in VI. Marr writes that 
n[t]he critical act in formulating computational 
theories for such processes is the discovery of 
valid constraints on the way the world behaves 
that provide sufficient additional information to 
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allow recovery of the desired characteristic [of 
a scene from images of itJ" (ibid, p. 330). 
6. 1.2 
Marr also cites evidence in support of his claim that 
vision may be thought of in terms of a number of modular 
subprocesses. The computer- generated work of Bela Julesz 
on stereopsis yields this conclusion, 
further support to the strategy 
as well as lending 
of beginning the 
investigation of any subprocess at the Computational level. 
Marr concludes that 
"observations like Bela Julesz' s are extremely 
valuable because they enable us to formulate 
clear computational questions that we know must 
have answers because the human visual system can 
carry out the task in question" (ibid, p. 102). 
This also illustrates the importance of an integrated 
approach to the issue of vision. The computer generations 
of Julesz suggest that it is possible to find answers to 
the questions stimulated by viewing vision as 
information-processing. 
These various considerations are regarded by Marr as 
evidence in support of his initial general hypothesis abou~ 
how we should study vision (VI). They will be referred to 
collectively in what follows as E1 · 
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Marr's next step is to argue that, since vision 1S modular, 
we can apply the strategy of explanation on three levels to 
each of the subprocesses which contribute towards the 
construction of one or another of the three key stages of 
vision outlined above in sUbsection 6.1.1, the primal 
sketch, the 2\-D sketch and the 3-D sketch. This means 
that he bootstraps from VII supported by El , to the possible 
construction of a whole host of specific hypotheses about 
the nature of a variety of visual subprocesses, such as 
stereopsis, directional selectivity, and apparent motion. 
These hypotheses are the local Computational hypotheses 
referred to by Kitcher (1988, p. 8), and each consists in 
a three-level account of a particular subprocess. 
notes that 
"general observations can often lead to the 
formulation of a particular process or 
representational theory, specific examples of 
which can be programmed or subjected to detailed 
psychophysical testing. Once we have sufficient 
confidence in the correctness of the process or 
representation at this level, we can inquire 
about its detailed implementation, which involves 
the ultimate and very difficult problems of 
neurophysiology and neuroanatomy" (ibid, p. 331). 
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I shall refer to these accounts collectively as hypothesis 
V2 . It will not be necessary to describe these accounts in 
great detail at this stage9 • Marr is relying upon the 
success of these Computational accounts of the visual 
subprocesses to provide him with a body of favourable 
evidence E2 , so that further confirmation is lent to VI. 
Such confirmation would amount to a vindication of Marr's 
preferred methodology for the study of vision. 
The successful construction of a theory of vision through 
the use of the bootstrap strategy is thought by Marr to 
provide confirmation ln its turn for his original 
hypothesis that the processes and representations within 
the mind/brain should be analyzed as information-
processors. As noted above, Marr believes that an 
evaluation of his theory of vision (A2 ) will yield evidence 
that his general methodological approach as outlined ln 
hypothesis Al has been vindicated. The body of evidence 8 2 
within his initial, more general bootstrap argument 
consists of the success of MarrIs use of his three-tiered 
system of explanation to produce a more comprehensive study 
of vision than rival theories, and one which is compatible 
wi th other facts that we have about the nature of the 
mind/brain. 
The next sUbsection comprises an evaluation of M3rr's use 
of the bootstrap strategy to see if it can sustain his t~o 
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main claims: firstly I that his three-tiered approach to 
understanding the mind/brain is the optimum method for 
study in this field, and secondly, that this method has 
afforded a satisfactory and comprehensive theory of vision. 
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6.1.3 criticism of Marr's bootstrap strategy 
A - Introduction 
Before I discuss the flaws within Marris bootstrap 
strategy, it is worth reiterating the vital criteria that 
Marr's argument must satisfy if it is to succeed in 
providing us with the outline of a methodology which will 
enable us to explain not only the processes involved in 
vision, but also other processes within the mind/brain. 
Like any other explanation, Marris account must supply us 
with new information in a testable format. If parts of his 
theory are not testable, then he is vulnerable to the 
criticism that he is resting his hypotheses upon 
unwarranted assumptions, with the result that his argument 
cannot be said to satisfy the demands of scientific realism 
as described in Chapter 2 (subsection 2.2.2). This would 
clearly be disastrous for Marr, who is a realist about the 
existence of representations and processes within the 
mind/brain10 • 
Although Marr does make some attempts to seek confirmation 
of the accuracy of his abstract task descriptions of visual 
processes and representations using computer simulations 
and neurophysiological research, his bootstrapping is 
rather lopsided, since at every stage in his argument he 
concentrates his discussion upon the issues raised by the 
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use of the information-processing concept11. 
implementation suffers particularly from 
The neuronal 
neglect. His 
priorities are clearly illustrated ln the following excerpt 
from his treatment of stereopsis. Marr declares that 
"A complete neural implementation of the second 
stereo matching algorithm just described has not 
yet been formulated. One reason is that such a 
formulation was not worth the considerable work 
involved until we were reasonably certain from 
implementation studies and psychophysics that the 
algori thm works and is roughly correct" (ibid, p. 
152, my italics). 
Although Marr sometimes demonstrates his awareness of the 
need to provide satisfactory evidence for his arguments 
wherever possible (see, for example, Marr, 1982a, p. 111), 
this is not necessarily enough. In Chapter 4 we noted a 
clear discrepancy between Fodor's ostensible 
acknowledgement of the onus upon him to provide reliable, 
testable sources of evidence in support of his sentential 
view of the mind/brain, and his actual failure to do so 
(see Chapter 4, sUbsections 4.3, 4.4). 
A detailed examination of Marr's local Computational 
accounts of the subprocesses involved in the construction 
of the three key representational stages within vision is 
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not needed here. This is partly because many of the 
criticisms of the bootstrap strategy relate to the general 
methodology used, rather than to the nature of the 
individual subprocesses. Moreover, detailed criticisms of 
Marr I s views by others have already revealed potential 
difficulties within his accounts of these subprocesses (see 
Kitcher, 1988 for a useful list of references). It will 
become clear in the following two parts of this sUbsection 
that such potential difficulties are enough to cast doubt 
upon the strength of Marr I s evidence in support of his 
strategy. 
Further, very similar hypotheses and evidence are relied 
upon at both levels of Marris bootstrapping strategy, both 
levels consisting in an initial general methodological 
hypothesis licensing the extension of the three-level 
approach to the study of processes and representations to 
deal with more specific issues. This initial hypothesis 1S 
then confirmed to the degree that the approach succeeds 1n 
throwing more light on these issues. As a result of this 
similarity, objections made against the methodology within 
one level of the bootstrapping argument will cast doubt 
upon the validity of the entire approach. 
There are two maln lines of criticism of the strategy. The 
first relates to MarrIs postulation of constraints upon the 
nature of the externa 1 wor ld as necessary to so 1 ve the 
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difficulties created by empirical underdeter~ination. The 
second is concerned with the cogency of a methodology ~hich 
takes information-processing as a starting-point for the 
study of the mind/brain, its processes and its 
representations. 
I shall consider each of these criticisms ln turn. 
B The status of constraints wi thin Marr' s bootstrap 
argument 
Marr is aware that vision should provide us with a Vlew of 
the external world that lS, by and large, accurate. 
However, this is sometimes made difficult by the 
possibility of gross empirical underdetermination when 
information is being mapped from one representational stage 
to another. For example, the process of stereopsis, which 
is used to help extract information about surfaces from the 
primal sketch, exhibits exactly this problem. Similar 
difficulties arise in the final mapping of the information 
contained in a viewer-centred 2~-D sketch onto an object-
centred 3-D model (see Marr, 1982a, pp. 317-8). 
constraints in the external world must therefore be 
identified, so that the number of possible mappings is 
reduced to one. Marr notes that in the case of stereopsis 
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" [t] he critical step 1.S the discovery of 
additional constraints on the process that are 
imposed naturally and that limit the result 
sufficiently to allow a unique solution" (ibid, 
p.104). 
6.1.3 
Indeed, the use of constraints is an integral part of the 
top level of Marr' s Computational methodology. However, 
these constraints are based upon a priori judgements rather 
than upon empirical data. Marr admits this 1.n his 
discussion of silhouettes. He notes that 
"there must be some a priori [sic] assumptions 1.n 
the way we interpret silhouettes that allow us to 
infer a shape from an outline" (ibid, p. 219). 
It is this aspect of Marr's approach that inspires Boden's 
comparison of his theory of vision to Kant's transcendental 
deduction. Like Kant, Marr is claiming that we have some 
kind of predisposition to see the world 1.n a certain way. 
Boden writes that Marr's constraints 
"make universal claims about what the world must 
be like, and what see-ers must be like, if vision 
1.S to be possible" (Boden, 1989, p.41). 
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It is the presence of these a priori elements within Marr's 
bootstrapping arguments which renders Marr susceptible to 
the same kinds of difficulties relating to evidence and 
realism as those that were levelled at the theories of 
McGinn, Fodor and the modularity theorists earlier in 
Section B. Indeed, Morgan draws an explicit comparison by 
commenting that 
"[t]his is just the sort of argument that Fodor 
and other language nativists use to assert that 
a child could never learn the meaning of even 
common nouns, unless they made strong assumptions 
about the nature of obj ects, their permanence, 
and so on" (Morgan, 1984, p. 160). 
Before I go on to demonstrate that Marr's argument about 
the nature of constraints may be reconstructed as a 
semantically inconsistent tetrad, it is worth developing 
the criticism a little more. 
Kitcher (1988, p. 20) comments that fault has been found by 
other critics of Marr's work (such as Todd, see Kitcher, 
1988, p. 20) in the nature of the particular constraints 
used to develop the local computational accounts of visual 
• 12' th' M ' subprocesses that make up hypothes~s V2 w~ ~n arr s 
theory of vision. These criticisms are not in themselves 
important for my argument: I am interested solely in the 
325 
6.1.3 
fact that they raise the possibility that MarrIs selection 
of these particular constraints might be wrong, and the 
consequences of this error for the remainder of the 
bootstrap theory. 
since the constraints operating upon the external world 
help to define the information-processing task being 
carried out by a particular subprocess, mistakes at this 
level could well result in the adoption of the wrong 
algorithm and the failure of many of the accounts within V2 • 
This would result in the undermining of the body of 
evidence E2 in support of V 2' and depr i ve Marr of the 
additional confirmation of his general hypothesis (VI)' 
which advocates the use of a three-tiered approach to the 
study of vision. Kitcher is quick to see these 
implications too, and argues that 
n[w]hether this result had further ramifications 
would depend on 'what the correct theories (or 
theory) of the process look (s) like. If they 
still had constraints of some sort, then it would 
seem that Marr was right about the form of a 
theory of vision, but wrong in detail. On the 
other hand, we might figure out that the rigidity 
constraint is wrong, and still have no very good 
idea about how the process does work" (Kitcher, 
1988, p. 20-21). 
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However, Kitcher has failed to see an important difficulty 
with her analysis of the situation. She is right to argue 
from the specific points raised by Marris critics to the 
need for a re-evaluation of Marr I s general theory, but 
there is a more fundamental problem. For, if we are to 
take Marr at face value, the constraints governing the 
development of our explanation of visual subprocesses are 
not arrived at via a process of experiments and testing, 
but via a consideration of a priori notions about what the 
world must be like for vision to be possible at all. This 
means that they cannot be rejected by experimental evidence 
(and are thereby rendered immune from the arguments put 
forward by critics like Todd). The only way to criticize 
Marr's view is to argue that he 1S simply mistaken about 
the nature of the physical laws which constrain how the 
external world must appear to us and to all other creatures 
with the capacity for vision. However, this does not mean 
that there are no constraints at all, merely that they are 
not the ones that Marr first thought that they were. Since 
we can neither prove nor refute Marris ideas by experiment, 
they are not testable. 
follows: 
Boden summarizes the situation as 
" [t] ranscendental deductions are not 1w:-:-.une to 
criticism, but they cannot be challenged 
experimentally. They are based on a 8rlorl 
327 
argument, not on isolated facts gained through 
particular experience ll (Boden, 1989, p. 42). 
6. 1. 3 
This places Marr at odds with the rest of science and lays 
him open to the accusation of metaphysical realism. It 1S 
easy to show that his argument about the constra ints on 
vision may be reconstructed as a semantically inconsistent 
tetrad which displays the same problems wi th respect to 
evidence as those underlying the assumptions of Fodor, 
McGinn and the modularity theorists. 
Marr holds the following four statements to be true: 
I there 1S an externa 1 rea 1 i ty over and above our 
perceptions 
II certain constraining features of this reality 
enable us to perceive it, hence they play a causal 
role in the construction of our perceptions 
III we can only ever have direct knowledge of our 
constrained perceptions; we can never have any 
knowledge of the external world except through our 
perceptions, which are themselves mediated by 
constraints, the nature of which we can neither 
confirm nor refute by experiment 
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IV our perceptions furnish us with an outlook on the 
world which is by and large accurate because of these 
constraints 
since we only ever have direct knowledge of our 
perceptions, which we take to be representations of an 
outer reality , but lack any source of evidence for the 
character of the constraints which dictate the nature of 
our perceptions (statement III), we can have no grounds for 
asserting that there are such constraints upon reality 
which make vision possible (statements I and II). Here, 
once again, is another reformulation of the ontological 
version of the veil-of-perception. 
Moreover, even if we simply assume that such constraints 
exist, we have no reason to believe that we will ever have 
any way of knowing what they are, and therefore no reason 
for believing that our perceptions of the external world 
are accurate (statement IV). This constitutes our weaker 
epistemological version of the veil-of-perception argument, 
as it applies to Marr. 
Boden claims that 
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"Marris 'transcendental deduction' 1S not 
absolutely a priori, since it takes for granted 
empirical knowledge of the world, as opposed to 
world-independent metaphysics" (ibid, p. 42). 
6.1.3 
It is for this reason that we may argue empirically that 
Marr has systematically misdescribed the nature of the 
world that we see. This weakens the accusation levelled 
against Marr that he falls into the strong version of the 
veil-of-perception trap. However, since we cannot test 
individual constraints by experiment, it is equally clear 
that Marr does suffer the difficulties associated with the 
weaker version of the veil-of-perception issue. We cannot 
know which postulated constraints really do exist and which 
do not. 
MarrIs theory of vision is therefore greatly weakened. If 
no evidence is forthcoming regarding the nature of the 
constraints he assumes in the formulation of his local 
Computational accounts of visual subprocesses (V2 ), then the 
evidence of their success (E2 ) is also rendered dubious, and 
no further confirmation of his general methodological 
approach to vision as described in hypothesis VI can be 
obtained. Indeed, this consequence accords with our 
intui tions, since, if it 1S not poss ible to test the 
assumptions that Marr makes about the external world, then 
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this difficulty is one inherent 1n his entire ~ethodology. 
Moreover, it was argued in sUbsection 6.1.2 that increased 
confidence in Marris general methodological principle (AI) 
was declared to depend upon its success in providing us 
with a satisfactory theory of vision. Clearly, the 
difficul ties noted with regard to Marr I s account of the 
constraints upon vision will therefore impinge upon his 
general theory of how the mind/brain should be studied. 
The existence of non-testable constraints is undesirable in 
the theory of any aspect of the mind/brain, and so Marris 
general hypothesis (Al) may be declared unsatisfactory 1n 
the light of the body of evidence 8 2 der i ved from an 
analysis of the success of the bootstrap argument as it 1S 
applied within the theory of vision. 
Thus far, we see that Marr I s problems wi th real ism and 
evidence arise as a result of poor conceptual argument, 
based upon assumptions about the nature of the external 
world that it is not possible to test. In Part C, I shall 
evince a second 
concentrates upon 
objection to 
the attempt 
Marris theory which 
to combine abstract, 
information-processing 
neurophysiological evidence. 
considerations with 
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C - The value of the information-processing approach to the 
mind/brain problem 
I shall commence this part of the discussion by seeing if 
it is possible to mitigate the criticisms of Marr evinced 
in Part B (above). 
Boden's criticisms of Marr certainly make him sound like an 
external or metaphysical realist. She writes, for example, 
that 
"Marr set himself the 'Kantian' task of 
specifying universal constraints, or ontological 
features, by virtue of which perception is made 
possible .... these constraints set limits on the 
nature of visual systems, and also on the nature 
of visible worlds" (ibid, p.38). 
This appears to be a clear-cut case of metaphysical 
realism. The external world has to take a certain form for 
vision to be possible. 
However, it 1S also possible to argue that Marr 1S an 
internal and not a metaphysical realist. Some evidence 
that Marris theory might be viewed along these lines occurs 
in Kitcher (1988) in a discussion of how Marris local and 
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global theories may constrain each other. 
that 
6. 1. 3 
Kitcher writes 
"We can get positive confirmation .... by finding 
data that are best explained by the existence of 
the hypothesized representation" (Kitcher, 1988, 
p. 21). 
This sounds like internal realism. Moreover, Marr 1.S 
certainly not unaware of the problems inherent in his use 
of constraints within his theory of vision. He intimates 
in the following passage that he may be prepared to treat 
them, not as a priori, but as revisable in the light of 
empirical evidence. Marr declares that 
"there is no hope of understanding the processes 
properly until some other means have been found 
for determining what 1.S safe to assume [sic] 
about the world and what is not, together with 
the related question of the reliability of the 
different kinds of information" (Marr, 1982a, p. 
266) • 
Perhaps Marr is saying that since we know V1.S1.on to be 
possible, we must form theories about the world that will 
explain this in the best possible way. 
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But here we encounter the second objection to Marris 
theory. Marr claims that "the best possible way" to study 
vision is, by adopting an approach that 1S, first and 
foremost, based upon viewing vision as an kind of 
information-processing and formulating a high level task 
description of what takes place within that part of the 
mind/brain that deals with vision. However, evolution 
cannot always be relied upon to solve problems uS1ng 
processes that are perfect from a design stance. For 
example, it might not be possible to integrate such 
processes with other processes within the system. Indeed, 
rough and ready solutions are often pioneered by nature. 
Morgan cites one example within Marris account of visual 
subprocesses which is not well supported by the available 
neurophysiological and psychophysical evidence. This 1S 
the formation of zero-crossings, distinctive indications of 
a change in intensity within a visual 1mage, which are 
useful in the mapping of information from the basic image 
onto a primal sketch. Morgan argues that 
" [e] legant though the ZC solution is, Marr offers 
no evidence for its correctness" (Morgan, 1984, 
p.162). 
Of course, it would be perfectly acceptable for Marr to 
regard such solutions as mere hypotheses which are then 
open to refutation by neurophysiological and 
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psychophysiological data, or even by information from 
research into computation. The problems ar ise from the 
suspicion that Marr overemphasises the importance of the 
information-processing approach at the cost of ignoring 
possible evidence that his theoretical accounts of the 
visual subprocesses are wrong. 
Marris methodology as 
Boden's characterizes 
"a combination of a priori argument and empirical 
study (including computer-modelling). His 
theoretical primitives for each representational 
stage were suggested in the I ight of abstract 
computational considerations, tested by being 
embodied in computer models, and also judged by 
psychological evidence" (Boden, 1988, p.60). 
This may well be an accurate description of Marris intended 
methodology, but if Morgan is correct, then Marr may well 
be guilty of placing too much weight upon the abstract, 
high level descriptions of the visual processes. 
Consequently, he runs the risk of producing incorrect local 
Computational accounts of what is actually going on within 
the mind/brain, with the result that, once agaln, he is 
unable to maintain his claim that the success of such 
accounts constitutes a sound body of evidence (E=) which 
yields further support for his general approach to vision 
as embodied in VI. 
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This criticism is supported by Kitcher, who comments that 
"[i]nsofar as Marr and his co-workers can devise 
experiments that reveal vision as an 'elegant 
contrivance', then the Computational approach of 
functional decomposition into optimally designed 
stages will seem attractive. If they are wrong 
in this very sUbstantial assumption, however, 
then the unified theory of vision that Marr 
dreamt of will be impossible. The passages from 
global Computational theories to local theories, 
and to algorithms, and to biological hardware 
will not be at all smooth, or perhaps even 
possible" (Kitcher, 1988, p. 23). 
This demonstrates that even if Marr can be shown to accept 
the position of a scientific realist with regard to the 
status of constraints upon the external world (at least 
some of the time), his problems are still not over. His 
decision to relegate the study of neurons to a relatively 
unimportant place in his theory may result in his rejection 
of nature's own solutions to the problems of vision. 13 
Instead, Marr may be advocating accounts which merely 
describe a possible solution, rather than explaining what 
is actually happening within the mind/brain. If this 
should turn out to be the case, then his methodology no 
more leads to an explanatory account of vision than do the 
neurophysiological theories that he was so quick to 
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criticise (see above, subsection 6.1.1). This deprives his 
bootstrap argument of its very motivation! 
Moreover, the failure of Marris three-tiered approach to 
vision to provide accurate explanations will also reduce 
the amount of confirmation sought by Marr for his general 
hypothesis (AI) that the mind/brain question should also be 
tackled using a three-tiered approach. The diff icul ties 
noted within the theory of vision conflict wi th Marr IS 
claim that the success of this theory will vindicate the 
use of the methodology to study other processes and 
representations within the mind/brain. 
Worse still, we noted above that the hypotheses within the 
first, more general bootstrap argument mirror those 
contained within the theory of vision. This means that the 
objection to the information-processing approach is equally 
pertinent here. If it 1S used to increase our 
understanding of other capacities within the mind/brain, we 
may still obtain accounts that conflict with the 
information that we have about the behaviour and 
conf iguration of neurons. This point is addressed by 
Churchland, who comments that 
"evolution proceeds by building on structures 
already in place; it cannot begin from scratch, 
even though considerations of optimal design 
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might favour this" (P.S. Churchland, 1988, p. 
396). 
6.1.3 
Andy Clark also supports my argument against over-
concentration upon the information-processing aspect of 
mind/brain function. He writes that if 
"evolution 'proceeds as a tinkerer, each step in 
the evolutionary chain exploits a net historical 
opportunity whose nature is determined by 
whatever materials happen to be available to 
adapt to a new requirement ••• This historical 
snowballing effect, combined with the need to 
achieve some workable total system at each 
modification ••• , often makes natural solutions 
rather opaque from a design-orientated 
perspective" (Clark, 1989, pp. 70-71).14 
It was noted in Chapter 2, subsection 2.5.1 that Glymour 
can be criticised for advocating the use of excessively 
abstract and formal criteria for" deciding which 
bootstrapping argument should be adopted in cases where the 
choice of theory is underdetermined by the evidence 
(Nordby," 1989). Nordby holds that there are some 
bootstrapping .scenarios in which such criteria -are 
inappropriate, :because there' is no overall guiding theory 
to determine either what should count as relevant evidence 
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or the relative importance of information from a variety of 
different sources (each with their own standards of 
evidence). In Chapter 2, subsections 2.5.2, 2.6, I argued 
that Nordby's argument should be extended to cover attempts 
to develop new theories of the mind/brain which incorporate 
the findings of neurophysiological data and psychology into 
philosophical argument. Here, I contend that Marr's 
excessive reliance upon the concept of information-
processing in the analysis of the mind/brain demonstrates 
similar deficiencies to those created by Glymour's reliance 
upon formal criteria. 
In Marr's view, previous studies of vision have failed to 
single out anyone account of visual processes from among 
many candidates on the grounds that it alone provides a 
comprehensive and correct explanation of these processes. 
This failure is, he argues, directly attributable to their 
neglect of the information-processing approach. This 
approach helps us to unify the information provided by 
neurophysiological research and by studies in computation 
into a rigorous explanation (Marr, 1982a, p. 19). Indeed, 
Marr's view amounts to the claim that the use of a three-
tiered Computational approach provides the guiding theory 
for resolving the difficulties created by the integration 
of evidence from a variety of different disciplines that 
are, I have argued, as prevalent in the philosophy of the 
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mind/brain as they are 1n detective work (see Chapter 2, 
sUbsection 2.5.2). 
However, it is clear that Marr has radically overestimated 
the power of his Computational approach. It is highly 
unlikely that evolution will furnish creatures with an 
elegant solution to the information-processing tasks that 
they have to address, yet Marris methodology is liable to 
over-emphasise abstract considerations that are more likely 
to suggest such elegant solutions than are the 
neurophysiological data that he relegates to a much later 
stage of theory construction. Indeed, Marris criterion 
for a satisfactory account of a visual subprocess 1S that 
it must begin with an abstract description of the 
information-processing task that the process 1S carry1ng 
out. This means that he automatically rules out accounts 
that do not set out from the same premises as incapable of 
providing a satisfactory explanation. It is likely that 
Marr is falling into precisely the trap outlined in Giere 
(1983) of incorporating constraints into our criteria for 
a sui table account so that only those accounts that he 
already finds acceptable will fulfil these criteria (see 
also my discussion of Giere, Chapter 2, sUbsection 2.5.2). 
This 1S another, more insidious way of rendering one IS 
theories systematically immune from refutation. 
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Like Glymourls formal criteria for theory selection, Marris 
approach is doomed to failure because it cannot adequately 
integrate data from a variety of empirical sources with 
more abstract considerations. We must decide in the 
absence of any guidelines which sources are most important. 
Marr has made a choice, but this choice is so clearly at 
odds with the empirical evidence available, that it must be 
rejected1S • 
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6. 1 . ~ 
summary of the lessons to be learned from Marris 
bootstrap methodology 
I have argued that, although Marr does adopt a co-
evolutionary approach to the study of the mind/brain, his 
use of a two-level bootstrap strategy to vindicate this 
approach fails because there is not enough evidence to 
support his hypotheses that the approach will succeed. 
Much of the plausibility of MarrIs theory is lost once it 
is seen that his use of the concept of information-
processing is doubly marred (no pun intended!). Firstly, 
I showed in the previous sUbsection (part B) that the 
constraints upon the external world postulated by Marr are 
not refutable by empirical evidence, with the result that 
Marr, like Fodor and McGinn, fails to satisfy scientific 
realism's requirement for testable evidence of the 
explanatory success of their hypotheses. 
Secondly, although Marr claims that his three-tiered 
approach to explanation is the only acceptable methodology 
for the study of the processes of the mind/brain, I have 
argued that this claim is unwarranted. In the first place, 
evolutionary considerations suggest that nature does not 
necessarily seek (and perhaps could not) the elegant 
solutions to information-processing problems that Marr' s 
methodology is liable to yield. Moreover, in making an 
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information-processing task description the essential and 
most important part of any explanation, Marr has simply 
eliminated theories that may be constructed in the future 16 
without reference to such a description from being 
considered as possible explanations, thus excluding a 
potential source of objections to his own Vlew. This 
renders his claim to have isolated the only possible 
methodology for the study of the mind/brain less testable 
than it might otherwise have been. Marr thus fails to 
resolve the difficulties associated with the integration of 
data from a variety of empirical sources into a 
philosophical account. 
Marr is therefore no more entitled to claim that he has 
provided us with a bootstrapping argument that is based 
upon well-tested evidence than is McGinn or Fodor, despite 
his overtly more scientific approach. Once more, we find 
that the use of the bootstrap strategy has not resulted 1n 
a satisfactory account of the mind/brain. MarrIs theory 1S 
blighted, because it incorporates unwarranted assumptions 
which render him vulnerable to the same objections as the 
metaphysical realists discussed in Chapter 2. 
I now turn to an examination of Churchland I s ability to 
deal with the very same issues of realism and evidence. 
6.2 Churchland's place 1n the debate 
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Patricia Smith Churchland is a very important figure in the 
recent history of the philosophy of mind. Her recent work 
in co-evolutionary theory has effectively controlled much 
of the post-1986 debate (following the pUblication of P.S. 
Churchland, 1986a). 
There are three central aspects to my discussion of the 
work of Patricia smith Churchland17 • Firstly, it 1S 
important to show that, despite the fact that her 
interpretation of the need for the co-evolution of 
philosophy, psychology and neuroscience in formulating 
theories of the mind/brain is radically different from that 
of Marr (see below, sUbsection 6.2.1), this does not 
prevent her from falling into the traps associated with 
metaphysical realism. A dispassionate consideration of 
Churchland's interpretation of evidence obtained from a 
variety of different disciplines, including psychology and 
neuroscience (subsection 6.2.3, below), will indicate that 
her inferences about the nature of the mind/brain, and 
about the methodology that we should use to learn about it, 
are frequently unwarranted. 
Secondly, Church land 's failings 1n this respect provide 
further confirmation for my argument that Nordby's account 
of the problems encountered when "bootstrapping while 
barefoot" (Nordby, 1989, p. 383) is readily extended to 
describe the difficulties involved in using the bootstrap 
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argument to develop co-evolutionary theories of ~ind/brain 
function. Here, as l.n detective work, there are no 
fundamental guidelines governing the relative importance of 
diverse sources of information, each of which have their 
own criteria for the evaluation of evidence. It will be 
demonstrated in the remainder of this chapter that although 
Churchland, like Marr, attempts to produce such guidelines, 
these guidelines derive much of their initial plausibility 
from Churchland's exclusion of those sources of evidence 
which cast doubt upon her interpretation of the data. She 
therefore fails to solve the problem of empirical 
underdetermination of theories by the evidence as it occurs 
within the study of the mind/brain. 
Finally, Churchland's neglect of some sources of evidence 
that tell against her theory of the mind/brain indicates 
that her use of the bootstrap argument is not significantly 
better than that of Fodor, which she criticises so roundly 
(see Chapter 4, sUbsections 4.4.2, 4.4.3). In fact, it has 
been argued that the imbalance in Churchland's argument is 
partly caused by her overestimation of the scope of her 
(rightly) critical attack upon the Fodorean sententia 1 
paradigm. 
In reality, there are some startling similarities between 
Churchland's work and that of Fodor. Both employ arguments 
which make unwarranted assumptions that have been 
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systematically shielded from potentially damaging 
criticisms, and both are therefore vulnerable to the charge 
that their views are more akin to the metaphysical realist 
than the scientific realist, despite their very vocal 
protestations to the contrary. 
I shall approach Churchland's bootstrapping argument in the 
same way that I dealt with Fodor's Representational Theory 
of Mind, and Marr's theory of vision. A short summary of 
Churchland's eliminative materialist position (subsection 
6.2.1) precedes a breakdown in SUbsection 6.2.2 of the 
bootstrap strategy that she employs. This will be followed 
by a criticism of the evidence that she employs at each 
. ) 18 stage of the argument (subsectlon 6.2.3 . I shall then 
demonstrate in subsection 6.2.4 that Churchland's co-
evolutionary theory of mind may be reconstructed in the 
form of a semantically inconsistent tetrad which resembles 
the one associated with the traditional veil-of-perception 
issue, before concluding the chapter with a review of the 
importance of the work of Marr and Churchland for my 
overall argument. 
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6.2.1 A brief outline of Churchland I s co-evolutionary 
theory of the mind/brain 
Like Marr, Churchland pronounces herself dissatisfied with 
the traditional isolation of the philosophy of mind, 
psychology and neuroscience. She believes that insular 
reflections on the part of the philosopher can only lead to 
conclusions that are completely divorced from reality. For 
example, she writes that 
" [f] or philosophers, an understanding of what 
progress has been made . 1n neurOSC1ence 1S 
essential to sustain and constrain theories about 
such things as how representations relate to the 
world" (P.S. Churchland, 1986a, p. 3). 
Conversely, the neuroscientist may spend many hours toiling 
at his laboratory bench in complete ignorance of the wider 
implications of the data that his experiments produce. 
Church land comments that 
"neuroscience needs phi losophy because ongo1ng 
research must have a synoptic vision within which 
the immediate research goals make sense. Such a 
synoptic vision, transcending disciplinary 
boundaries but informed by the relevant 
disciplines, testing the integrity of the 
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governing paradigm and investigating 
alternatives, is philosophy" (ibid, p. 482). 
Thus far, it is unlikely that Marr would find anything 
disagreeable in Churchland's remarks, but it is clear that 
Churchland is prepared to accord a much greater 
significance to neuroscientific data in the actual shaping 
of a theory of the mind/brain. Recall that Marr relegates 
the examination of neuronal function to the final stages of 
his three-tiered top-down explanation of processes within 
the mind/brain. Churchland makes her opposing position 
clear in this passage: 
"We want to know how we actually see, plan, 
learn, and so forth. If we commit ourselves to 
purely top-down approaches, we deny oursel ves 
important constraints that would help narrow the 
search space. Di tto, of course, for purely 
bottom-up approaches" (P.S. Churchland, 1988, p. 
394) . 
Churchland disagrees with the distinction made by top-down 
theories of the mind/brain between structure and function. 
Whereas the top-down theorist contends that 
"at best, neuroscience can provide only a 
structural theory, as opposed to the functi2~al 
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theory sought; at most, it will give us the 
engineering minutiae as opposed to the design 
configurations we want" (P.S. Churchland, 1980b, 
p. 186), 
6.2.1 
Churchland argues that no such rigid divisions can be 
postulated since, for example, 
"[i]t is to the neural structure of the 
cerebellar cortex that we must look in order to 
determine more exactly what the cerebellum does 
and how it does what it does" (ibid, p. 205). 
Moreover, Churchland believes that it is good practice 
within the philosophy of science (and, indeed, within 
science itself) to aim for unified explanations of 
phenomena. This often results in the reduction of a very 
specific explanatory theoretical framework to another, more 
basic theory, so that the basic theory explains everything 
that was previously accounted for by the specific theory, 
and succeeds in explaining phenomena that this specific 
theory could not deal with, whilst also accounting for the 
failure of the specific theory. 
This may sometimes result in the simplification not only of 
explanations, but also of the ontologies that are thought 
to exist. It may be that a more basic theory will indicate 
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that the structures and entities postulated by the specific 
theory to account for a given phenomenon do not exist. 
Churchland cites the reduction of the laws of optics to the 
laws of electromagnetic theory as an example of such 
ontological simplification. Light simply 1S 
electromagnetic radiation, but until the end of the 
nineteenth century it had been thought that they were two 
different things (P.S. Churchland, 1986a, p. 280). 
In more radical cases, unity of explanation is achieved not 
by the reduction of one theory to another, but by the total 
elimination of the more specific theory, and the ontologies 
that it postulates. 
Churchland's co-evolutionary approach to understanding the 
mind/brain results in her adherence to a position known as 
eliminative materialism. The work of several key figures 
from the history of philosophy has had an influence upon 
the development of this view. For example I Churchland 
comments that it was Kant who first realised that Hume's 
remarks about the problems inherent in the traditional 
veil-of-perception issue could be extended to cover our 
knowledge of the mind/brain, so that 
"there is nothing epistemologically unique or 
sacrosanct about introspectively based beliefs; 
they are not on an entirely different footing 
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from beliefs about the outer world, and they have 
neither more nor less need for justification" 
(P.S. Churchland, 1986a, p. 248). 
6.2.1 
Moreover, Kant's followers developed a second Humean 
insight, namely, that the mind must be studied by empirical 
means (ibid, pp. 247-8). 
Ultimately, however, it was Feyerabend who suggested that 
Kant's negative hypothesis that our knowledge of our own 
minds is not direct, but mediated by our very concepts of 
mental and processes could be developed into the positive 
thesis that these concepts might themselves be revised in 
the light of scientific, empirical investigations of the 
mind/brain (ibid, p. 275). Thus two of Hume' s central 
tenets fused into a naturalistic basis for eliminative 
materialism. 
Briefly stated, eliminative materialism is the view that, 
since folk psychological theory19 provides us with a very 
inadequate explanation of our mental life, it should 
ul timately be revised into or even replaced by a more 
scientific psychology. The categories of this scientific 
psychology are envisaged to reduce smoothly to mirror those 
divisions that neuroscientific research has isolated within 
the brain (see P.S. Churchland, 1986a, p.396). Many 
objections to eliminative materialism concentrate their 
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attack upon the impossibility of achieving neat 
correlations between the functional categories of 
psychology and the structures wi thin the brain. Churchland 
counters that 
"from the reductionist viewpoint, this 
possibili ty does not look like an obstacle to 
reduction so much as it predicts a fragmentation 
and reconfiguration of the psychological 
categories" (ibid, p. 365). 
Churchland uses examples taken from neuroscientific 
research to support her view that our psychological 
theories should be developed in conjunction with results 
from the laboratory. I include a brief outline of one such 
example below, with the sole aim of indicating the way in 
which Churchland thinks that it casts doubt upon the 
established terminology of folk psychology and top-down 
theories of the mind/brain. 
Church land discusses the tensor network theory of 
Pellionisz and Llinas20 and its implications for her wider 
thesis of eliminative materialism(ibid, pp. 412-458). This 
is an attempt to explain the mechanics of sensorimotor 
control based on a computer model of the structure of the 
cerebellum of a frog. Eye-limb co-ordination is then 
understood in terms of a vector-to-vector transformation 
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between the co-ordinate system of neurons providing the 
visual input (the visual phase space) and the co-ordinate 
system of the neurons that occasion motor output (the motor 
phase space). Each phase space is represented in the brain 
in the form of a grid, such that when the vector 
transformation of the co-ordinates ln the visual phase 
. 
space 1S complete, a deformed map or grid of this phase 
space is superimposed upon the grid of the motor phase 
space. The grids are linked by short vertical fibres. 
When a certain point within the sensory phase space is 
stimulated, the corresponding point in the motor phase 
space (according to the vector transformation) is also 
stimulated and sends a signal to the motor fibres which 
control limb movement. Churchland argues that the theory 
is consistent with the structures to be found ln the 
central nervous system, since 
"many structures abide by a principle of 
topographic mapping, whereby neighborhood 
relations of cells at one periphery are preserved 
in the arrangement of cells at other locations in 
the projection system. If we think of the 
neurons at the sensory periphery as forming a 
receptor sheet, then deformed versions of that 
sheet are represented in a large number of eNS 
regions" (ibid, pp. 119-20). 
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Church land proceeds to argue that the tensor network theory 
suggests that our cognitive abilities may be based upon 
similar transformations between phase spaces, which 
themselves consist in representations that are definitely 
not sentential. Neuroscience, therefore, provides a way of 
countering Fodor's claim that representations must be 
sentential if computational processes exist within the' 
mind/brain (ibid, pp. 451-2).21 
I now turn to an examination of Churchland I s attitude 
towards bootstrapping and an analysis of her use of the 
strategy. 
6.2.2 Churchland and the bootstrap method 
A - Churchland I s awareness of the difficulties of the 
bootstrap method 
I noted at the start of my examination of Churchland' s 
criticisms of the Fodorean language of thought hypothesis 
in Chapter 4 (subsection 4.4. 1) that Churchland is not 
opposed to the use of the bootstrap strategy per see Her 
support for this method of constructing a theory of the 
mind/brain is equally apparent in her arguments for 
eliminative materialism. For example, she comments that 
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"what may happen is that neuroscience, initially 
making use of commonsense concepts, will make 
discoveries that transmogrify them. Neuroscience 
is able to bootstrap as any other science" (P.S. 
Churchland, 1980b, p. 193). 
6.2.2 
Moreover, Churchland refers to the use of the bootstra~ 
method in terminology reminiscent of the traditional veil-
of-perception issue. Folk psychological descriptions of 
our mental states and experiences may be caused by the 
structures within our mind/brains, but they are not an 
accurate reflection of the nature of these structures. We 
may conclude that Churchland shares Feyerabend's view that, 
just as we question the way that the external world appears 
to us, we should also question the way that our mind/brain 
appears to operate, lest we are equally misled here by 
appearances. Churchland remarks that this line of 
questioning may result in a situation in which 
"[p]rimitive theories give way to sophisticated 
theories, and as the latter become the common 
coin of everyday life, they may then acquire the 
status of common sense. A remarkable thing about 
the human brain is that it can use those 
primitive theories to bootstrap its way to ever 
more comprehensive and powerful theories - to 
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find the reality behind the appearances" (P.S. 
Churchland, 1986a, p. 265). 
6.2.2 
Further, there are favourable indications that Churchland 
understands the particular difficulties of bootstrapping 
within a new area of scientific activity, into which the 
results of many different disciplines are incorporated (see 
Chapter 2, sUbsection 2.5.2). 
For example, Churchland makes it abundantly clear that she 
is aware of the lack of an overall theory governing the co-
evolutionary development of psychology and neuroscience. 
How can our theories ever get off the ground unless we know 
what questions to ask, and how can we know what questions 
to ask in the absence of any theory? 
notes that 
Indeed, Churchland 
"[i]t may be that commonsense theory (folk 
psychology) is so misconceived, and its taxonomy 
so askew, that even the formulation of our 
questions thwarts our inquiry ... 
.... The difficulties here are such as to make one 
fear that we cannot get a theory until we have 
one that acquisi tion of theory, like 
acquisition of wealth or breeding stock, 1S 
limited to those who already have it .... " (ibid, 
pp. 152-3). 
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However, Churchland concludes that the situation here is no 
worse than in any other branch of science, and declares 
that 
"any successful science got to where it did by 
heroic and stubborn bootstrapping" (ibid, p. 153, 
my italics) 22. 
Nonetheless, a cursory glance at P.S. Churchland's 1986a 
would suggest that we have every cause to be optimistic 
that she is capable of avoiding the problems that we saw 
afflict the bootstrapping arguments of McGinn, Fodor, and 
most recently, Marr. In other words, it appears that 
Churchland is well aware of the need for caution when 
evincing conclusions based upon a consideration of a 
variety of disciplines, each with their own sources of 
evidence, and even with their own preconceptions concerning 
the correct usage of key terms, such as "representation" 
and "information". 
An example of this kind of preconception may be found in 
Hacker (1987). Hacker argues that attempts to construct 
theories of the brain using concepts such as 
"representation" are doomed to failure. The resulting 
theories will be meaningless, since they are 
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"born of the inadvertent misuse of language, 
misunderstandings of crucial concepts such as 
language, code, representation, understanding, 
and equivocation over, for example, information, 
sign, map" (Hacker, 1987, p. 491). 
6.2.2 
Churchland is scathing of such "category error" criticisms, 
believing that they serve only to restrict the development 
of psychological theory (P.S.Churchland, 1986a, p. 273). 
These criticisms are a legacy of conceptual analysis, and 
should be rejected on the grounds that 
"one person's category error is another person's 
deep theory about the nature of the universe, and 
what is deemed appropriate or inappropriate in 
the application of categories depends 
tremendously on one's empirical beliefs and one's 
theoretical imagination" (P.S. Churchland, 1986a, 
p.273). 
Those philosophers who persist in retaining our traditional 
use of all concepts in spite of any empirical suggestions 
that they may be appropriately extended to new domains are 
simply guilty of rendering their theories immune to 
empirical refutation. Such rearguard action can only 
result in lack of testability, and hence in the charge that 
these theories are little better than those postulated by 
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the traditional metaphysical realist (see Chapter 2 
sUbsection 2.2.1). A co-evolutionary methodology is able 
to avoid these difficulties, Churchland maintains, since 
one of its fundamental tenets is that 
"psychology and neuroscience should each be 
vulnerable to disconfirmation and revision at any 
level by the discoveries of the other ... " (ibid, 
p. 376). 
Neglect of this point can, in her view, only lead to 
disaster. She continues 
"[t]he isolation of psychology from the 
disconfirmatory reach of neuroscience would be a 
mistake, because in general it is such 
susceptibility that keeps a science honest" 
( ibid, p. 376). 
still more encouraging is Churchland's emphasis upon the 
problems endemic in the use of data from a branch of study 
that is still in its infancy. She stresses the dangers of 
making unwarranted inferences from a small amount of 
information, the risks of obtaining conflicting results 
from a variety of methodologies and, most importantly, 
warns against the temptation to cite a hypothesis out of 
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context, as if it were a proven truth (P.S. Churchland, 
1986a, pp. 147-8). 
However, one of the major messages of this section of my 
thesis is that an apparent awareness of the constraints 
upon the scientific realist with regard to the need for 
testable evidence from a variety of sources is frequently 
belied by the nature of the assumptions that are actually 
made within the bootstrapping arguments of the philosophers 
under scrutiny. In sUbsection 6.2.3, I shall demonstrate 
that this dichotomy between an ostensible grasp of the need 
for satisfactory evidence upon which to base inferences and 
an actual neglect of this very same issue is also present 
within Churchland's co-evolutionary theory of the 
mind/brain. Specifically, she demonstrates a failure to 
expose her general hypothesis concerning the inadequacy of 
folk psychology to the possibility of refutation, thereby 
rendering it systematically untestable. 
Churchland's use of the bootstrap strategy will be outlined 
in the second half of this sUbsection. 
B - The bootstrap in action - Churchland's co-evolutionary 
theory of the mind/brain 
Churchland, like the other theorists whose arguments I have 
examined, sees the potential of the bootstrap argument for 
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arguing from a general hypothesis to a more specific one, 
which will (when combined with additional evidence in its 
favour) eventually yield further confirmation of the 
general hypothesis. Her two major bodies of evidence are 
intended to disabuse opponents of two key misconceptions 
about the value of neuroscience for psychology. Churchland 
remarks that 
"[t]he complaint that neuroscience cannot in 
principle do justice to the generalizations of 
psychology errs in two directions: it is 
overconfident about the integrity of folk 
psychology and it underestimates the value of co-
evolution of theories" (ibid, p. 385). 
Within her theory of eliminative materialism, which I shall 
call EM, Churchland postulates a general hypotheses, H11 
which may be summarized as follows: 
Hl We are accustomed to categorizing and discussing our 
mental states and experiences using the terminology and 
rudimentary generalizations of folk psychology. However, 
the concepts of folk psychology are incapable of describing 
or explaining many of these states and experiences, and so 
the theory should be regarded only as a temporary starting-
point for the study of the mind/brain. It is ripe for 
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radical revision, and will perhaps be eliminated completely 
in time. 23 To this extent she agrees with Ryle (1949). 
Some of Churchland's sources of evidence in support of this 
general hypothesis have been mentioned briefly in the first 
half of this discussion. However, it will be instructive 
to list all the sources here, so that they can be readily 
identified in the course of the critical examination of the 
bootstrap argument in subsection 6.2.3 below. These 
sources, which I shall refer to collectively as El , are as 
follows: 
a) data accumulated from the study of brain-damaged 
subjects and those sUffering from mental illness indicate 
that the categories of folk psychology do not correspond to 
the underlying mechanisms within the brain. For example, 
Church land comments that 
"[t]he brain undoubtedly has a number of 
mechanisms for monitoring brain processes, and 
the folk psychological categories of 'awareness' 
and 'consciousness' indifferently lump together 
an assortment of the mechanisms" (ibid, p. 
321) .24 25 
b) folk psychology is a theory, and is therefore subject to 
correction or even elimination. Churchland declares that 
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"if we see that folk psychology has no right to 
epistemological privilege, and no immunity to 
revision and correction, then we can begin to see 
that its generalizations and categories can be 
corrected and improved upon" (ibid, p. 311) 
6.2.2 
c) folk psychology makes use of the sentential paradigm to 
characterize the representations and processes of the 
mind/brain. There are strong arguments against the 
plausibility of such a paradigm, including evolutionary 
considerations which suggest that it is unlikely that all 
representations within the mind/brain are sentential (see 
Chapter 4, sUbsections 4.4.2, 4.4.3 for details). 
d) an argument by analogy with other folk theories, such as 
folk physics or chemistry. Churchland comments that a 
discussion of the fate of folk physics yields 
"several points that will be useful in the 
discussion of reducing mental states to brain 
states: first, that in reductive developments one 
theory can displace and falsify another; second, 
that sometimes what is displaced and falsified is 
a folk theory within which those who hold it make 
their observations; third, that despite the self-
evidence of the folk theory, it can be 
demonstrated to be misconceived; and fourth, that 
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as a newly acquired theory becomes familiar, it 
can be as routinely and casually used as the old 
folk theory" (ibid, p. 291). 
6.2.2 
These are the main sources of evidence cited by Churchland 
in support of the possibility that folk psychology may be 
revised or eliminated26 • They are used, in conjunction 
with the general hypothesis itself (HI)' to derive her more 
specific hypothesis (H2 ), which comprises the methodological 
assertion that we should seek to replace folk psychology 
with a more scientific psychology. It is envisaged that 
the categories postulated by this scientific psychology 
will correlate neatly with those uncovered in the 
mind/brain by neuroscientif ic research. 
pronounces that 
Church land 
"[a]s neurobiology and neuropsychology probe the 
mechanics and functions of the brain, a 
reconfiguring of categories can be predicted" 
(ibid, p. 321-2). 
Like Marr, Churchland is perfectly prepared to countenance 
the use of the bootstrap strategy within individual co-
evolutionary research proj ects. For example, she notes 
with regard to the tensor network theory of Pellionisz and 
LlinAs (see above, subsection 6.2.1), that 
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"[als more is discovered about the neuronal 
basis, the basic hypothesis may be corrected and 
elaborated, and thus theory and experimental 
research co-evolve" (ibid, p. 437). 
6.2.2 
As we might expect,. Churchland derives her final body of 
evidence, E2 , from the success of specific attempts to' 
develop co-evolutionary accounts of processes and 
representations within the mind/brain. In her opinion, 
such accounts provide us with further support for the view 
that the structural divisions within the mind/brain 
correlate with functional divisions that are not well 
represented by the concepts of folk psychology. 
Consequently, she believes they yield further confirmation 
of Churchland's general hypothesis (HI) about the poverty 
of folk psychology as an explanatory theory.27 
I shall now move on to a critical examination of the 
plausibility of Churchland's argument. 
6.2.3 criticisms of Churchland's eliminative materialism 
This SUbsection will be divided into two parts. The first 
part will discuss the validity of Churchland' s initial 
general hypothesis (HI) concerning the nature of, and 
outlook for, folk psychology, and the strength of the body 
of evidence (E l ) that she cites in support of this theory. 
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In the light of these criticisms of HI and EI , I shall then 
argue that Churchland's inference to H2, the need for a co-
evolutionary approach to the mind/brain, is unconvincing. 
The central claim of the second part of this sUbsection 
will be that the data obtained from the co-evolutionary 
studies of the mind/brain cited by Churchland do not 
constitute sufficient evidence that this approach 1S the 
only one likely to yield success. In fact, they derive 
much of their plausibility from a pr10r acceptance of 
hypothesis HI and its supporting body of evidence, and 
therefore cannot provide further confirmation of HI in a 
non-circular fashion. 
A - Folk Psychology and foul play - the first half of 
Churchland's bootstrap argument 
We saw in the previous SUbsection that Churchland relies 
upon a variety of arguments to support her general 
hypothesis HI that folk psychology yields an inaccurate view 
of the mind/brain and therefore should not be allowed to 
remain as the backbone of explanations of our mental 
states, processes and experiences. It seems as if 
Churchland has understood the need for a bootstrap argument 
to employ evidence from a variety of sources to avoid 
accusations of circularity (at least thus far). 
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However, I shall argue that this part of her bootstrap 
strategy is flawed on three counts. Firstly, many of the 
points that Churchland cites in support of her hypothesis 
about folk psychology are simply wrong. Secondly, although 
her remaining observations about the nature of folk 
psychology, and about the diff icul ties inherent in the 
sentential paradigm, are correct, they do not entitle her" 
to the radical view that folk psychology must be radically 
revised, if not eliminated. Thirdly, and perhaps most 
damningly, Churchland renders her hypothesis immune to 
falsification by systematically avoiding discussion of some 
sources of evidence that might tell against her hypothesis. 
She is therefore guilty, like McGinn, Fodor and Marr, of 
basing her theory upon unwarranted and untestable (hence 
metaphysical) assumptions. 
I shall divide my criticisms of Churchland's argument into 
two groups, each of which deals with one of the first two 
fundamental errors identified in the preceding paragraph. 
These two types of error overlap in some cases with the 
third flaw because the deliberate and systematic exclusion 
of some evidence has resulted in either faulty assertions 
or unwarranted inferences from acceptable premises. I 
shall point out these cases where appropriate. 
I begin with the evidence that is just plain wrong. In 
fact, many of Churchland's critics have argued that she is 
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attacking a straw man, because she has misunderstood the 
true nature of folk psychology and is therefore either 
expecting it to explain phenomena that it was never 
supposed to explain [for example, claim (a) 1n my summary, 
above], or attributing to it qualities that it does not 
possess [claims (b) and (c)]. One key objection is made by 
Wilkes (1984, 1986). Wilkes argues firstly, that folk 
psychology is not a theory, since it does not consist of 
universal laws like those of sC1ence, but rather of 
generalizations that will only hold true 1n given 
circumstances, and with many caveats. Moreover, she 
continues, folk psychology 1S simply not intended to 
explain phenomena that are caused by exceptional 
circumstances such as bra in damage, or menta 1 illness. 
Both of these objections are encapsulated in the following 
passage. Wilkes comments that 
"Churchland stresses the failure of common-sense 
psychology to provide terms that are suitable as 
parts of scientific explanations. What she does 
not emphasize enough is that common sense also 
has wildly different explananda most of the time" 
(Wilkes, 1986, p. 170). 
These two points need not necessarily be linked. I think 
that Churchland may well be entitled to the view that folk 
psychology is a theory [claim (b)], given that the laws of 
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science may themselves be very complex and may . requ1re very 
specific conditions for them to hold. However, even if 
Church land is right to call folk psychology a theory, this 
does not obviate the objection that she is not entitled to 
claim that it is inadequate simply because it cannot 
account for every single mental state imaginable [claim 
(a)]. Thus Horgan and Woodward declare that 
.. churchland ' s argument seems to impose the a 
priori demand that any successful psychological 
theory account for a certain pre-established 
range of phenomena, and do so in a unified way. 
Arguments of this general type deserve to be 
treated with scepticism and caution" (Horgan and 
Woodward, 1985, p. 200)28. 
I think that Horgan and Woodward are correct to criticise 
this particular source of "evidence" for the poverty of 
folk psychology as an explanatory force. Moreover, 
churchland's use of an a priori constraint upon the variety 
of phenomena that a satisfactory theory of the mind/brain 
must account for results in a measure of immunity for her 
hypothesis against falsification. If a satisfactory 
explanation of the mind/brain must, ex hypothesi, account 
for a number of specif ied phenomena, then any potential 
rival that does not do this is automatically excluded from 
consideration, thereby reducing the number of plausible 
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alternatives to eliminative materialism. Here, we see that 
one source of evidence [(a) above] for the poverty of folk 
psychology rests upon an unwarranted assumption that may be 
described as metaphysical, because it has been rendered 
untestable. 
There is a great deal of evidence that Church land regards 
the view that all representation within the mind/brain is 
sentential as an integral part of folk psychology. For 
example, she comments that 
"there are substantial reasons for predicting 
that at best inference and sentence-like 
representations will have a small role in the 
theory of information-processing, and for 
predicting quite radical revisions in folk 
psychology" (P.S. Churchland, 1986a, p. 386). 
However, several critics have argued persuasively that it 
is perfectly possible to endorse a psychology that makes 
reference to the intentional states of folk psychology 
without being committed to the view that all representation 
is sentential. For example, Kitcher claims that 
"[i]n associating cognitive psychology with 
sententialism, Churchland appears to have gone 
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seriously astray ..... she has uncritically 
accepted Fodor's claim that propositional 
attitudes are the constructs in terms of which 
cognitive theory elaborates its typical 
elaborations" (Kitcher, 1984, p. 85). 
6.2.3 
In other words, Church land 's penetrating criticisms of 
Fodor's own representational theory of the mind are 
acceptable, but they do not entitle her to the further 
claim that all theories that postulate the intentional 
concepts used in folk psychology are tarred with the same 
Fodorean brush. They are not. Thus, claim (c) in support 
of Churchland' s general hypothesis Hl is quite simply wrong. 
It was also noted in sUbsection 6.2.2 that Church land uses 
an argument from analogy to show that folk psychology is an 
unnecessary and unhelpful theory [claim d]. Comparisons 
are made with folk physics which has now been rejected in 
favour of more scientific theories. Churchland maintains 
that discussion of such examples from other branches of 
science can only be advantageous for an area of study that 
is still in its infancy. She asserts that 
"by surveying dispassionately sciences with long 
histories, mature theories, and a rich 
theoretical evolution, it is to be hoped that 
analogies and disanalogies can be discerned that 
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will be instructive in confronting the issues at 
hand" (P.S. Church land , 1986a, p. 8). 
6.2.3 
However, even a cursory survey of the available literature 
yields the conclusion that Churchland has overstressed the 
similarities of folk physics with folk psychology and 
ignored the differences. This lends her hypothesis about 
the negative value of folk psychology greater credibility 
than it deserves. Stoljar, for example, argues that the 
argument from analogy fails because it is important for us 
to examine the merits of folk psychology as a theory in its 
own right, rather than simply assuming that it will suffer 
the same fate as folk physics (Stoljar, 1988)29. Indeed, 
it is clear in the light of the arguments already put 
forward against the remainder of Churchland's evidence in 
favour of her initial hypothesis that, not only does the 
argument by analogy beg the question, it also does folk 
psychology a grave disservice (assuming Church land to have 
correctly summarized the history of folk physics). 
So far, we have seen grounds for doubting three out of four 
of Churchland's sources of evidence in favour of hypothesis 
HI. Only claim (b), that folk psychology is a theory, and 
is liable to revision in the light of empirical evidence, 
has not yet been countered by any very telling objections. 
However, even this source of support for Church land • s 
general hypothesis is tenuous, and I shall now present 
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arguments which demonstrate that Churchland's radical 
conclusions are not justified. 
The first point borders upon the trivial, but is 
nevertheless worthy of a brief mention. Even if Church land 
is correct to claim that folk psychology, as a theory, 
should be open to correction or elimination, this does not-
mean that the theory is automatically in need of revision. 
Churchland is, in principle at least, aware of this point, 
hence her remark that 
"I have not argued that [displacement] will be 
the fate of folk psychology, but only that once 
we have seen that folk psychology has no more 
epistemological privilege than folk physics, ... 
we can rid ourselves of a huge weight of argument 
that tempts us by appeal to the obviousness and 
the certain inviolability of folk psychology" 
(P.S. Churchland, 1986a, p. 312). 
As a result, Churchland can only justify the replacement of 
folk psychology if there is empirical evidence that it is 
dissatisfactory. So far, as we have seen, Churchland has 
provided no solid evidence that this is actually the case. 
Moreover, even if the categories of folk psychology cannot 
be reduced smoothly to those thought to exist within the 
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mind/brain, Churchland is not entitled to move from this 
general hypothesis (H l ) to the bald assertion of her more 
specific hypothesis H2 , that the best methodology for 
understanding the mind/brain is a co-evolutionary one. 
There are, as her critics point out, other possiblities 
that Churchland has simply overlooked 
" ' 
even though the 
evidence that she has cited so far in favour of her" 
position radically underdetermines the choice between the 
various alternatives. This is the message put forward by 
McDonough: 
"The assumption that the replacement could be 
something like neurobiology begs the question 
about the limits of the revisability of our self-
conception" (McDonough, 1991, p. 273). 
There are a variety of other hypotheses that follow equally 
from the situation as Churchland has so far described it 
(allowing her for the moment that there is at least some 
support for her negative views upon folk psychology). For 
example, the failure of folk psychology to reduce to 
neuroscience has also been remarked upon by Donald Davidson 
(1980). Unlike Churchland, however, Davidson does not hold 
that we must revise folk psychology in order to accept that 
mental events are caused by and ultimately identical with 
events and processes within the brain. Instead, he adopts 
a position known as anomalous monism, 
which is 
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characterized by the view that there can be no laws 
relating the description of these states in the concepts of 
the mental and their description as physical events. This 
is because laws do not hold between events themselves 
(unlike causal connections) but between events under 
certain descriptions. For Davidson, mental events form a 
holistic, open-ended system which 1S incapable of 
sustaining nomological connections, and which cannot 
therefore be reduced in any lawlike manner to a 
nomological, closed system like that of the physical world. 
Davidson, like Churchland, is a physicalist, but he accepts 
neither the need for or the possibility of a smooth 
reduction of the concepts of the mental to those of the 
physical. Horgan and Woodward comment that P.M. Churchland 
fails to discuss the Davidsonian view30 , and this balance 
is not redressed in the work of P.S. Churchland31 • Horgan 
and Woodward's conclusion applies with equal force to her 
views. She is 
"just mistaken to assume that [folk psychology] 
must be reducible to neuroscience in order to be 
compatible with it" (Horgan and Woodward, 1985, 
p. 204). 
Horgan and Woodward have suggested that even if folk 
psychology cannot account for the totality of our mental 
experiences, it may still be possible to develop more 
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satisfactory explanations without resorting to an ultimate 
reduction of psychology to the categories of neuroscience. 
They argue that 
"cognitive psychologists have developed extensive 
and detailed theories ... that employ concepts 
recognizably like the folk- psychological 
concepts of belief, desire, judgment, etc" (ibid, 
p. 200). 
Similarly, von Eckardt criticizes Churchland for failing to 
realize that cognitive psychology is equally able to 
bootstrap from the starting-point of folk psychology (von 
Eckardt, 1984, p. 68). 
Churchland has simply failed to provide us with enough 
evidence that the basic concepts of folk psychology are so 
inherently flawed that only a reduction of psychology to 
neuroscience can provide a satisfactory explanation of the 
and representational capacities of the processes 
mind/brain. Greenwood criticises the Churchlands' 
enterprise as follows: 
"the Churchlands [do not] attempt ... to document 
in detail the supposedly de facto inaccuracies of 
everyday folk-psychological explanations, nor do 
they, for example, engage 1 n an extended 
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methodological critique of the evidential basis 
of generally accepted theories in cognitive, 
social, and clinical psychology that make 
essential reference to intentional psychological 
states" (Greenwood, 1991a, pp. 15-16), 
6.2.3 
As a result, Churchland's inference from the limitations of 
folk psychology to the specific hypothesis that we must 
endorse a co-evolutionary methodology for the study of the 
mind/brain is unwarranted. She has, once more, 
systematically ignored the possibility of rival 
interpretations of the empirical data, thereby securing the 
relative immunity of her argument from refutation. This 
is, as we have already noted, an unacceptable move, since 
it results in a theory which is grounded upon untestable 
assumptions32 , and in the charge that Churchland is no 
more capable of dealing with the constraints placed upon 
evidence by scientific realism than McGinn, Fodor or Marr. 
It is now time to assess the evidence provided by 
Churchland in further support of her more specific 
hypothesis H2 that the co-evolutionary approach to the 
mind/brain is the right one to use. This evidence (E2 ) 
consists in the data obtained from the use of this approach 
so far. Churchland believes that these data indicate that 
the approach is a fruitful one and that they provide 
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further confirmation of the poverty of folk psychology's 
explanatory apparatus. 
B - Neurophysiology and new faits accomplis - a critique of 
Churchland's co-evolutionary data 
I shall not be concerned in this discussion with the 
precise details of the co-evolutionary studies that 
Church land uses to advocate the concentration by 
researchers upon such a methodology. It is sufficient to 
demonstrate that the results of these studies do not 
entitle her to this conclusion, nor do they provide any 
further sUbstantiation of her view that folk psychology is 
likely to be revised or eliminated. 
Many of the points to be made in this part of my argument 
are really just the natural corollaries of the criticisms 
that I have just made of the first part of Churchland's 
bootstrap argument. Firstly, Churchland holds that a more 
neuroscientific approach to the mind/brain will result in 
the explanation of mental processes and phenomena that folk 
psychology is not capable of accounting for. Yet, given 
the view put forward in the previous subsection that folk 
psychology was never intended to explain every single 
mental state, experience, or process, including those that 
result from rare occurrences like brain damage or mental 
illness, the ability of the co-evolutionary approach to 
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provide such explanations cannot be taken as evidence that 
folk psychology must be superseded by a more 
neuroscientifically orientated view. 
Secondly, and more generally, the success of neuroscience 
in providing explanations of some of our mental phenomena 
does not entail that it should be allowed to dominate the· 
investigation of the mind/brain. We could allow for two 
different levels of explanation, a psychological theory 
which makes use of intentional concepts, and a 
neuroscientific account which concentrates upon providing 
explanations in terms of the structures to be found within 
the brain. The success of some neuroscientific work does 
not entitle Churchland to infer that all other 
methodologies fail. Further, no more confirmation is 
provided of her general hypothesis that folk psychology and 
its concepts are doomed to failure. 
It has been suggested that Churchland misinterprets the 
results of some neurological studies so that they give the 
appearance of supporting her argument more than they 
actually do. For example, Churchland is keen to refute the 
notion that all apparently intentional states require the 
existence of mental representations (which take a 
sentential form) so that the requisite information 
processing can take place (P.S. Churchland, 1980b, pp. 194-
7). Consequently, she cites studies of the sea slug which 
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are intended to demonstrate that habituation to a stimulus 
is possible even in the absence of representations, because 
it can be accounted for in purely neurophysiological terms 
(ibid, p. 200). Similar neuronal accounts are given of the 
abili ty of monkeys to direct their attention towards a 
given object. Eckardt argues that both examples fail to 
support Churchland's view. In the case of the sea slug, 
she notes that it is not clear that habituation is an 
intentional phenomenon in the first place, and she comments 
that Church land may not have succeeded in providing a non-
representational account of visual attention, since the 
monkeys may still be using some kind of representational 
system (von Eckardt, 1984, p. 88). This means that unless 
Churchland is prepared to stipulate a priori that some uses 
of the term "representation" are acceptable whilst others 
are not (thereby rendering her view untestable), she is not 
entitled to the inference that these examples provide 
unequivocal support for her theory. 
Similarly, Churchland suggests that the vector 
transformation theory put forward by Pellionisz and Llinas 
provides us with an alternative view of representation from 
that encapsulated in Fodor's sentential paradigm. However, 
since, as we saw in the previous part of this subsection, 
it is incorrect to assume that an irreducible psychology 
must incorporate sentential representations, the vector 
transformation theory does not provide us with any clear 
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grounds for pursuing the co-evolutionary approach and no 
other. Once more, it is equally clear that good 
neuroscientific data fail to lend further confirmation to 
the general hypothesis that folk psychology is inadequate. 
Hence, McDonough comments of the Church lands that 
"when they say that neuroscience may lead us to 
eliminate beliefs, what they really mean is that 
it may lead us to eliminate internal states that 
picture a sentence. Beliefs have already been 
eliminated on metaphysical grounds before the 
empirically motivated revision is even 
considered" (McDonough, 1991, p. 279). 
Indeed, McDonough has succeeded in identifying a 
fundamental diff icul ty within the second half of 
Churchland's bootstrap argument. I have traced a 
distinctive pattern in her use of neuroscientific studies 
to support her strategy. Churchland cites evidence in 
support of a co-evolutionary methodology, which she hopes 
will also provide further confirmation of her general 
hypothesis that folk psychology is inadequate, yet this 
evidence cannot provide unequivocal support for either of 
her hypotheses unless her arguments against folk psychology 
have already been accepted. In other words, the body of 
evidence (E2 ) rests tacitly upon acceptance of evidence Ell 
which has already been discredited. Churchland' s 
381 
6.2.4 
apparently empirical argument is thereby exposed as both 
circular, and as based upon unwarranted, untestable and 
metaphysical assumptions. She falls readily into the trap 
of bootstrapping identified by Achinstein that her evidence 
is only supportive of the hypotheses within her theory, if 
we assume the truth of the theory to begin with (see also 
Chapter 2). 
These comments will be developed in the following 
sUbsections. 
6.2.4 Churchland and the veil-of-perception issue 
Churchland, like the other theorists that I have discussed, 
presents an ostensibly impeccable understanding of 
scientific realism, but is then incapable of transferring 
this understanding into a satisfactory bootstrapping 
argument. Indeed, we can put Churchland's claims into the 
format of a semantically inconsistent tetrad. Churchland 
takes the following four statements to be true: 
I there are natural neurological categories 
within the mind/brain that can be embodied in a 
scientific psychology using a one-to-one mapping 
of concepts 
382 
II these neurologically isolable categories give 
rise to our overt mental experiences, and will 
ultimately provide us with the only acceptable 
explanation of these experiences 
III we are not directly aware of these 
categories, as defined by neuroscience and 
scientific psychology: their effects are 
generally interpreted in the light of our 
(largely inadequate) folk psychological theory of 
mind/brain processes 
IV nonetheless, we can be sure that scientific 
psychology and neuroscience do postulate the 
right kinds of categories, thereby providing the 
only satisfactory means of understanding the 
mind/brain, both because of the systematic 
breakdown of folk psychology which demonstrates 
that a more neurological account is appropriate, 
and because of experimental evidence. 
6.2.4 
These statements are related to Church land ' s bootstrap 
argument in the following manner. statements I and II 
comprise the essence of hypothesis H2 , that a scientific 
psychology which will reduce smoothly to neurologically 
defined categories is achievable. Statement III is 
effectively a combination of hypothesis Hl and the body of 
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evidence El - that is, it embodies the initial premise that 
we are not usually aware of neurological categories, 
because we interpret our mental experiences in the light of 
a folk psychological theory, together with an implicit 
summary of El , the evidence that this theory is inadequate. 
Finally, statement. IV amounts to an attempt to support 
hypothesis H2 on the basis of the evidence contained in E1 
and ~2 that folk psychology 1S inadequate and that 
neuroscience has provided some useful clues to the nature 
of the mind/brain. 33 
. 
It is now easy to see why the tetrad is semantically 
inconsistent. Given that we are only ever aware of our 
folk psychological views of the mind/brain, how can we ever 
assert that the categories postulated by neuroscience and 
scientific psychology will provide us with an alternative 
explanation? This is the strong or ontological version of 
the veil-of-perception issue once more. The body of 
evidence El , upon examination, provides us with no firm 
grounds for doubting the adequacy of folk psychology. I 
think it is unlikely, however, that anyone would want to 
argue that Churchland has provided us with no reason at all 
for examining the possibility of a second, more co-
evolutionary approach to the mind/brain problem34 • 
However, this does not mean that Churchland is out of the 
woods. It is clear that she falls foul of the weaker, 
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epistemological version of the veil-of-perception 1ssue. 
Even if we grant her the possibility of a second, more 
basic level of explanation, she has failed to provide us 
with the evidence we require to be sure that it has a 
unique explanatory status or that it . 1S capable of 
performing the tasks that she claims it can. statement IV 
does not support statements I and II, because the evidence 
cited neither demonstrates that folk psychology 1S 
incapable of playing some explanatory role, nor that any 
potential replacement must incorporate neuroscience. This 
is a clear case of empirical underdetermination that 
Churchland has failed to address. The initial plausibility 
of her claim that a co-evolutionary approach 1S to be 
preferred is chiefly attributable to her systematic neglect 
of evidence that casts doubt upon the possibility that folk 
psychology is fundamentally flawed and should be 
eliminated. Once Churchland's initial evidence is exposed 
as resting upon such unwarranted metaphysical assumptions, 
her argument is greatly weakened. The co-evolutionary 
approach therefore loses its much vaunted super10r 
explanatory status, thereby depriving eliminative 
materialism of its chief motivating factor. The problem is 
exacerbated by the fact that, as we have seen, her second 
body of evidence can only support her co-evolutionary 
approach given a prior acceptance of the paucity of folk 
psychology. 
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Churchland's bootstrap argument is essentially circular in 
precisely the manner declared unacceptable within 
scientific realism by Glyrnour (see Chapter 2, subsection 
2.3.1). Yet Churchland claims to understand the need for 
constraints upon evidence. How has this happened? 
6.2.5 Analysis of Churchland's failure 
Churchland presents a mixture of poor conceptual arguments 
and unwarranted inferences from empirical evidence in 
support of her bootstrapping strategy. These flaws in an 
superficially well-structured argument demonstrate that the 
use of the bootstrap argument cannot simply prevent 
empirical underdetermination by the adoption of abstract 
criteria such as those suggested by Glyrnour and P.M. 
Churchland (see Chapter 2, subsection 2.3. 1) • Patricia 
smith Churchland has presented us with an argument which 
attempts to provide a unified explanatory system and claims 
to provide a variety of evidence in support of her 
hypotheses. Both of these strategies would be applauded by 
P.M. Churchland and Glyrnour. However, Patricia smith 
Churchland has failed to appreciate the r1gours of 
bootstrapping in an area of science which must take account 
of data from radically different disciplines. We saw in 
Chapter 2 that Nordby's description of the difficulties for 
the detective who must decide what facts constitute 
relevant evidence for the crime that he is investigating is 
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equally applicable in this kind of scientific scenario. 
The decisions as to what evidence is relevant, and what is 
not, and the weight that should be accorded to evidence 
from a variety of disciplines are not abstract, formal 
decisions, but ones which are frequently influenced by the 
preferred view of the theorist. 
It seems clear that this is what has occurred within 
Churchland's bootstrap argument. Churchland's use of 
neuroscientific data appears acceptable if we assume what 
she sets out to prove, but this is clearly not a scientific 
decision. Churchland is predisposed to regard eliminative 
materialism as the only satisfactory theory of the 
mind/brain, and this results in her imposing very strict 
criteria for the success of folk psychology (and ignoring 
evidence that folk psychology might have a role to play in 
understanding the mind/brain), whilst employing very lax 
criteria for the validity of the more neuroscientific 
approach, so that any data are interpreted as supporting 
evidence for her own view (see also my discussions of Giere 
in Chapter 2, sUbsection 2.6)35. 
Churchland's theory therefore fails to constitute a radical 
improvement upon the Fodorean sentential paradigm. It is 
interesting that she castigates anti-reductionist arguments 
on the grounds that they sometimes 
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"simply work fuzzy intuitions about what is and 
is not imaginable,or even about what is and is 
not desirable" (P.S. Churchland, 1986a, p. 327). 
6.3 
The burden of my argument in the second half of this 
chapter has been to demonstrate that Churchland's own 
theory rests upon little more. 
6.3 Conclusion 
Both Churchland and Marr present co-evolutionary theories 
of the mind/brain, but emphasise different elements within 
this broad framework. I have demonstrated that both of 
them nevertheless fall into difficulties akin to those of 
the traditional metaphysical realist, since their decisions 
about the evidence that supports their hypotheses are not 
impartial, but are rather made in the light of their own 
preferred views of the mind/brain and the appropriate ways 
to study it. This means that their work does not, at 
present, constitute a significant advance upon the more 
traditional theories of mind I discussed earlier. 
In the final section of this thesis, I shall summarize my 
conclusions and make some suggestions for future work in 
this area. 
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1. Some of the content of this chapter formed part of the paper 
I read at King's College, London in November, 1990. 
2. The term "co-evolutionary" was coined by Churchland to denote 
those res~arch strategies :vhic~ ~re a synthesis of philosophical, 
psycholog1c~l and neurosc1ent1f1c methods. It is in this spirit 
that she wrl.tes that: "top-down strategies (as characteristic of 
philosophy, cognitive psycholog~, and artificial intelligence 
research) and bottom-up strateg1es (as characteristic of the 
neurosciences) for solving the mysteries of mind-brain function 
should not be pursued in icy isolation from one another. What 
is envisaged instead is a rich interanimation between the two 
which can be expected to provoke a fruitful co-evolution of 
theo~ies, models, and methods, where each informs, corrects, and 
insp1res the other" (P.S. Churchland, 1986a, p. 3, my italics). 
A~th~ugh M~rr's approach to the, n~t~re of vision falls clearly 
wlth1n th1s very broad defln1tlon of a co-evolutionary 
methodology, there is fundamental disagreement between Marr and 
Churchland regarding the emphasis placed upon the role of 
neurophysiological data within the creation of a theory. See 
sUbsection 6.1.1 for further discussion. 
3. This is exactly analogous to the claim made by Fodor that 
there can be no computation without representations (see Chapter 
4, sUbsection 4.2.2). 
4. Marr employs the term "computational" to denote a specific 
kind of hypothesis or theory with distinctive features that are 
not ordinarily associated with the term as it is more generally 
used. I have therefore decided to adopt Patricia Kitcher I s 
(1988) excellent device of distinguishing between the two uses 
of the term by writing "Computational" with a capital "c" when 
I am employing it in Marris sense. When the term is used in the 
wider sense, it will begin with a lower case "c". For a brief 
discussion of the distinction between the two uses, see also my 
Introduction to section B. 
5. To avoid confusion in the later stages of this chapter, in 
which the way in which Marr constructs an overall theory of 
vision by bootstrapping between hypotheses, I propose to refer 
to Marris Computational theories as Computational hypotheses. 
Since Kitcher uses the same terminology as Marr, I shall make the 
same sUbstitutions when referring to her work. This change in 
vocabularly is purely pragmatic an~ does not de~troy the meaning 
of anything that either Marr or Kltcher has wrltten. 
6. It is worth noting that part of the ta~k of the co~puta~ional 
level of explanation is to determine WhlCh, constra ln,ts, I,n the 
external world will be strong enough to permlt the deflnltlon,of 
the information-processing task (Marr, 1982a, p. 23). We wlll 
return to this point in sUbsection 6.1.2. 
7. However, I shall demonstrate in the course o~ th~s chapter 
that the different emphasis placed upon the relatlve lmportance 
of neurophysiological information by Marr and Church land has 
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absolutely no effect upon the diff icu1 ties they encounter in 
their use of the bootstrap strategy. 
8. I.t will become apparent in later subsections that, where more 
deta1ls of Marris theory are needed to understand the thrust of 
my argument, I have endeavoured to provide them. 
9. Furthe~ details of the.specific theories will be given where 
necessary 1n later subsect1ons. I have decided to refer to them 
collectively in this sUbsection to avoid over-complicating the 
general outline of Marr's bootstrap argument. 
10. In view of the problems inherent in Fodor's Representational 
Theory of Mind highlighted in Chapter 4, Marr's choice of phrase 
to declare that he is a realist with regard to representations 
and processes within the mind is perhaps rather unfortunate. He 
writes that "[f]rom a philosophical point of view, the approach 
that I describe is an extension of what have sometimes been 
called representational theories of mind •.... Modern 
representational theories conceive of the mind as having access 
to systems of internal representations; mental states are 
characterized by asserting what the internal representations 
currently specify, and mental processes by how such internal 
representations are obtained and how they interact" (Marr, 1982a, 
p. 6). 
11. Note that although Marr takes a top-down stance on the 
methodological issues involved in studying visual processes, he 
argues that visual processes themselves operate from the bottom-
up in that each representational stage is constructed from the 
combination of primitive elements (see Marr, 1982a, p. 52). 
These are very separate points and should not be confused. 
12. See sUbsection 6.1.2 for an explanation of these labels. 
13. Marr does in fact admit this possibility (see Marr, 1982a, 
p. 339). 
14. See also Chapter 4, sUbsection 4.4.2. 
15. It is surprising that Marr makes this mist~ke, since ~e.does 
recognize that the impetus to construct theor1es may or1g1nate 
from many sources. In fact, Marr confesses that "there is no 
real recipe for this type of research - even though I ~ave 
sometimes suggested that there is - any more than there 1S a 
straightforward procedure for discovering things in any other 
branch of science" (Marr, 1982a, p. 331). 
16. It is true that Marr has provided some justification. for the 
development of his unique methodology ba~ed upon the fa1l~re of 
other theories to provide a full and r1gorous explana~10n of 
processes within the mind/brain. However, ~y elevat1ng the 
description of a task in information-process1ng. terms to ~he 
status of a necessary and primary factor .1n develop1ng 
explanations of these processes, Marr has effect1vely precluded 
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the possibility th~t ~is a~alysis of the situation is mistaken. 
In ot~er wor~s, he 1S 19nor1ng the possibility that these earlier 
theor1es fa1led because of some other difficulty and that 
subseque~t attempts may succeed even in the absence of a 
Computat1onal account. 
17. ,r ,have ?hosen to concentrate my discussion upon the work of 
patr1<?1a sm~ t~ ,Churchland so that I can compare her incisi ve 
negat7ve cr1t1c1sms o~ ~odor's argument with her neglect of the 
same 1ssues of testab111ty, realism and evidence in her positive 
attempt to formulate a satisfactory strategy for the development 
of a theory of mind/brain function. References to Paul M. 
Churchland are made only when r am convinced that Patricia 
Ch':lr<?hla~d shares, hi,s view. Al though they both adopt an 
e11m1nat1ve mater1al1st stance, the emphasis within their 
arguments is slightly different, and space precludes a lengthier 
treatment of all aspects of their position, I have been unable 
to examine stich's views for the same reason. 
18. Many criticisms of Church land will be directed against the 
conclusions that she draws from psycho log ica 1 and neurosc ient i f ic 
data that has obtained by research rather than against these data 
themselves. 
19. Opinions vary as to the precise definition of "folk 
psychology", particularly between the eliminative materialists, 
who regard it as a theory and their opponents, who think that it 
is not. See P.M. Church land (1991), and Wilkes (1984, 1986) for 
further discussion. Broadly speaking, however, "folk psychology" 
is the collective term for the everyday expressions that we use 
to describe our mental experiences, and states. It therefore 
includes such concepts as "beliefs" , "desires" , and 
"consciousness". 
20. Further examples may be found in P,S. Churchland, 1980b, as 
well as elsewhere in her 1986a. 
21. It is not my intention in this thesis to provide detailed 
criticism of the neuroscientific theories that Churchland 
endorses. My general line of attack will con~ent~ate.upon the 
conclusions that Churchland thinks such theor1es Just1fy. For 
my arguments against the Pellionisz/Llinas tensor network theory, 
see my 1988a. 
22. r shall argue in sUbsection 6.2.4 below t~at Churchla~d's 
bootstrapping is indeed stubborn in a very n~gat1v~ manner! S1nce 
it involves a refusal to acknowledge two maJor p01nts. F1rstly, 
the successes of neuroscientific research projects do not 
necessarily entail the revision or elimination of folk ~sychology 
and secondly, the inability of folk psych?logy to ex~la1n all our 
mental experiences and states need not 1mply that 1t should be 
deemed wholly inadequate either. 
23. This hypothesis is effectively embodied 1n the follo~ing 
passage from P.S. Churchland, 1986a, p. 3~4: "Some initial theory 
is essential to get the whole enterpr1se g01ng, and broadly 
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speaking, folk psychology is that initial theory. We have 
already gone beyond folk psychology, and as neuroscience and 
psychology co-evolve, the likelihood is that the initial theory 
will by inches be revised, lock, stock, and barrel". 
24. See also P.~. Churchland's examination of blindsight (1980b, 
pp. 191-3), whl.ch she says forces us to question either the 
commonsen~e belief that our ?bility to report upon a feature of 
the perce loved world prerequlores that we have experienced this 
featu:-e, or the . equ~lly basic assumption that we can only 
experloence someth1ng 1f we are conscious of doing so. 
25. Church land also comments that if "diseases such as 
schizophrenia do have a basis we can describe in biochemical 
terms, this invites the idea that we might enhance our knowledge 
generally, of the sane as well as the insane, should we acquire 
kno~ledge of the biochemical aspects of emotions, moods, and 
des1res and of cognitive development and organization" (P.s. 
Churchland, 1986a, p. 88). This is an extension of Paul M. 
Churchland's point that mental illness is not well accounted for 
by folk psychology (P.M. Churchland, 1981, p.73). 
26. Paul M. Church land cites still more reasons for rejecting 
the categories of folk psychology, apart from its failure to 
account for mental illnesses, and its inability to develop or to 
extend its explanations into other areas (see, for example, P.M. 
Churchland, 1981, pp. 72-76). 
27. See above, note 20, for relevant references. Further 
details of these co-evolutionary accounts of mental processes 
will be given where necessary in the course of my critical 
discussion of Churchland' s bootstrap strategy (subsection 6.2.3) . 
28. Horgan and Woodward's attack was originally directed at the 
arguments of P.M. Churchland, but it applies with equal force to 
the views of Patricia Smith Churchland. 
29. See also Kitcher, 1984, pp. 98-100 for criticism of P.M. 
Churchland's argument by analogy with alchemy. 
30. A fleeting reference to Davidson is found in the 
introduction to P.M. Churchland, 1989, p. xii. Here, he 
describes the Davidsonian view as conceptual dualism, but 
dismisses it as a view that is liable to render folk psychology 
immune from scientific refutation, because it does not adequately 
allow for the requirement that science p~o~ide us with unifi~d 
explanations. However, it is clear that 1t 1S c~ur~hl~nd wh? 1S 
jumping the gun here, and not Davidson, ,becaus,e 1t 1S 1mI;>osslble 
to simply assume that unified explanat10ns w1ll be a~hlevable, 
when bootstrapping in a very new area (see my comments ln Chapter 
2, above, sUbsection 2.5.2). 
31. P.S. Churchland (1986a) includes a reference to Davidson in 
her Bibliography, but does not discuss him ,in her tex~. See my 
1988a for further comparisons of the two Vlews. It is perhaps 
worth differentiating Davidson's view from that of the property 
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dualists, which is di~cussed in P.S. Church land , 1986a (pp. 323-
335). Property dual1sts could accept a type-type identity of 
mental and physical events, but refuse to accept that a physical 
description can adequately convey the nature of our mental 
experiences. Davidson, on the other hand, does not accept that 
any such type-type identification is possible. 
32. Churchland might well be inclined to argue that her 
hypothesis is testable, since she has provided empirical evidence 
in support of her view. However, this in itself does not refute 
my criticism. Testability is not simply a matter of citing 
possible sources of evidence which confirm a hypothesis. Rather, 
it involves exposing this hypothesis to those sources of 
empirical evidence that could falsify it. See my discussion of 
Giere, Chapter 2, sUbsection 2.6. 
33. This is an unusual version of the semantically inconsistent 
tetrad. Most versions claim that it is the veracity of the overt 
experience that guarantees the existence and nature of the inner 
processes (or, in the case of the traditional veil-of-perception 
issue, of the external world): here, it is the failure of folk 
psychology that provides the guarantee, combined with the success 
of current neuroscientific research. However, the relationship 
between the hypotheses and the supporting evidence in this tetrad 
is nonetheless semantically inconsistent in the same way as those 
of previous tetrads. 
34. A possible exception would be McDonough (1991). 
35. cf. Shanon' s criticisms of Fodor's modularity thesis in 
Shanon, 1988, p. 335, also above, Chapter 5, SUbsection 5.5.3. 
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7.1-7.2.1 
Section C - Conclusion 
Chapter 7 - Evidence or Ignorance? Some final 
reflections 
7.1 Introduction 
This concluding chapter will be comparatively brief. It is 
in two parts. In the first, I shall summarize the aims, 
strategy and findings of my argument. In the second part, 
I make some suggestions for the future of the bootstrapping 
strategy in the philosophy of mind. 
7.2 Summary and conclusions 
7.2.1 Aims of the thesis 
As I remarked in my general introduction to this thesis, my 
discussion of realism and evidence in the philosophy of 
mind had four central objectives. The first, and most 
fundamental, of these was the evaluation of a variety of 
theories of the mind/brain to establish the validity of the 
co-evolutionary theorists' claim that their approach to the 
study of the mind/brain constitutes a significant advance 
over the more traditional theories constructed using 
conceptual analysis. 
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This primary objective could only be achieved once an 
appropriate criterion for the comparison of a number of 
radically different theories of the mind/brain had been 
selected. Theories of the mind/brain are no less 
constrained by the principles of scientific realism than 
any other theories. This means that, if they are to 
provide a good explanation of the ways that the processes 
and representations within the mind/brain generate our 
mental experiences and capacities, their constituent 
hypotheses must be well tested and supported by reliable 
sources of evidence. 
Neglect of these constraints upon explanation will result 
in the difficulties associated with metaphysical realism, 
of which the veil-of-perception issue may be regarded as a 
paradigm case. I hoped to show that it is possible to 
isolate the characteristic features of metaphysical realism 
within the veil-of-perception issue, and thereby to draw 
attention to the wider implications of the veil-of-
perception issue. 
My remaining objectives related to the methodology employed 
by all the theorists whose views were examined in section 
B of the thesis. I argued that all the theories discussed 
were constructed with the help of a bootstrapping argument 
which enabled them to derive both a general hypothesis and 
a more specific one from the same initial body of evidence, 
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before going on to cite a second independently obtained set 
of data in support of this specific hypothesis, with the 
subsidiary effect of providing further confirmation for the 
more general hypothesis. I went on to render explicit the 
bootstrap strategy implicit in each theory. 
Further, I hoped to show that the account of the problems 
involved in bootstrapping to solve a crime put forward in 
Nordby (1989) is also relevant to the use of the strategy 
in the construction of co-evolutionary theories of the 
mind/brain. 
7.2.2 structure of my argument 
It would clearly have been unwise to attempt an evaluation 
of the relative explanatory merits of the different 
theories of the mind/brain discussed in Section B without 
any preliminary discussion of some of the key factors that 
influence nature of explanation, notably motivation, the 
aim of constructing a realist theory and the question of 
satisfactory evidence. I therefore began section A with a 
brief summary of how motivation can affect the development 
of theories (Chapter 1, sUbsections 1.1.1) and a short 
resume of how theories are said to explain phenomena. In 
sUbsection 1.2.3, I introduced the first central feature of 
my argument, the use of the veil-of-perception issue as a 
paradigm instance of metaphysical realism. I discussed the 
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problems inherent in this view 1n detail in Chapter 1 
(subsections 1.2.4 and 1.2.5) and demonstrated their 
relevance to twentieth century psychology in sUbsections 
1.2.6, 1.2.7 and 1.2.8. 
In the second chapter of section A, the difficulties 
involved in providing evidence capable of supporting multi-
level theories were discussed further, and variations of a 
methodology for overcoming these difficulties were 
described. I argued that, even in science, there are 
grounds for rejecting the possibility of evaluating rival 
theories using the abstract criteria suggested by Glymour 
(1980) (see sUbsections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2). 
In section B, I proceeded to isolate and criticise the use 
of a variation of the bootstrap methodology to construct 
the theories of the mind/brain under V1ew. Each theory, 
ranging from McGinn's theory of the hidden structure of 
consciousness to Churchland's eliminative materialism was 
evaluated in the light of the constraints upon the nature 
of evidence imposed by scientific realism. A summary of my 
main conclusions is given below. 
7.3 Conclusions 
I contend that I succeeded 1n reaching all four of my 
primary objectives. It will be convenient to discuss my 
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main conclusions in the order that they appear in the body 
of the thesis. 
Firstly, I was able to show that the veil-of-perception is 
readily reformulated as a problem about a metaphysical 
relationship betwe~n sources of evidence and the hypotheses 
that they are intended to support. It is possible t'o 
isolate a characteristic feature of the metaphysical 
realists' position within the veil-of-perception issue. 
This is the existence of four assumptions that, taken 
together, form a semantically inconsistent tetrad by virtue 
of the fact that the relationship between the evidence that 
is cited and the hypotheses is a metaphysical one and not 
a scientific one. within the terms of the theory, the 
hypotheses cannot be refuted by conflicting evidence, and 
they are therefore untestable (see sUbsection 1.2.4). 
Further, I showed that it is possible to isolate similar 
semantically inconsistent tetrads within the theories of 
the mind/brain discussed in section B. This demonstrates 
that the veil-of-perception issue should be rehabilitated 
as a test for metaphysical realism within the philosophy of 
science, thereby vindicating my belief that it has been 
sadly undervalued and dismissed too quickly in recent 
philosophy. Moreover, my discussion of modularity in 
Chapter 5 demonstrates that the veil-of-perception issue 
may be relocated from its traditional position of that 
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between self and world with equal force. 
Secondly, I believe that one of my major contributions to 
the current debate within the philosophy of mind has been 
to render the implicit bootstrapping strategies of the 
theories discussed. in section B explicit. So far as I 
know, this has not previously been attempted, with the 
consequence that the true relationships between the 
hypotheses and the evidence used to support them have been 
mistakenly treated as scientific, rather than metaphysical, 
even by the theorists themselves. 
Moreover, my extension (2.5.2) of Nordby's arguments 
concerning the difficulties of bootstrapping in the absence 
of an overall theory about how to evaluate evidence has 
been shown in practice to apply, as I suggested in Chapter 
2, to the co-evolutionary theories of mind. These theories 
exhibit particular difficulties in evaluating evidence from 
a variety of disciplines. Moreover, as I showed in my 
discussions of Marr and Churchland in Chapter 6, these 
problems are faced irrespective of the degree of emphasis 
given to neuroscientific data. 
Of course, many of my conclusions have been at the level of 
detailed criticisms of the theories discussed in Section B, 
and it would not be appropriate for me to repeat them all 
here. However, I have succeeded in showing that the claim 
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made by the co-evolutionary theorists that they have 
provided a more satisfactory account of the mind/brain, and 
how it should be studied cannot be upheld. By making their 
bootstrap strategies explicit and demonstrating that, In 
every case, it is possible to isolate the semantically 
inconsistent tetrad of metaphysical realism, I have been 
able to show that the mere use of the bootstrap strategy is 
not in itself an adequate guard against the dangers of 
incorporating systematically untestable hypotheses within 
a theory. The bootstrap strategy has failed to screen out 
such metaphysical assumptions. 
There is therefore no real difference in kind between the 
problems isolated with the more traditional theories of 
mind (such as McGinn's account of consciousness, Fodor's 
Representational Theory of Mind and Churchland's co-
evolutionary theories), but merely a difference of degree. 
Indeed, I argued in Chapters 4 and 6 that there is a strong 
dichotomy between Churchland' s attitude to the need for 
testable evidence within Fodor's Representational Theory of 
Mind (see Chapter 4 subsections 4.4.2 and 4.4.3) and her 
failure to observe these constraints upon her own theory as 
noted in Chapter 6 (subsections 6.2 - 6.2.5). 
Although there IS more use of empirical evidence in the 
more modern, co-evolutionary theories, this has not 
resulted in an increase in testability of the constituent 
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hypotheses within their bootstrap arguments. Recall that 
my discussion of modulari ty demonstrates a strong 
possibility of empirical underdetermination between the 
views of Fodor and Gardner (which Gardner systematically 
ignores). This indicates that the difficulties noted by 
Nordby of how evidence should be assessed are particularly 
relevant here. Moreover, my discussion of Churchland in 
Chapter 6 indicates that her evidence too, frequently lends 
unique support to her hypotheses only if the basic 
principles of eliminative materialism have already been 
accepted. Churchland relies upon metaphysical assumptions 
to render her empirical evidence relevant. 
I therefore conclude that the factor of motivation plays an 
important role in determining the actual tests that 
theories undergo. The lack of a guiding theory controlling 
the use of evidence noted by Nordby makes it particularly 
easy for theorists to accord greater weight to their 
preferred views, but the tendency to provide only lax tests 
for their favoured arguments was also noted in the 
traditional theories of Fodor and McGinn in Chapters 3 and 
4. 
7.4 Future Work 
The bootstrap scheme seems sufficiently adaptive to 
illuminate the difficulties involved in producing adherent, 
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testable theories of the mind/brain without lapsing into 
metaphysics. It follows that the near fatal flaws that I 
have isolated within the theories discussed in section B 
could have been avoided, had their authors rendered their 
bootstrap strategies explicit as I have just done. 
Adoption of this method may yet succeed in producing better 
tested theories of the mind/brain, as it goes some way 
towards redressing the ineliminable bias caused by 
motivational factors. I contend that my contribution to 
this debate has been, as a philosopher, to illuminate the 
nature and place of the current def iciencies wi thin a 
system of evidential reasoning and to suggest a possible 
solution. It is, of course, a decision for the mind/brain 
theorists themselves, whether they wish to follow, or 
whether they prefer to leave the assumptions upon which 
their theories are based behind a metaphysical veil. 
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